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Abstract 
In sub-Saharan African countries that have made democratic transition from military 
rule and military-backed authoritarian regimes, state elites have embarked upon 
strategies aimed at demilitarising the new democratic political process. Demilitarisation 
of the state and politics has become an imperative because it is decisive for 
consolidating democratic politics and for ensuring improvements in public safety and 
security. Yet the process of such demilitarisation in these countries has often generated 
a paradox, whereby the reduction of the political influence of state institutions of 
violence has been associated with rising civil militarism and the prevalence of organised 
violence in the wider society. 
In these circumstances, taking cognisance of the dangers of civil militarism and other 
forms of private violence is a priority for designing and implementing demilitarisation 
strategies and other security reforms in post-authoritarian African states. Reform- 
minded political elites and external supporters need to be sensitive to these dangers or 
risk perpetuating the shell of electoral democracy that cannot deliver the goal of human 
security in the region. This dissertation explored how the current approach to 
demilitarisation is related to the problem of civil militarism by examining the case 
studies of Nigeria and South Africa. It explains that given the condition of the state in 
Africa, demilitarisation of politics after transition from military or military-backed 
authoritarianism contributes to the emergence of civil militarism. Based on this finding, 
it argues for a comprehensive approach to demilitarisation as a strategy that caters to 
both state and societal violence in order to mitigate the risks of civil militarism in the 
process. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Background to the Study 
This dissertation is an exploratory investigation into the relationship between the 
demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism in post-authoritarian African states. The 
study seeks to determine the extent to which and how civil militarism is exacerbated by 
demilitarisation of politics in post-authoritarian regimes, using the cases of Nigeria and 
South Africa. It is hoped that the results of the study can be used to inform future 
approaches to demilitarisation as part of democratisation, conflict prevention and 
security reform strategies in the region. 
This inquiry is driven by the central paradox associated with the renewed search for 
democracy and security in sub-Saharan Africa since the end of the Cold War. 
Following the macro-economic dislocations and the attendant social crisis experienced 
in most parts of the region during the `lost decade' of the 1980s, mass-based domestic 
demands for political freedom and popular participation coincided with an awakened 
international pressure for political liberalisation as precondition for desperately needed 
neo-liberal economic reforms in Africa by the turn of the 1990s. Thus since the 
unprecedented Sovereign National Conference of 1991 in Benin, the global wave of 
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democratisation has finally begun to sweep through the region that has now seen the 
end of about three decades of authoritarian rule since the end of colonialism and the 
transition in nearly all the states to, at least, electoral democracy. This quest for 
democracy in sub-Saharan Africa has however been associated with greater insecurity. 
More specifically, the end of authoritarian repression and the transition to democratic 
politics has coincided with the unleashing of deadly internal conflicts and violence 
across the region, and this is where the paradox lies. This is a paradox because the 
international promotion of democracy has largely been driven by the search for global 
security. This is based on the assumption that the promotion of democracy from the 
West to the rest of the world would also promote peace globally, as underpinned by the 
democratic peace theory. ' In Africa, this assumption has been a major driving force 
behind the strategic shift in the official foreign policy of Western powers since the early 
1990s towards pressure and support for democratisation? 
Admittedly, this paradox is not limited to Africa, but was to be found in the former 
Soviet Union and elsewhere since after 1990.3 However, the sheer magnitude of 
violence in Africa's post-Cold War conflicts as demonstrated in the extreme cases of the 
conflict in Somalia (which has consumed the state itself since 1991), the 1994 genocide 
in Rwanda, the war crimes in the conflict in Sierra Leone, and the on-going 
humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan, means that the paradox of 
democratisation and insecurity is most intense in the region. A crucial area where this 
paradox is most noticeable is the process of demilitarisation of politics, particularly in 
situations where the military had been extensively entrenched in governance before the 
transition to democracy. While the reduction of many of the professional and political 
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prerogatives of the military is essential for consolidating Africa's new democracies and 
for prevent them from political predation or even surveillance by the military and 
security forces, the implementation of such agendas have been accompanied with 
militarism in society or civil militarism indicated by the aggravation of privatised 
violence. 
In such circumstances, promoting democratic consolidation without taking cognisance 
of the associated risks of violence would be too costly for human security. Yet holding 
back demilitarisation would be equally dangerous for human security because, as has 
been aptly noted, demilitarisation is decisive not only for democratic consolidation but 
also for conflict prevention and peace-building .5 Furthermore, there 
is no existing 
absolute international or regional strategy with a set of guidelines for demilitarisation 
that could provide guidance for such processes in Africa's new democracies. Rather, 
elements of demilitarisation have been implemented as part of programmes of Security 
Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Defence 
Reviews, and more recently, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). This 
approach concentrates on the demilitarisation of politics and neglects the 
demilitarisation of the wider society, and given the non-existence of clear guidance on 
demilitarisation, such approach constitutes a hybrid effort at best and a lacking strategy 
at worst. 
Given this dilemma, understanding the conditions that permit successful 
demilitarisation without generating or aggravating the risk of civil militarism is the first 
requirement for designing a robust and comprehensive strategy that supports the 
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consolidation of sustainable peace and democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. This study 
therefore deals with the phenomenon of civil militarism as a threat to public security in 
the context of the demilitarisation, and explores why demilitarisation of politics in post- 
authoritarian African states is often associated with civil militarism. This dissertation 
represents the complete report of the study, which is organised into seven chapters 
discussed below. 
Organisation of the Research Report 
Chapter 1 forms the introduction to the study. It establishes the background to the 
research and brings into focus the global security and development context within 
which the predicament of public security in sub-Saharan Africa is conceptualised. Most 
importantly, it elaborates on the central problem of the relationship between 
demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism. 
Chapter 2 lays out the methodological framework of the study. It describes the various 
methods used in each phase of the research and offers the justification for the choice of 
those methods. This chapter also describes the limitations encountered over the course 
of the study, and the limits, which were deliberately imposed on the study by the 
researcher. 
The review of literature, which sets out the theoretical focus of the research, is covered 
in Chapter 3. Two main bodies of literature were examined in this chapter and they 
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include those on civil military relations and internal armed conflict. Specific issues 
considered are military-society relations, societal militarism, and demilitarisation. 
Other issues discussed include the privatisation of violence, the new violence, and how 
civil militias emerge under those conditions. 
Chapters 4 and 5 provide the analysis of data from the fieldwork supporting the two 
case studies. Both chapters address the main research questions in the case of Nigeria 
and South Africa, respectively. Together they form the first stage of the main analysis, 
which explores the relationship between demilitarisation and civil militarism within 
each case. Chapter 6 is the second stage and represents analysis across the two cases. 
This chapter compares the findings from each case analysis and relies on common 
patterns and trends to generate higher order explanations. 
Chapter 7 is the conclusion of this dissertation. The chapter begins with the summary 
of the report, in which key findings of the research are presented. At the end of the 
chapter a set of recommendations are offered to support policy development and further 
research. 
Public Security and the State in the Global Context 
Physical security is one of the most crucial public goods in short supply in post-colonial 
Africa. Until the wave of democratic transition in the dawn of the 1990s, the 
militarisation of politics in most states of the region undermined the delivery of this 
critical service to citizens by central governments. As the emerging national elites 
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assumed the political leadership of the post-colonial state, it became apparent that a 
major concern of state policy across the continent was the consolidation of national 
sovereignty and, by extension, national security. Within the domestic environment, 
however, the legitimacy of these new states began to decline as the quality of 
governance deteriorated and as the failure of development generated a deep crisis of 
authority. This contributed immensely to the rise of popular political demands that 
made the hold of the political elites on power increasingly tenuous. National security, 
modified through the urgency of regime survival, thus became the main driver of state 
domestic policy. 
Yet, public security (the state's responsibility to protect citizens from physical violence 
or the threat of it) was not only neglected but also continued to deteriorate. National 
security was narrowed to meeting the exigency of securing the sitting regime from 
internal political `enemies' and democratic pressures from those who demanded 
political accountability from state elites for dashing the hopes of post-colonial 
development. The central aspect of this exigency was the use of the monopoly of 
coercion by state security agencies traditionally tasked with external security 
requirements against their own citizens. The unwieldy employment of the monopoly of 
military force internally also undermined state agencies tasked with the preservation of 
internal order, and consequently public security. Thus the centrality of regime security 
as the guiding principle of state policy in an increasingly restive polity not only 
relegated pubic security in the conception of national security, but more importantly 
worked against its objectives. 
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In the context of authoritarian rule, which became the trend in the region within the first 
few years of independence, state elites fell back on state security forces to bolster social 
control through the suppression and neutralisation of political pressure. Consequently, 
the role, influence and power of the military and security forces in state policy and the 
political process became a preponderant feature of governance in the majority of 
African states. In many countries the security forces, particularly the military, exercised 
this political dominance indirectly from behind the facade of civilian rule. In many 
other extreme cases, the military directly took over the reins of power and became the 
decisive political force. Apartheid South Africa until the transition to democracy in 
1994 and Nigeria before the end of military rule in 1999, respectively represent these 
models of military intervention in domestic politics. In both cases, the authoritarian 
political order fed on the militarisation of politics, which produced a state that became 
the major source of insecurity to citizens until the dawn of democratic transition in the 
1990s. 
However, despite the enthusiasm generated by the wave of political transition in both 
countries, in terms of the enhancement of public security in the context of 
improvements in the wider quality of governance, popular expectations remained 
largely unmet. While the process of democratisation itself, particularly its 
consolidation, required the demilitarisation of politics in order to dismantle state 
violence, this strategy did not produce commensurate transition from insecurity to a 
state of greater security for citizens. Rather, as the cases of South Africa and Nigeria 
reveal, the post-transition strategies of demilitarisation themselves have been closely 
accompanied by prolonged public insecurity, and a precipitous worsening of the 
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conditions of insecurity, in some cases, from other sources within the wider society. 
One of the most important of those other sources is the privatisation of violence in the 
form of civil security forces, or militias, which appear to have only replaced the role of 
the authoritarian-era state security forces within the civil society. The emergence and 
proliferation of informal security forces after the demilitarisation of politics, reveals a 
militarisation of civil society or a condition of civil militarism. 
To set the context within which public security in contemporary Africa is to be 
understood, it is necessary to examine the global changing role of the state with regards 
to its responsibilities in the social contract with citizens. It is perhaps too early to 
conclude with certainty that the full experience of the `coming anarchy' prophesied less 
than a decade ago by Robert Kaplan may never materialise, but the post-Cold War era 
does provide convincingly sufficient evidence for societies all over the world to nurse 
an increasing sense of foreboding over personal security. 6 This is in spite of the 
(unrealistic) optimism and dreams of a new peace and greater security in the new world 
order following from the cessation of superpower confrontation from the end of the 
1980s. This optimism was quick to announce the end to the costly preoccupation of 
states with national security concerns as the spectre of the nuclear threat was replaced 
by the hope for greater international cooperation and the triumph of neo-liberalism. 8 
This search for a more secure order has been one of the most crucial concerns of nation- 
states since Westphalia, which conferred on the state the obligation of securing and 
developing national territories and populations .9 The logic of external state sovereignty 
demands that states, with their divergent and often conflicting interests, take into their 
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own hands the responsibility of maintaining their respective survival in the absence of 
an external guarantor. The defence of national population and territory against external 
enemies by the state in turn narrowed the conception of security in terms of `national 
defence'. This practice came to be fully endorsed during World War II, given the total 
nature of social and industrial mobilisation by the opposing coalitions of forces. '° 
Security, thus, came to be defined in hard military and state territorial terms, giving rise 
to the national security doctrine, by which states sought to enhance their national 
security over one another. National security became the dominant paradigm in 
orthodox or traditional security thinking within the academic field of International 
Relations, which saw the sovereign territorial state as the central referent and unit of 
security rooted in political and military understandings of the realist school, and 
underpinned by the sub-field of Strategic Studies throughout the Cold War period. " 
The preoccupation of Cold War security studies with the nation-state as its fundamental 
referent arose from the dominance of the realist school of International Relations which 
assumes that the international system is an anarchic collection of rational state actors, 
and saw its concern as solving what John Hertz (and others later) label as the `national 
security dilemma'. 12 However focusing on the national security dilemma, it has been 
argued, rendered Cold War security studies grossly inadequate. One of the reasons 
offered for this objection is that its basic assumptions of internal social cohesion, regime 
legitimacy, the state's capacity to provide security, and definition of threats as 
exclusively external, ran contrary to the real experiences of developing countries. 13 
Furthermore, national security focused rather narrowly on the theory of deterrence and 
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the politico-military relations among the US, Western Europe and the former Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), while neglecting other non-military but relevant 
elements of security. 14 This is notwithstanding the obvious fact that most of the post- 
1945 violent conflicts took place in the developing parts of the world. 
The traditional notion of national security came under more fierce attacks as economic, 
social and environmental agendas and their bearing on security gained ascendancy in 
International Relations from the 1970s and 1980s. 15 This challenge gave rise to 
sustained calls from both the policy and academic communities to broaden the scope of 
security studies. 16 These calls later developed into the critical security discourse, which 
sought to accommodate, among other things, the security concerns of Third World 
countries frozen by the East-West power relations of the Cold War. " One major strand 
of the critical tradition is the notion of human security expounded by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) since 1994.18 
Human security places human beings rather than states at the centre of security, and 
defines the security of individuals and groups in terms of safety and well-being, 19 that is 
protection from fear and want mostly threatened directly, not by an anarchic 
international system, but by armed elements within states, including the state itself. 20 
Rather than usher in an era of global peace and security, the end of the Cold War and 
aspects of globalisation, however, exposed the declining capacity of the state to fulfil 
the ends of human security. 21 This loss of capacity has only been symptomatic of a 
more general and well-published syndrome - the retreat of the state - which can be seen 
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in the two key traditional roles of the state: the provision of development and the 
provision of security. 
The state has historically assumed the role of the provider of social and economic 
welfare, as a crucial element of its raison d'etre. Started by Otto Von Bismarck of 
Germany through the `Revolution from above' of the 1880s22, and reinforced by the 
1917 Communist Revolution in Russia as well as the Great Depression of the inter-war 
years, the endorsement of the welfare state in Europe and North America was finally 
sealed by the necessity to respond to the social and economic dislocations of World War 
11.23 More than social welfare, the end of World War II also marked the beginning of 
the developmental state by which the state became the major driver for improving the 
well-being of citizens and economic growth of society, including the less developed 
countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America where governments sought to catch up with 
the developed world through state-led modernisation and industrialisation 24 
Secondly, the role of the state as the main guardian of the security of citizens, especially 
from external threats, was assumed as inherent in the notion of territorial sovereignty. 
The universal acceptance of this role received the greatest inspiration from the works of 
modem political theorists who regarded security as a public good? S The most 
influential proponent of this theory was Max Weber, who argued that the monopoly 
over the instruments of legitimate violence is one of the defining characteristics of 
statehood. 26 Yet, the growing inability of the state to fulfil these dual functions had 
become evident even before the Cold War was declared over. 
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The global economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s made the cost of the welfare state 
unacceptable in the West and generated a macro-economic crisis in the Third World 27 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist economy in Central and Eastern 
Europe ended the last bastion of the state as the provider of development, giving way to 
the triumph of neo-liberalism in the post-Cold War economic order. In the field of 
security, the ability of the state to maintain its monopoly of legitimate violence began to 
face bold challenges. Actors other than the state have emerged on the scene to share in 
the use of organised violence forcing the state to falter in its responsibility to protect the 
lives and properties of its citizens. 
In the West, the growing threat of global terrorism renders the nuclear and most 
conventional arsenals of the state useless in securing its citizens. 28 In the former USSR 
and the rest of the developing world, the state has been faced with much worse security 
challenges of internal disorder. The collapse of the Soviet state and the sequence of 
civil wars, secessionist violence and identity conflicts, involving the use of private 
military forces, have become one of the salient marks of the post-Communist security 
reality. In Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East, the loss of the monopoly 
of legitimate violence is most evidenced in the unchecked proliferation of state failure, 
civil war, Islamic fundamentalism, ethnic conflicts, illegal drug trafficking, warlords, 
trans-border violent crime, gang violence, privatisation of security, and a range of other 
symptoms. 9 Most of these forces, which had already been brewing, were unleashed 
with the sudden abdication of superpower strategic and ideological commitments to 
maintain regimes that lacked a broad base of domestic legitimacy. 
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This global strategic change also coincided with a drastic global reduction of the 
political influence of the military and security agencies of the state (demilitarisation of 
the state) as part of the adaptations of the new world (dis)order and the broader agenda 
of democratisation in post-authoritarian states. Demilitarisation in transition states was 
seen as a prerequisite for democratic consolidation, since it is the military and security 
forces of the state that had mostly, directly or indirectly, dominated the political space 
to keep undemocratic regimes in power. 30 Demilitarisation in these regions has thus 
required the altering of civil-military relations to create a political context in which the 
military could become democratically accountable to society through elected 
representatives in government. This in itself can be seen as a global momentum that has 
generated an emerging global agenda for SSR, which focuses on the reform of the 
military and security agencies of the state as well as those institutions responsible for 
their governance. 31 It also focuses on policies, normative values, the political and legal 
framework necessary for the governance and management of the state security 
structures and institutions responsible for governing them. 
However, within this context of post-authoritarian transition demilitarisation needs to be 
taken beyond the realm of the state and to transcend democratic governance of the 
military, if the provision of security is the objective. This is because the process of 
democratisation itself has created the conditions for the introduction of new 
complexities in the civil-military equation in these regions. In Africa and Latin 
America in particular, the rise of new forms of conflict and violence in society, where 
informal armed formations have become critical security actors. This gradual 
informalisation of security has become a hallmark of the post-authoritarian era, and a 
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manifestation which have implications for demilitarisation. Informal armed groups in 
these contexts include ethnic or regional militias, vigilantes, warlords, street gangs and 
similar groups that are not publicly accountable, but perform parallel military and 
security functions in conflict-prone environments - environments that could be 
characterised as those of violent peace rather than reflecting `normal' conflict. 
Apart from eroding the state's hegemony of force, these informal forces are themselves 
a security problem due to their ungovernability, and contribute to militarism in the 
wider society. This is where the limits of formal demilitarisation of the state become 
obvious, and where the need to take demilitarisation beyond the state into the society 
becomes urgent. This is a process, which has been described as involving the erosion of 
the ideology of militarism which views violence as a legitimate solution to social 
conflict and as an effective means of obtaining and defending power. 32 This imperative 
of demilitarising the society has become particularly urgent in the course of democratic 
transition in Africa, where physical security has become a pre-eminent concern of 
citizens as the state's capacity to provide the fundamental conditions for the protection 
of life has weakened considerably. 
This research seeks to assess the impacts and explore the limits of existing patterns of 
demilitarisation processes carried out by democratic governments in Africa with respect 
to the physical security of citizens, using experiences in Nigeria and South Africa. The 
study is limited to situations of relative peace, where armed violence is more sporadic 
than conventional (civil) war, armed rebellion or insurgency. Within this context, the 
study specifically examines the relationship between state demilitarisation and the role 
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of non-state actors in the provision of violence and public security. It also explores the 
possibilities of extending the process of demilitarisation to armed groups within the 
wider society outside of the state. This study deals specifically with non-state armed 
groups that take the form of militias, and in this regard, terrorists, guerrillas and 
insurgents are excluded, as they are usually engaged in open ongoing conflict. 
The Research Problem 
What has been described as the third wave democratisation" witnessed the process of 
decline in the power and influence of the military and security forces of many African 
countries in governance. From the late 1980s radical changes in both the international 
and domestic environments had begun to shake the foundations of authoritarian 
regimes, which had held sway for decades after decolonisation, and precipitated their 
collapse in the wake of the 1990s. From military rule in West Africa, through intolerant 
single-party politics in East and Southern Africa to racial oligarchy in South Africa34, 
the coercive force of the military was employed to underwrite and sustain 
authoritarianism while it lasted. 35 During this period, African states and politics came 
to be highly militarised36 through direct intervention in politics by the armed forces, 
resulting in socio-political instabilities; partisan use of the military and security forces 
by civilian dictators rooted in one-party; ethnic or racist constituencies; or the 
systematic embeddedness of a militaristic culture in resolving conflicts in the wider 
society. 
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Post-independence civil-military relations in Africa were thus characterised by the 
preponderance of the armed forces in politics and society. This arrangement embodied 
a state, which unleashed terror and violence on political dissent, culminating in the 
eventual diffusion of intimidation and coercion amongst the wider population by the 
state security agencies. 37 Thus authoritarian civil-military relations38 was characterised 
by state violence through the instrumentality of the military, either as tools of civilian 
dictators or as direct political leaders. However, the eventual disengagement of the 
military from active involvement in domestic politics and the decline of its political 
influence clearly indicated that the hold on authoritarianism was no longer tenable. This 
recession of authoritarianism and the consequent transition to democracy in sub- 
Saharan African countries, sparked off since the dawn of the 1990s, opened a window 
of opportunity for rapid improvement of human security by permitting the evolution of 
a supportive political and constitutional climate. 
Within the wider project of democratic development, some of the new democratic (or 
post-election) governments in the region, most notably South Africa, Nigeria and 
Ghana, have made attempts to demilitarise39 the political process through the 
establishment of civil control over their armed forces and to balance civil-military 
relations in favour of civilian supremacy 40 The project of demilitarisation in these 
countries therefore has witnessed attempts to reduce or contain the political power and 
influence of the official military in governance and in the society. These efforts have 
taken the forms of depoliticisation of the military, strengthening of democratic 
parliamentary control of the armed forces, reprofessionalisation of the military, 
improvement in civil oversight of the security sector, integration of military factions 
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into single national armed forces, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex- 
combatants (DDR) after a conflict situation, and other similar forms of institutional 
reform within the broader agenda of SSR and parallel programmes. To various degrees, 
defence and security policies were reviewed, institutions restructured or constructed, 
and security practices changed. The assumption behind these initiatives is that stable, 
unified and effectively governed armed forces are necessary to put transitional countries 
(including those in Africa) back on the path of stability, security, economic growth and 
sustainable development. 1 These initiatives are thus necessary to create the enabling 
environment for improved security following democratic transition from the era of state 
coercion and the consequent political crises. 
However, these initiatives have proved to be necessary, but not sufficient in themselves 
to guarantee public safety and security. The measures have, to some extent, helped in 
curtailing the political excesses of the military through accountability and control 
mechanisms. It is however arguable to state that, with some exceptions, populations in 
many African countries no longer fear the spectre of military coups now considered 
anachronistic, thanks to the post-Cold War strategic environment. 2 Rather, a more 
critical threat to the security of citizens in contemporary African countries comes from 
the phenomenal growth of armed violence precipitated by the activities of emerging 
non-state militant actors that challenge the position of the state as the sole security actor 
even in peacetime. 
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The radical surge of militias and their complicity in armed communal violence in post- 
military Nigeria; insurgent groups with free access to small arms in nearly the whole of 
West Africa; dubious and unaccountable vigilante groups as well as party militias in 
post-Apartheid South Africa; and similar scenarios in both post-conflict and conflict- 
prone new African democracies, outpacing the capacity of the police and security 
forces, are new dimensions that have come to replace the authoritarian-era forms of 
militarism in the region. 3 Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily aptly captured this 
scenario when they argue that, the earlier problem of whether governments could 
maintain control over their military forces is being displaced by the question of whether 
the African state could maintain its monopoly over the instruments of violence. With 
the end of authoritarianism, state militarism is being reproduced in the emergence and 
growth of several actors outside the state whose agendas have seriously undermined not 
only the state's monopoly of violence, but also the physical security of citizens in many 
Africa countries. 
The timing of their emergence is also of critical importance. It is at this crucial juncture 
when the political process is being demilitarised within the broader project of 
democratisation, when state violence is being controlled and when the involvement of 
military and security forces in social control is being rolled back that civil militias have 
emerged. Their emergence therefore not only contests the state's monopoly of violence, 
but also indicates the reproduction of state militarism in civil society through the years 
of militarised politics. Worse still, the timing indicates that demilitarisation does not 
only fail to take account of civil militarism but rather appears to be associated with it. 
As the strategies of demilitarisation were implemented, civil militias began to emerge as 
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prevalent features of the transition period. This association, in turn, suggests the 
existence of some form of relationship between demilitarisation and civil militarism. 
Conceptual Framework 
As shall be observed in the literature considered in the next chapter, at least 5 possible 
hypotheses can be generated that seek to explain the privatisation of violence and the 
emergence of civil militias in post-authoritarian African states, which are listed as 
follows: 
1. Civil militias emerged because of socially embedded legacies of authoritarian 
violence, which remained even after the transition to democracy; 
2. Democratisation opens up the space for uncivil society which mobilises and 
employs violence; 
3. Civil militias represent a development of new and powerful incentive systems 
for violence linked to conflict or crime; 
4. The privatisation of violence is an exit strategy for the poor; and 
5. Demilitarisation increases the risk of public insecurity and creates the conditions 
for civil militarism 
This array of hypotheses shows that there are multiple factors that can directly generate 
civil militarism or can indirectly act upon other factors to support the emergence or 
growth of civil militarism. The main conceptual factors of democratisation, the legacies 
of militarism, conflict, crime, poverty and demilitarisation, together with the presumed 
19 
relation they have with the rise of post-authoritarian civil militarism form the 
conceptual framework for this study. As with most studies, a graphic display is useful 
for making this conceptual framework clear and this is presented in Figure 1 below. 45 
Yet, this research is concerned with the effects of demilitarisation on civil militarism, 
and the working hypothesis at the beginning of the study is that; in the context of post- 
authoritarian transition, demilitarisation of politics can cause the generation of civil 
militarism. 
In order to test this hypothesis, all the 5 hypotheses above were explored in the course 
of the research. This was done in order to explore rival explanations and to identify 
intervening factors that might influence the effects of demilitarisation on civil 
militarism. In Figure 1 below, the bold arrow shows that democratic transition certainly 
drove the need for the demilitarisation of the political process. But demilitarisation is 
undertaken in order to consolidate the democratisation process and the two processes 
are mutually reinforcing, hence the two-way arrow between them. This arrow is bold 
because the relationship between the two concepts is already known and does not form 
part of the research question. While democratisation and demilitarisation were 
identified as possible causes of civil militarism, the other factors could also have acted 
as independent factors or factors acting upon democratisation and demilitarisation, and 
these are represented by the broken arrows. These arrows therefore depict the 
hypotheses above, and form the main questions explored in the study. Due to the 
exploratory nature of the study, the research was conducted inductively while the 
findings are provided in the concluding chapter. 
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This research aims at understanding and explaining the extent and nature of the 
relationship between the demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism in sub-Saharan 
Africa. It adopts a comparative approach and examines post-authoritarian 
demilitarisation and the evolution of civil militarism in Nigeria and South Africa as case 
studies. Supporting the overall aim of the research, the following enabling objectives 
are outlined: 
> To understand the conditions under which the two phenomena occur in both 
countries; 
> To determine the extent and nature of change in civil militarism in relation to the 
demilitarisation of politics; and 
> To discover the extent to which this relative change is mediated by other factors 
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This study is both timely and relevant as it seeks to extend the existing understanding of 
governance in the security sector by embracing the phenomena of privatised and non- 
state violence. Very little is known about the place of informal security forces in SSR 
analysis and policy, even though the privatisation of violence has become a most 
intractable menace in contemporary Africa south of the Sahara. Apart from the 
governance of privatised violence, this study also looks at the way in which efforts to 
govern security often exacerbate insecurity. By attempting to explore the link between 
the implementation of policy reforms in the security sector and the privatisation of 
violence, this study attempts to investigate an area that is not yet well understood. 
Equally important, the comparative approach adopted for this study makes it possible to 
understand the contextual conditions in sub-Saharan Africa which impact on policy 
reforms in the security sector, and which influence the outcomes of such policy reforms. 
The reasons for the comparative approach and the selection of the cases of Nigeria and 
South Africa in particular are specified in the next chapter, which deals with the overall 
methodology of the research. 
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Chapter 2 
Research Methodology 
This chapter sets out the overall methodological framework used for the study. It 
outlines the strategy, the design, the analytical tools, conceptual framework employed 
for the study, the schedule of specific activities, the boundaries of the study, and the 
limitations encountered in course of the research. 
Research Strategy 
The Comparative Case Study Approach 
In the examination of civil militarism and demilitarisation in the course of post- 
authoritarian transition, this research employs the comparative case study approach, 
using the two country cases of Nigeria and South Africa. The social behaviours studied 
are contemporary and lie outside the immediate control of the study. These factors 
make the manipulation of the key variables and control of extraneous variables through 
experimentation or quasi-experimentation impossible. Under such circumstances, the 
case study is the most appropriate approach for this research. Furthermore, the use of 
comparison across the cases makes it possible to control for the effect of variables and 
thus enhances the validity of the research findings. This is because this approach is an 
empirical investigation of social realities in their real-life contexts, where contextual 
conditions are highly significant for the phenomena under study. 6 For these reasons, 
other strategies such as survey, narrative history and archival analysis are not deemed 
appropriate for this research and therefore not employed. 
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However, in the course of the study, historical materials on the cases selected were 
examined in order to understand the historical context within which the key variables 
are studied. The examination of the historical context is also considered to be important 
because of its potential implications for the phenomena under study. The importance of 
context is highlighted here because this study assumes that demilitarisation and civil 
militarism are closely linked to their context, which is crucial to the overall analysis. 
Most importantly, case studies have the advantage of providing a full range of sources 
of evidence, including direct observation, `grey literature', documentary evidence and 
interviews. This enhances the scope of triangulation of evidence and control of the key 
variables, both of which are crucially necessary for enriching the validity of the findings 
of this research. Furthermore, the choice of two cases is based on the need to undertake 
comparison so as to enhance the validity of conclusions drawn from the study. The use 
of two cases allows for assessment of the effects of change in the independent variable 
(demilitarisation), upon the dependent variable (civil militarism). A multiple case 
approach could have been used for the same purpose. However, the research is 
constrained in terms of the time and resources available, as well as the number of 
researchers involved in the study. The two-case approach is thus a less ambitious and 
more realistic tool for achieving the goal of the study. 
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Framework of Strategy 
Figure 2 below illustrates a concise framework for the comparative case study strategy 
used in this research. The arrows represent the progression of the study, while the 
broken lines represent the feedback chain. The feedback link is important because 
initial findings during the course of data gathering from the field made reappraisal and 
adjustment of the original research design and proposition inevitable. 
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Research Design 
Research Objectives 
As stated in Chapter 1, this study is essentially an exploratory investigation of the 
relationship between the demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism in post- 
authoritarian Africa. The main objectives of the investigation are: 
¢ To understand the extent and nature of the relationship between the two 
phenomena, and 
> To explain this relationship; if any exists between the two phenomena 
Enabling objectives of this research are: 
> To understand the conditions under which the two phenomena occur in both 
countries; 
> To determine the extent and nature of change in civil militarism in relation to the 
demilitarisation of politics; and 
> To discover the extent to which this relative change is mediated by other factors. 
Units of Analysis 
The units of analysis for this research are the demilitarisation of politics and civil 
militarism. It is these variables and the presumed relationship between them that form 
the focus of the study. The research takes the demilitarisation of politics as the 
independent variable and civil militarism as the dependent variable and looks at the 
effect of the former on the latter. However, these units are conceptual constructs and 
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they are operationally defined and translated into empirical variables in the following 
section to allow for observation and measurement. 
Conceptual Definitions 
This section defines the major conceptual blocks of analysis for this study - 
militarisation, demilitarisation of politics, civil militias and civil militarism - in the way 
in which they are meant and used throughout the research project. This definition is 
aimed at translating the concepts into variables that are empirically measurable for 
analysis. What follows is a brief survey of the literature where these concepts have 
been mostly used and their various connotations therein. 
Militarisation 
Demilitarisation is the reversal of militarisation and clarifying the meaning of the latter 
is essential to understanding the former. Various definitions have emphasised different 
dimensions to militarisation, and this itself illustrates the fact that it is a contested 
concept 48 One definition considers the concept as a steady growth in the military 
potential of states, and an accompanying increase in the role of military institutions both 
in national and international affairs. 9 This definition is useful in bringing out the 
domestic and international perspectives to the concept. Another definition sees 
militarisation as a social process of military build up. This process involves the 
mobilisation of resources for war at all levels, including the political, the economic the 
social50 This definition is important because while it overlooks the 
domestic/international dichotomy, it emphasises the forms that militarisation takes, 
including the militarisation of politics, the economy or society. 
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Two types of militarisation have been identified as, first, a process that contributes to 
militarism. This process includes excessive use of violence and increased importance 
attached to militaristic ideologies, values and beliefs about human relationships. The 
second type involves increases in military spending, in the size of armed forces, in arms 
imports and production, and in the military's political role. 51 This definition suggests 
the linkage between militarisation and the concept of militarism, which is discussed 
below. Moreover it suggests some important indicators for assessing militarisation, 
including ideological and material indicators. In addition to this list of indicators other 
elements have been identified as being an increased destructive capacity of weapons, 
and the number of people under arms in a given society. More indicators include 
aggressive foreign policy, the preponderance of the military in the state, the 
subservience of the whole society to the needs of the military, and an ideology that 
promotes military ideas. 2 The concept of militarism is discussed in a separate 
subsection below, although it has been associated with militarisation. 
For the purpose of this study, militarisation is used at the domestic level and in terms of 
its political and social dimensions. It is defined as a deliberate process that contributes 
to an increase in the role of military and security establishments in domestic politics and 
in society, including excessive use of violence and increased importance attached to 
militaristic ideologies, values and beliefs in the course of social interaction. Given this 
definition, a militarised society is one that exhibits a capacity for organised violence in 
combination with neglect of the detection, investigation and successful prosecution of 
crime. The key indicators of militarisation used in this study therefore include the 
military's political role, the preponderance of the military in the state, the use of military 
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coercion to resolve conflict in society, paramilitary policing and armament of civil 
groups. 
Demilitarisation 
As the reversal of militarisation, the concept of demilitarisation has been used broadly 
to denote changes associated with reductions in military values in society at various 
levels. This involves sustained reduction in the size and influence of the military sector 
in state and society and the reallocation of military resources to civilian purposes 53 
Thus like militarisation, the concept of demilitarisation is multidimensional and various 
conceptualisations of the term have been suggested in the literature. These include the 
political, the economic and the social, psychological or cultural dimensions. Political 
demilitarisation deals with issues of the interaction between the military and the civil 
authorities, particularly the question of civil control of the military. The economic 
dimension deals with the winding down of defence and related budgets. These two 
approaches correspond to what is termed the demilitarisation of the state, while the 
social/psychological/cultural approaches deal with the demilitarisation of society. 54 In 
this second category, an ideological dimension has been identified as the deconstruction 
of violence as a legitimate means of solving problems SS Thus the concept of 
demilitarisation is applicable to the sphere of the state and the political, as well as to the 
civil society. 
This dual conception of demilitarisation has also been underscored in the report of a 
seminar on Post-Conflict Peace-Building held in London by the Committee for Conflict 
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Transformation Support (CCTS) 56 The report examines different forms of 
demilitarisation needed to achieve security and stability in society. It argues that the 
societal conception of demilitarisation goes beyond changing public institutions to 
changing `values, attitudes and mindsets of ordinary people', particularly attitudes 
towards violence and its causes. 57 In a discussion paper on which the seminar was 
based, this distinction is further clarified. It identifies two levels of demilitarisation, 
namely surface demilitarisation and deep demilitarisation. While the former is 
concerned with disbanding forces, surrendering arms and implementing ceasefire 
agreements, the latter `seeks to address the roots of militarisation and to undo the legacy 
of war and militarisation as part of an effort to reconstruct society on a different basis'. 8 
The former is a top-down approach and corresponds to the state/institutional model 
identified earlier, requiring the reform of state security agencies. On the other hand the 
latter requires a bottom-up process initiated at the community level to reduce the culture 
of organised violence. 
These two conceptualisations have also been characterised as quantitative and 
qualitative demilitarisation. Quantitative demilitarisation deals with the process of 
withdrawing tangible military instruments such as defence expenditure, force level, 
arms procurement and military intervention in politics. The qualitative is the non- 
tangible side which seeks to reverse `militaristic ideologies and values' and de- 
emphasises violence as a means of resolving conflict S9 A comprehensive alternative to 
demilitarisation would therefore attempt to deconstruct the ideological and institutional 
structures of militarism. 0 
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The indicators of demilitarisation suggested in the literature include civilian control, 
demobilisation, disarmament, a decrease of defence spending and armed forces, 
conversion, and an erosion of the ideologies, which support violence. 61 In this study, 
the dimensions of demilitarisation considered are the demilitarisation of politics and the 
demilitarisation of society. Strategies that target the institutions of the state are referred 
to as the demilitarisation of politics and the indicators used are civil control of the 
armed and security forces, reductions in the role of the military in political decision 
making, reductions in internal deployment of security forces, and reductions in 
paramilitary policing. The demilitarisation of society refers to strategies that aim to 
reverse militaristic ideologies and values and de-emphasise violence as a means of 
resolving conflict among social groups. Indicators of this dimension are reduction in 
number and activities of armed groups, and reversal of their attitude towards violence. 
Civil Militarism 
Civil militarism refers to militarism in the civilian society and so it is helpful to first 
define the concept of militarism. Militarism and militarisation are close concepts and 
the distinction between them has been blurred in many cases in the literature. A helpful 
clarification is that while militarisation is a process, militarism is in the realm of 
behaviour and attitude, 62 and a manifestation of militarisation 63 The definition of 
militarism is equally diverse. It has been defined as the pervasiveness in society of 
symbols, values and discourse validating military power and preparation for war; or the 
inclination to rely on military means of coercion for handling conflicts. M A common 
agreement sees militarism as the expansion of the military beyond certain bounds and' 
its encroachment over civilian institutions with a corresponding decline in freedom and 
31 
democracy. 65 Although militarism, according to these definitions is mostly associated 
with the state, the concept of civil militarism has been used to denote the manifestation 
of the same traits in the wider society. 66 There are therefore state militarism and 
societal or civil militarism, and this dual conception is adopted in this study. The main 
indicator in both conceptions is the pervasiveness in the use of organised violence as 
instrument of addressing conflict. 
Civil Militias 
This concept is used to address the problem of categorising the diverse array of militias. 
Militias have been classified into a variety of categories that offer little help in terms of 
their motivations, activities and modes of operation. These definitions see them either 
as ethnic militias, religious militias, armed vigilantes, separatist militias, party militias, 
or civil defence forces. 67 The main problem with such classification is that it does not 
accommodate the flexibility of militias to take on a variety of functions at different 
times. The reality of militia activities, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa is that those 
who appear to be ethnic do also operate as militants for religious, ideological, political 
and traditional vigilante objectives. 
A more useful distinction categorises militias into `first generation' and `second 
generation' conceptualisations. The first category includes groups of citizens who are 
mobilised by the state to provide military service as a reserve army or auxiliary force for 
war. 68 Since they are put together and maintained by the state, these militias are 
regulated and accountable to central authority. The second type is autonomous of the 
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state and sometimes works against the authority of the state. 69 The crucial element of 
these militias is that they operate outside state regulation and are accountable only to 
themselves. Once again, the state-society distinction associated with the concepts 
defined above is present in the definition of militias, and it is this second generation of 
militias that is studied in this research. This distinction and the multipurpose objectives 
of various militias have led to definition of militias operating independently of the state 
as civil militias. 0 For the purpose of the research, civil militias are defined as 
structured and organised informal armed groups that use violence for various purposes 
and which operate outside state control and regulation. 
Research Questions 
This study is guided by three main questions: 
The first question is: What is the relationship between civil militarism and 
demilitarisation of politics in Nigeria and South Africa? Investigating the answer to 
this question requires the research to address the following specific questions: 
¢ In what ways and to what extent were security forces involved in political 
decision making before the transition from authoritarian rule in the two cases? 
¢ To what extent has this political involvement reduced? 
> What are the phases in the evolution of civil militias in both cases? And 
> What is the change in the activities and size of civil militias before and after 
reduction in the involvement of security forces in political decision-making? 
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The second question is: Why have the activities and size of civil militias changed 
immediately after the implementation of demilitarisation in Nigeria and South Africa? 
The enabling questions here are: 
¢ Under what conditions is reduction of the involvement of security forces in 
political decision-making followed by change in the size and activities of civil 
militias in the cases? 
¢ Have these conditions been present before or after the emergence of civil 
militias? 
¢ Do these conditions determine the emergence of civil militias? 
The third question is: How is civil militarism minimised in the process of demilitarising 
politics in the context of post-authoritarian transition? The enabling questions include: 
> What are the policy responses of the state to civil militarism? 
¢ Is there any instance of reduction in civil militarism in the cases studied? 
¢ What is the extent of this reduction? 
¢ What policy decisions were responsible for this reduction? 
> Are there more effective alternative approaches to these policies in addressing 
post-authoritarian public security crisis? 
> To what extent can these policy interventions be applied successfully in similar 
other cases within and outside Africa? 
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Justification for the Case Studies 
The units of analysis used for this study are the two country cases of Nigeria and South 
Africa. The selection of these specific cases is a deliberate choice and based on the fact 
that they both have in common a number of salient characteristics that are relevant for 
comparison. They also have crucial dissimilarities that permit control of variables and 
comparison. 
In term of similarities, a very crucial fact is that both countries share a recent history of 
authoritarianism, in which the military played a central role in governance, and which is 
significant to a study focused on post-authoritarian states. While Nigeria made its 
democratic transition from direct military rule in 1999, South Africa made this 
transition earlier in 1994 from the apartheid political system in which the military was 
equally dominant in policymaking and governance. The political process in both 
countries was therefore highly militarised as a result of the preponderance of the 
military and security forces in governance. 
Secondly, the two countries represent cases where the new democratic governments 
attempted to demilitarise the political process. In both Nigeria and South Africa, 
various efforts were made to reverse or reduce the involvement of the military in 
politics. These efforts include the reform or reconstruction of security policies, 
institutions and practices towards effective democratic control of the security forces. 
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Furthermore, civil militias and non-state organised violence has been a prevalent 
phenomenon in the aftermath of democratic transition and demilitarisation in both 
countries. This is in spite of differences in the extent to which the political process has 
been democratised and demilitarised in both countries. Thus the two key variables of 
the study - civil militarism and the demilitarisation of politics - are present in both 
cases. 
Nigeria and South Africa are not the only countries with experiences of civil militias in 
sub-Saharan Africa. However, in many of the other countries in the region civil militias 
operate in the context of internal armed conflict, such as the Janjaweed in the current 
crisis in Darfur, the Kamajor during the civil war in Sierra Leone, and a host of other 
examples of prolonged armed conflict or immediate post-conflict environments. The 
militias in such contexts are protagonists involved in or associated with clearly 
delineated armed conflicts. In the cases of Nigeria and South Africa, the civil militias 
are not essentially a war-fighting force, but are more concerned with preserving their 
own order in conditions of relative peace. 
Admittedly, the two countries have experienced internal armed conflict in the past, but 
the militias in these countries emerged long after the end of the conflict and do not 
openly pursue agendas that are related to the issues in the historical conflict. The 
political climate under which civil militias in the two cases operate is characterised by 
civil disorder and low level conflict of which crime and spasmodic inter-group violence 
are key characteristics. The militias here appear to emerge as localised responses to this 
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general condition of disorder, as against the conditions of protracted and widespread 
armed conflict. 
Another important similarity is that the two countries are the glaring hegemonic powers 
capable of providing increasing leadership roles in sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of 
development and security. Both of them have displayed leadership capability in 
peacekeeping intervention within their respective sub-regions - Nigeria, through the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and South Africa through 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC)71. This means there is a high 
probability that these countries would transmit their experiences and lessons learned in 
the process of post-authoritarian reform in the security sector to other countries within 
their spheres of influence. This is even more significant with the instrument of the 
African Peer Review Mechanism of the New Partnership (APRM) established in 2003. 
The APRM is a key instrument of the New Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD), through which member states commit themselves to exerting positive 
influences and to collective self-monitoring on a number of vital governance 
indicators. 2 In addition, both countries play a significant role in global politics and 
global institutions, marking them as regional champions for development, and peace- 
building in Africa. 
Furthermore, both Nigeria and South Africa have vast economic resources that could 
catalyse economic growth and human development in Africa if those resources are 
properly harnessed. Even though they have faced obstacles to the full utilisation of 
these potentials, the two countries have been able to mobilise their economic wealth to 
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support development efforts in neighbouring countries. The two countries therefore 
represent potential nodes of sustainable human development in Africa. 
With respect to contrast, a significant element is the fact that these countries have 
emerged from different types of authoritarianism. Given the fact that authoritarianism 
in Africa took diverse forms, it is important to control the probable influence of such 
differences in the analysis. While Nigeria is a post-military democracy, South Africa is 
a post-racist political system emerging from an exclusive or restricted form of 
democracy. In Nigeria, the militarisation of politics and society was total (direct 
military dictatorship), while in South Africa militarisation took a different form as it 
was mediated by a civilian government that was responsible for state policy and 
practice. It is important to acknowledge the difference in the extent of militarisation 
and to measure its effect in relation to civil militarism. 
Another area of very important difference relevant to the selection of the cases is the 
differences in the nature and extent of democratic transition. While the transition in 
South Africa was mass-based and thoroughly negotiated, in Nigeria it was driven 
largely by the retreating military elites and lacked mass mobilisation. Again in South 
Africa the transition was more explicitly focused on redefining the role of the military, 
but in Nigeria it was rather more general in nature, and had no specific focus on the 
military beyond its political disengagement. While the democratic project in Nigeria is 
still fragile and yet to take firm roots, South Africa represents a case of consolidating 
democracy73. The width and depth of demilitarisation has therefore been far greater in 
South Africa than in Nigeria. In the former, the strategy of demilitarisation has been 
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more inclusive, more thorough, broader and highly institutionalised through legislation, 
new policy frameworks and restructuring. In the latter it has tended to narrowly 
concentrate on breaking the political power of the military elites, and has hardly been 
institutionalised. In spite of this crucial difference, however, civil militarism after the 
transition and demilitarisation is pronounced in both cases. Informal armed groups and 
violence prevail in South Africa as much as in Nigeria. These differences are important 
in order to measure the effects of the extent and nature of the association between the 
demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism. 
Finally, after the initial rise and assertiveness of civil militias in both countries, they 
have tended to decline in South Africa while they still remain high Nigeria. This 
difference has important policy implications. It provides a strong justification for 
inquiring into the conditions responsible for the observed reduction and the possibility 
of replication of those conditions where the incidence of civil militarism is high. Given 
the similarities and differences considered above, it is of high analytical value to look at 
Nigeria and South Africa together in the study of demilitarisation and civil militarism. 
Comparison between these countries makes it possible to understand the influence of 
different contextual conditions on the association between demilitarisation and civil 
militarism. 
Level of Analysis 
This research uses the national state as the level of analysis. While the behaviour of 
non-state armed actors is central to the study, the analytical focus is on state policy 
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changes and the way in which the behaviour of the non-state armed groups responds to 
those changes. 
Theoretical Proposition 
The central argument of this study is that, within the context of post-authoritarian 
transition the demilitarisation of politics can promote the generation of civil militarism, 
at least in the short term. The study argues that military-backed authoritarianism 
contributes to the militarisation of the larger society and that this militarisation incites 
greater militia violence as repressive controls are relaxed. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
This research has been conducted in two phases. The first phase commenced with a 
review of the relevant literature in order to achieve a full understanding of what is 
already known about the key questions of the study, and to delineate clearly the gaps 
that need to be addressed. This phase commenced fully in the later part of 2003 and has 
proceeded throughout the duration of the study. The second phase consisted of 
empirical study conducted within a period of six weeks in Nigeria and six weeks in 
South Africa. The fieldwork in Nigeria was conducted between March and April 2005 
and in South Africa between November and December 2005. This section specifies the 
types and forms of data collected from the field, the sources of the data, the techniques 
employed in gathering them and the method used for their analysis. 
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Data Types and Forms 
The study relied on primary, secondary and tertiary types of data. The primary data 
used include audio tape recordings of semi-structured and focused interviews, which 
were transcribed for analysis. Primary data were also generated through notes taken 
during interviews as well as direct observation of relevant contextual conditions and 
events. Other primary data used included government documents, policy statements, 
statistics, indices, surveys and similar publications already compiled and maintained in 
their raw forms. Secondary data were obtained from the results of analysis already done 
and published, including books, journals and other materials in libraries located both 
within the United Kingdom and in the case countries. Most of these data are essentially 
qualitative, although some are quantitative in nature and contained in secondary 
documents in the form of tables and charts. Other vital secondary data used were grey 
literature obtained via the Internet and from institutions in the field. Produced by 
government agencies, universities, research centres, professional organisations, and 
special interest groups, this literature comprised fact sheets, working papers, 
government documents, scholarly journals, bulletins, newspapers and conference 
proceedings. This literature was used because it is extremely valuable in offering 
additional knowledge used in modifying and refining the earlier findings of research, 74 
and in providing quick and flexible access to current research summaries, statistics and 
facts, as well as the opportunity to go into considerable details in the conduct of 
research 75 The data obtained from the grey literature were also very helpful in placing 
this research in a wider perspective. 
41 
Data Sources 
Most of the data collected in Nigeria came from interviews with key individuals and 
groups within the following organisations: the O'odua People's Congress (a militia 
group), in Lagos, and the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (a militia group), in Abuja; the 
Centre for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria (CLEEN), Lagos; Centre for 
Democracy and Development (CDD), Abuja; Africa Strategic and Research Group 
(AFSTRAG), Lagos; the Nigeria Defence Headquarters, Abuja; the National War 
College, Abuja; and the Police Headquarters, Abuja. In addition, a number of serving 
and retired military officers, who preferred to maintain anonymity, offered valuable 
information informally in their private capacities. 
In South Africa, the data came from the following organisations and individuals: the 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS); the Institute of Criminology, University of Cape 
Town; Institute for Contemporary Islam, University of Cape Town; Mapogo a 
Mathamaga (a former militia organisation); the South African Police Service (SAPS), 
Nyanga Station, Cape Town; and individuals who have worked closely with the 
disbanded militia, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), as well as current 
and former officials of SAPS who have worked closely on PAGAD violence. 
The interviews were conducted around the following broad questions: what are the 
experiences and perception of militia violence? The indicators of this variable include 
organised criminal violence, vigilante violence, and ethnic armies. A second question 
dealt with observations or recorded changes in militia violence and the rate of this 
change since transition (democratisation and demilitarisation). The main indicators for 
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this variable were the changes in the number of militia groups and in the number of 
violent acts committed by them. A third area addressed the policy responses of the state 
to militia violence from the point of their emergence to the point of their climax, the 
indicators for which include policy statements and actual interventions by state 
agencies. Furthermore, the interview included questions that probed the motivation, 
dynamics, and methods of non-state actors: what were the driving motives of non-state 
actors, how have they changed over time and what are their methods of operation? The 
full range of the guiding questions used in the interviews is presented in the interview 
schedule in Appendix I of this report. 
Techniques and Timing 
As stated earlier in this chapter, the initial phase of the study consisted of a literature 
survey. This involved the review of documents, including journal articles and textbooks 
obtained through online and library research in the United Kingdom. This technique 
was also used to generate data during the second phase of the study in the field. Books, 
articles, government reports and official statistics obtained from Nigeria and South 
Africa were reviewed for primary and secondary data. 
In addition to literature review, observation was used as a technique for data gathering 
during the fieldwork. This technique was found to be powerful especially by helping to 
strengthen the validity of data points revealed by other techniques. It was equally useful 
in generating data on some contextual aspects of the case studies. A very good example 
of the utility of this technique was the institutional resistance demonstrated by the 
defence establishment in Nigeria towards some aspects of the research observed during 
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fieldwork. This strongly suggested the perpetuation of the culture of secrecy 
characteristic of the era of military rule and exposed the limit to which demilitarisation 
has been implemented in the country. 
The third technique employed was interviews, including in-depth and focus group 
interviews. Interview proved to be the most important tool used during the second 
phase of the study in the field. It was used mainly to generate primary data on the 
views, perceptions, experiences and interpretations of key individuals in and out of 
government who have been either involved in or were critical observers of the 
demilitarisation process and militia violence. Interviews were found to be most suitable 
for dealing with these variables, which were related to what the actors made of their 
experiences and social realities. Those interviewed were members of the armed forces 
and law enforcement agencies, former servicemen, leaders of militias, public policy 
oriented researchers in the security field, and end-users of security such as people in the 
business community. 
The semi-structured type of interview was used to ask measured and guided questions. 
This allowed for free but guided responses from interviewees without imposing a 
predetermined direction. Questionnaires were not used for fear of delays and low 
response rates. Given the distance between the field (Nigeria and South Africa) and 
Cranfield University where the main analysis was carried out, it proved difficult (both 
in terms of costs and time) to re-administer questionnaires in case the initial exercise 
failed to elicit timely and adequate response. Furthermore, questionnaires were not 
employed because they were deemed to be inappropriate for qualitative study of this 
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nature, and would be much more difficult to employ under the environmental conditions 
in which the research was undertaken. 
Data Analysis 
Preliminary analysis was conducted during the initial review of literature, which helped 
shape and refine the key questions of this research. However the major part of the 
analysis took place during and after the collection of relevant data from the field. At 
this stage the data collected from the two cases were condensed, categorised, structured 
and interpreted within each case. Initial findings were then used for cross-case analysis 
in support of the overall research. 
Both within-case and cross-case analyses were based on matching emerging patterns 
from the data with the initial theoretical proposition, including the elimination of rival 
explanations. This analytical technique has been referred to as pattern matching 76 This 
involved relating careful observations of the patterns, which emerged from the data 
(after they have been categorised and structured), to those patterns of civil militarism 
and demilitarisation so as to compare between the predicted and actual pattern. The 
conclusions are linked back to the differences in the type of transition between Nigeria 
and South Africa. 
Limitations 
Several difficulties were encountered in the collection of data during the fieldwork. In 
Nigeria it was not possible to gather data on defence regulation and state response to the 
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civil militia challenge. While data on defence legislation in South Africa is available 
through open sources, it is not the case with Nigeria. Several attempts to secure items of 
information failed for many reasons. All the informal contacts made within the Defence 
Headquarters lacked currency. These individuals had been posted to various locations, 
which the headquarters was not disposed to divulging. New contacts had to be made 
within the period of the fieldwork, and those who were willing to offer any help were 
former officers who had retired from service. Some of these ex-officers were very 
helpful in providing information based on their personal experiences while in service. 
However, these former officers did not have access to official documents and so could 
not provide access to objectively verifiable data on policy outputs that could be 
interpreted as attempts to demilitarise the political process. Several rescheduled 
meetings with the Directorate of Defence Information to fill in this gap did not take 
place before the expiry of the duration of the fieldwork, as the relevant officers were not 
always available at the appointed time. The unavailability of these data through open 
sources and the inability to secure them from official sources both suggested that the 
extent to which the state implemented demilitarisation was highly limited. This 
suggestion was confirmed by several former and serving senior officers of the Nigeria 
Army interviewed during and after the fieldwork. 77 In separate discussions, all 
underscored a recurrent trend: that the government had deliberately kept defence and 
security related information from public access because it did not have much 
information to offer as no systematic reforms have been carried out in the sector since 
the end of military rule in 1999. 
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A major limitation was also encountered in South Africa. It was impossible to meet 
directly with members of the main militia organisation studied in the country. The 
militia, PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs), itself had ceased to exist as 
an organisation since after 2000. Most of its core operatives, the militants, had been 
convicted and were still serving various jail terms at the time of the fieldwork. Several 
attempts were made to visit the prisons so as to hold interviews with the former 
militants, but the bureaucracy within the correctional services was very slow and the 
necessary official permission for the visit could not be obtained before the end of the 
fieldwork. It was therefore impossible to have access to the perspective of the militia 
itself, although an attempt was made to make up for this limitation by talking to the 
initial supporters of the organisation at the time that it was still a popular movement and 
had not become a militia. 
Significance of the Study 
To date, there is no theoretical framework linking demilitarisation and the phenomenon 
of civil militarism. As an exploratory study this research attempts to contribute to the 
development of such a framework. It is also significant for policy and practice in the 
security sector of post-authoritarian societies, with similar conditions to the ones studied 
here. It attempts to re-examine existing propositions and assumptions about 
demilitarisation and privatisation of violence in post-authoritarian states as well as 
linking the theory of civil-military relations with conflict analysis. In terms of policy, 
this study seeks to broaden the range of approaches used by national governments in 
designing programmes aimed at consolidating democratic development and improving 
security conditions. Related to this, it attempts to feed into the policy tools of bilateral 
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and multilateral donors engaged in the fields of security and development in sub-Sahara 
Africa. Finally it suggests more innovative ways, based on empirical analysis, by which 
actions from the national to the grassroots levels can be improved upon for more 
effective delivery of public security. 
The need to situate this research within the existing body of knowledge and to sharpen 
the focus of its key questions required an examination of the literature and specifically 
the analyses that have been undertaken on the problems of militia violence and 
demilitarisation in post-authoritarian transition. Two main bodies of literature were 
reviewed, including analyses on civil-military relations and internal armed conflict, and 
this review is presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Review of Literature 
Introduction 
The observed paradox between demilitarisation and the rise of civil militarism, as 
specified in the background to Chapter 1, necessitates a critical examination of the 
existing literature. This review covers two broad areas of extant analysis, including 
civil-military relations and internal armed conflict analyses. These bodies of literature 
have been selected to examine the extent to which societal militarism and 
demilitarisation of politics have been linked and analysed, and to understand what has 
already been known in the area of civil violence in post-authoritarian societies. 
More specifically, the review seeks to understand what is known about the problem of 
military intervention in the domestic political process and its impacts on violence in 
society. It is also important to consider what is known about the relationship between 
the reversal of this intervention and changes in civil order. Furthermore, it is the aim of 
this review to discover the extent to which analysis has illuminated the location of 
informal security forces and militias in the civil-military equation. The very fact that 
these armed formations perform military and security functions, even if irregularly; 
enjoy some level of localised legitimacy, however narrow; usurp state authority; and 
impact on the security of citizens in the civil society through their activities; makes 
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them worthy of consideration within the field of civil-military relations. They are a 
crucial element in the interaction between the state, the security institutions and the 
society, and it is important to understand how these interactions translate into change in 
the level of public security. 
This security reality also generates a need to review the existing analysis of conflict 
because it is the context within which militias operate and it most suitably characterises 
the nature of social interaction between militias and other groups in society. This is in 
spite of the fact that conflict analysis tends to assume a clear distinction between peace 
and war and focuses less on the `grey area' in between these two extremes. This is 
because much of the violence perpetrated by militias does not fit perfectly into the 
context of open armed conflict, even if they are difficult to define. Even though militia 
violence portrays the society to be at war with itself, it is difficult to put it in any of the 
existing categories of internal armed conflict such as civil war, insurgency, small war, 
low-intensity conflict, and other similar categories. Nor is it correct to characterise 
those countries where militias operate, as those enjoying internal stability and order, and 
this tension seems to blur the academic distinction between war and peace in many sub- 
Saharan Africa countries. Issues specifically discussed under conflict are the nature of 
political crisis in which civil militias operate in Africa, the impact of democratisation 
and demilitarisation on violence in society, the role of structural factors and other 
extraneous causes of civil militarism 
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Civil-Military Relations 
The literature on politico-military relations as it affects militarism and demilitarisation 
is broad and complex. This complexity derives from the sheer amount and diversity of 
the issues considered within its scope. The concept of demilitarisation began to receive 
academic attention in the early twentieth century with emphasis on questions associated 
with imposed reduction in the military capabilities of defeated nations after hostilities. 
However, during the Cold War research on demilitarisation was subsumed under Peace 
Studies and broadly dealt with reduction in the role of the military in politics 78 Since 
the end of the Cold War, however, the concept has generated much interest from a 
multiplicity of academic efforts. 
In relation to sub-Saharan Africa, attempts have been made to identify the various ways 
in which demilitarisation has been undertaken. Of these efforts, five major strategies 
have clearly been noted to include: 
... downsizing military budgets; demobilisation and reintegration; redefining 
roles and missions of armed forces; restructuring governance structures in the 
security arena; and reforming paradigms and structures. 9 
The common theme running through these processes is that they deal with the better 
governance of the security institutions and policies of the state to achieve a desired 
pattern of power relations between the civil authorities and the armed forces. Yet such 
analysis tends to ignore the broader scope of relations involving elements of the wider 
society in civil-military relations. 
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Civil-military relations can therefore be conceived of in two broad categories. The first 
is a narrower, more traditional conception, which deals with the set of political relations 
between the military and civilian governments over the control of military force. The 
second is a broader and more recent conception. This considers the social relations that 
exist between the military and the wider society and between the civil authorities and 
the society over defence and security matters. 8° Since this study deals with societal 
militarism, the main focus of this review is the broader dimension, particularly as it 
relates to the militarisation of society and its implications for demilitarisation. The 
review therefore does not consider the details of the traditional literature of civil control. 
However, the debates in the literature of military-society relations emerged from the 
more traditional analyses, and its development over time is traced in the beginning of 
the review. Thus the traditional literature is touched upon, but only tangentially. 
Traditional Civil-Military Analyses 
Early studies on civil-military relations were centred on finding solutions to the problem 
of civil control of armed forces, especially in established democracies where periods of 
crises posed real threats to the norm of civil supremacy over the security establishment. 
For Samuel Huntington, the solution to this tension is in the establishment of objective 
civilian control and this could only be achieved through professionalism in the armed 
forces, especially among the officer corps. 81 Morris Janowitz proposes the integration 
into the military the values of civil society. 82 Samuel Finer has suggested the 
inculcation of the principle of civil supremacy in the military establishment as the 
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guarantee of its subordination to political authority. 83 Michael Desch also argues that 
structural factors, especially threats, are the primary determinants of the ability of 
civilians to control the military. 84 Thus these early thoughts tend to focus exclusively 
on what Peter Feaver calls `the civil-military problematique' : the dilemma of 
maintaining a military that is strong enough to implement the policy objectives of 
civilians and a military that is at the same time subordinate to the political superiority 
the civilian leadership. 85 Although these arguments are very useful in grappling with 
the major traditional issues of civil-military relations, they do not have much to offer on 
the impact of the military or militarism on the wider society. 
However, the focus on the issue of civil control of armed forces assumes that the 
primary problem of civil-military relations is the threat of praetorian military 
intervention in domestic politics, and the inadequacy of such focus has forced a shift 
towards a wider problem of democratic management and implementation of defence 
and security policy. This moves the argument from the `first generation' problem of 
preventing military intervention to a `second generation problem' of the processes and 
practices of establishing effective structures for democratic governance in defence and 
security sectors - building effective defence policymaking structures, establishing 
meaningful parliamentary oversight of the defence and security sectors, and developing 
wider civil society input into defence and security debates. 86 While this shift has helped 
in broadening the scope of civil-military analysis, one crucial gap that has remained is 
the inadequate attention given to the social dimension. In summary, the traditional 
literature on the civil control of armed and security forces virtually ignores the place of 
society in civil-military analysis, and is therefore unhelpful for examining and 
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understanding the issues of societal militarism and demilitarisation in post-authoritarian 
societies. 
Interestingly, however, beyond the question of civil control, the literature of civil- 
military relations in the developing world has generated enormous debate in other 
directions that touch upon the place of the society. Prominent among them are the 
causes of military intervention, the nature of military rule, military politics in socialist 
states, the role of the military in politics, ethnic segmentation of the military, economic 
performance in military dictatorships compared to democratic economies, as well as 
military disengagement from politics. 7 These concerns began to receive the academic 
attention just as the armed forces took over power and began to dominate the political 
landscape in many Latin American, African and Asian countries. Much has also been 
written on the conditions that influence the disposition of the military to disengage from 
politics 88 These conditions include forces that are both external to and internal to the 
military as an institution. This analysis is very useful in that it is based on comparative 
examination of experiences drawn from across the developing world, and advances 
explanations for the differences in the type and nature of post-military democracies. 
Moreover such analysis of military disengagement from politics is crucial mainly 
because disengagement is an essential element of demilitarisation in post-authoritarian 
societies where the military had been deeply involved in politics, and this is examined 
in more detail under the literature on military-society relations. 
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Military-Society Relations 
While the literature considered above has been concerned essentially with the 
arguments around the subject of civil control, more recent authors have taken 
cognisance of the inadequacy of such approaches to the study of civil-military relations, 
and have suggested a shift in analysis that accommodates the broader question of the 
relationship between the armed forces and the societies of which they are a part. A very 
useful element of this shift is the theory of concordance, which highlights the need for 
dialogue, accommodation and shared values or objectives among the military, the 
political elites and the wider society. 89 This theory considers the citizenry as an 
important partner in civil-military relations, even though the ultimate goal of such an 
arrangement is to enhance civil control over security forces. Another strand of this shift 
suggests more emphasis on the problem of how to maintain a military that sustains and 
protects democratic values in consolidated democracies 90 These works are important in 
so far as they seek to involve the society in military matters. Yet it is obvious that this 
involvement of the society is considered in terms of its role in the democratic 
management and control of the armed forces and related policy matters. 
Other studies have made much bolder contributions to the understanding of the 
relationship between armed forces and society, although in different directions. Martin 
Edmonds argues that the nature of the military's relationship to its society is largely 
dependent on the society's woridview, which is in turn influenced by the level of 
technology, culture, and the socio-economic structure of the society 91 Others have 
looked into the factors that shape particular military-society relations and how these 
relations determine the legitimacy of the military institution in such societies. 2 It is this 
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legitimacy of the military, as observed by some, which constitutes the main linkage 
between the military and the civilian society. This legitimacy derives from the 
military's functional and socio-political missions, and directly determines the support it 
enjoys from the society. 93 It is also argued that the functional mission, or `the 
functional imperative of war', makes the military unique and separate from the civilian 
society. 94 
Charles Moskos and Frank Wood examine the societal forces that have pressurised 
Western militaries to change to a more organisational structure, which may have 
detrimental implications for the functional imperative of war. 9S The concept of the 
`post-modem' military, which represents a phase in military organisation that is shaped 
by geopolitical and societal changes in post-industrial societies, is a recent development 
towards military-society analysis. 96 These changes are seen as having undermined the 
militarisation of society, particularly the tradition of mass armies, conscription and 
military service, leading to a `post-military' society in industrial countries 97 These 
contributions are very insightful, not least because they mark a sharp departure from the 
traditional problem of civil-military relations and focus broadly on the place of the 
military within the society. 
Nonetheless, these analyses are heavily weighted in favour of the impacts of society on 
the military, particularly on how changes within society (both at the national and 
international or global levels) have forced the military to change in its structure, mission 
and outlook, and do not provide as much insight into the opposite direction of this 
interaction. A significant area that has received serious attention is the way in which 
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changes in societal values are determined or influenced by the military or its values. 
Furthermore, they deal more strictly with Western societies and do not reflect societies 
in the developing world, particularly African societies. 
One important attempt to study the connection of the military to society is Huntington's 
comparative study of 16 countries of Southeast Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America, 
and the Caribbean, which points to the legacies of military intervention in politics that 
pose challenges for democratic consolidation after transition. 98 Also drawing from 
cases in Latin America, Central America, the Caribbean, Africa and Europe, 
Constantine Danapoulos explores the links between long-term disengagement and the 
factors in society that prompted military intervention in the first place. His focus is on 
the trends in society that prompt intervention and which must be reversed for military 
withdrawal to be sustainable. 99 Roger Hamburg links the success of any disengagement 
to societal pressure (as was the case in Sudan); military defeat (citing the example of 
Argentina in 1982), serious domestic policy failure; intra-military cleavages; 
international pressure; and the crisis of governance faced inherently by military 
regimes. 1°° 
In furtherance of this thread of analysis, Samuel Finer links the success of any 
disengagement to the combination of three conditions: the breakdown of the original 
praetorian group; increasing conflict of interest between political and military leaders; 
and political difficulties faced by military regimes. '°' These writers provide the leading 
direction on thinking about the process of depoliticising the military, especially in 
developing and transitional countries, where the military had dominated almost every 
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facet of society. Within this thinking, demilitarisation is concerned with reversing the 
militarisation of politics, where militarisation is seen as the preponderance of the armed 
forces in the political, economic and social life of a country102. The emphasis of the 
literature on disengagement is crucial for providing insights on demilitarisation, not 
only as it relates to the withdrawal of military forces from active politics, but more 
importantly on the continued influence or indirect role of the security forces in politics, 
and the impact of other legacies of militarism on the new democratic space. 
Yet, as noted by Bayo Adekson, military disengagement cannot be equated to 
demilitarisation as has tended to be, even though the former is crucial to the latter. 103 
Other commentators have further elaborated upon this distinction and provided useful 
insights worthy of mention here. Said Adejumobi has pointed out that military 
disengagement from politics does not necessarily undo the practices and norms 
associated with militarism. This is because militarism is not limited to military rule, but 
is present also in civilian regimes and post-military new democracies where the 
entrenched norms and practices of militarism are not readily eradicated with the formal 
transfer of political power to civilian elites. 104 In fierce support of this position, Robin 
Luckham has recently argued for a rethinking of the notion of military disengagement, 
which tends to focus only on official armed forces as a single unit of analysis. For him, 
such rethinking needs to consider all forms of militarism, including those deployed 
under military rule, by civilian dictators or `semi-democracies', and by non-state armed 
formations. 105 Further questioning of the concept of military disengagement have also 
directed attention to the conflict between the professional elements of the military and 
those in government under military rule, and showed that the military did not always act 
58 
politically in unified and consistent manner. 106 These analyses are very relevant in the 
context of Africa where civilian dictators and non-state armed groups have served as 
critical agents of militarism as much as military regimes, and where disengagement has 
not ended the culture of militarism even in post-authoritarian regimes. Under such 
conditions demilitarisation needs to extend beyond formal termination of the military's 
political role to a wider process of dismantling those ideological and institutional norms 
and practices of militarism in both the state and the society. 
The continued political influence of the military beyond its political visibility in the new 
democracies of the developing world, which have a history of military dictatorship, 
including the legacies of such history in the national society is an important dimension 
of military-society relations that has begun to receive increasing academic attention. 
This new attention has included the role of other security apparatuses; the privatisation 
of violence and the emergence of non-state armed formations; the spread of low-level 
conflict and its impacts on human security; and the implications of all these for 
democratic governance. 107 The continued political power and influence of the military 
and other state security forces after democratic transition is an important element of 
military-society relations because it deals with the legacies of militarism in new post- 
military democracies discussed above and is a central concern for strategies of 
demilitarisation. The role of other security apparatuses, including the police and 
intelligence services, falls somewhat within the consideration of civilian autocratic 
regimes that rely on paramilitaries to undermine the power of the institutional military, 
and so has implications for politico-military relations. It also has relevance for 
understanding the militarisation of law and order as a legacy of militarism in new 
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democracies, particularly where the militarisation of politics in the past involved a 
fusion of military and police functions. The notion of the privatised violence represents 
one of the most important breaks in the attempt to link the military to society. 
Admittedly the privatisation of violence is a broad term that could refer to a wide array 
of non-state armed movements including global terrorist groups, mercenaries, 
insurgents and rebels engaged in armed conflict, the concept does not necessarily occur 
in situations of armed conflict as it also applies to civil militias operating in crisis or 
crisis-prone political environments. 
In relation to the privatisation of violence, the notion of civil-militia relations has been 
suggested as a conceptual guide for examining the interaction of militias and their host 
societies. Marrie-Joelle Zahar offers a typology of four patterns of civil-militia 
relations. These are militias, which have their independent sources of revenue; those 
that are predatory; those that are parasitic; and those that have symbiotic civil-militia 
relations with their hosts. 108 The concept of civil-militia relations reinforces the 
imperative of factoring militias and similar forces into the analysis of civil-military 
relations, as well as the spread of low-level conflict. It brings to the fore the relevance 
of militia groups as important players in the civil-military equation, as well as the 
spread of private violence, though this is not strongly linked to the relationship between 
the military and society as an aspect of civil-military relations. The implications of the 
spread of armed conflict are considered later in the section on conflict, while the 
linkages between non-state groups and civil-military relations are examined here. 
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Societal Militarism 
A second important manifestation of this shift is an emerging perspective in thinking 
away from the direct political power and influence of the military to the indirect 
legacies of military politics in the society. This concern could aptly be referred to as the 
`negative externalities' 109 of the militarisation of politics on civil-military relations, 
since it looks not at what the military, either in or out of power, intentionally does in 
relation to the state or society, but at the unintended fallouts of historical militarism that 
have relevance for reference to the militarisation of society. This should not be 
confused with the material impacts of militarisation on society, which are well-known 
issues (including the impacts of military governance on national economic performance, 
the quality of governance, etc). Rather it is the linking of past political activities of the 
military with the emergence of non-state armed groups mentioned earlier. "" This is a 
sharp departure from the tradition in the literature because it takes the interaction of the 
civil and the military from the physical and institutional to the social and psychological 
plane. It suggests the examination of this relationship in the physical absence of the 
military, particularly the consequences of military politics in producing the conditions 
under which non-state security forces that occupy the civil side of security calculations 
emerge as a legacy of militarism. 
In addition, it has been noted that effective maintenance of the means of legitimate 
coercion and its deployment to secure public order, the rule of law, and citizenship 
rights on the basis of norms and procedures should be the ultimate goal of democratic 
consolidation rather than the attainment of civil control. "' All of these points about the 
monopoly of violence by the state, public order, the rule of law and rights of citizens, 
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are threatened by non-state actors, and must therefore be factored into the understanding 
of civil-military relations. This connection is very apparent in the context of Africa 
where it is observed that, because so much of policing is paramilitary, civil-military 
relations establishes the context in which nearly all policing systems, including those 
operated by non-state actors occur. 112 This connection is very relevant for 
understanding how the militarisation of policing has created the conditions for parallel 
security and activities engaged in by civil militias as part of the legacies of militarised 
politics. 
In a study of militarism and the prospects of democratic consolidation in Nigeria, 
'Kayode Fayemi provides another interesting direction. His study reveals that years of 
military repression have conditioned many communities to adopt military strategies in 
responding to any form of domination. Thus `the greatest challenge in combating the 
scourge of political militarism is addressing the psychology of militarism that has 
become reified in the context of exclusionary politics'. 113 The notion of the 
psychological legacy of militarism is re-echoed by the same author more recently, using 
the phrase, `societal militarism and violence', as a legacy of years of military rule in 
Nigeria. This is the erosion of the culture of compromise, dialogue and accommodation 
in the resolution and management of conflicts. This is supported by Pita Agbese's 
position that the legacies of military rule include a culture of violence which places a 
premium on force and violence; and de-emphasises dialogue, bargaining and 
compromise between and within social groups. "" These points are very crucial to this 
study because they open up new areas of inquiry into the psycho-social impacts of 
military politics on society and point towards the process by which structural violence 
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and social exclusion translate into physical and cultural violence. lls These are 
discussed in more detail under the section on armed conflict, as they are considered 
pertinent to the understanding of the kind of context within which militias emerge and 
operate. In a similar study of civil-military relations in Southern Africa, Jackie Cilliers 
emphasises the structural issues of political and social alienation as eroding social 
norms and producing gangs and warlords. 116 This study brings into perspective the 
social dimension of civil-military relations, but also raises further questions. Though 
the term `demilitarisation' is not used, the argument for reclaiming militarised minds 
requires looking in the direction of the values and attitudes which have become 
entrenched among civilian populations and which support the propensity to use violence 
in normal social conflict. This proposal for psychological demilitarisation prompts the 
question of how to do so and is an area that requires further research, as opposed to the 
demilitarisation of politics and how it affects the privatisation of violence by civil 
militias, which is a central concern of this study. 
Yet, as the foregoing review shows, academic analysis on the relationship between the 
demilitarisation of politics and the phenomenon of civil militias is still far from being 
fully developed. One very important piece of work, which suggests emerging thinking 
in this area, raises the paradox of demilitarisation. Guy Lamb observes that the 
demilitarisation of the state (or politics) may work in the opposite direction to the 
demilitarisation of society. "? In other words efforts to dismantle the political role of the 
military in politics and law and order functions in emerging democracies have coincided 
with growing militarism in the wider society. Going by this study's definition of 
demilitarisation of the society, this observation lends credence to the proposition of this 
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study. Exploring the way in which this observed paradox works is therefore a most 
central concern of the study. In the following section, the review focuses on the 
literature of internal armed conflict and the purpose is to examine what has been 
understood already about militias, the conditions under which they emerge and operate, 
and how they relate to the process of demilitarisation. 
Internal Armed Conflict 
The literature on armed conflict, more than that of civil-military relations, is enormous 
and diverse, and because the study deals with public security within national borders, 
this review excludes international armed conflict and concentrates on internal conflict. 
Even within the scope of internal conflict, the debates are so many and deal with a very 
wide array of issues that this review does not cover. This research deals with informal 
groups engaged in low-level conflict situations, where the state is relatively strong (not 
challenged effectively by on-going armed rebellion), and where there are no long- 
running violent conflicts among groups with a prior definition of an enemy. It deals 
with the security context of crisis situations or situations of disorder in which violence 
is mobilised by relatively small groups intermittently over specific issues. For this same 
reason, insurgencies, civil wars, genocide and other acts of open violent internal strife 
involving structured forces (even if they are non-state) are not considered in the review. 
Admittedly, delineating such a context of crisis in a clear-cut manner has been 
analytically problematic, and this difficulty is discussed below. 
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The Problem of Taxonomy 
Finding the appropriate nomenclature for the conflict context described above, critical 
as it is, immediately faces the problem of definition and classification of internal armed 
conflicts. This problem has generated its own debate since the end of the Cold War, 
creating over a decade of what has been referred to as conceptual turmoil or semantic 
confusion among writers on internal conflict. ' 18 This debate rages among those who 
interchangeably use concepts such as civil wars, intrastate wars, internal wars, ethnic 
wars, resource conflicts, communal wars, low intensity conflicts, small wars, 
insurgencies, complex emergencies, post-modern wars, among many others. 
Several attempts have been made to overcome this confusion through the categorisation 
of internal conflicts. One of such efforts establishes four criteria for defining civil wars 
as distinct from other types of internal armed conflict, including the level of violence, 
the geographical scope, the actors involved and the relative distribution of force among 
the contenders. 119 According to this categorisation, such a civil war must involve, at 
least, 1000 battle-related deaths annually, being fought within established state borders 
with the state as one of the main actors, and where fighting is equally intense from both 
government and rebel sides. If this categorisation is generally accepted, civil wars are 
clearly not the type of violence considered in this study and is therefore not pursued 
further. 
The level of violence has also been used to distinguish between three types of internal 
conflict since the end of the Cold War: minor armed conflict, which must result in a 
minimum of 25 battle-related deaths annually and less than 1000 deaths over the course 
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of the entire conflict; intermediate armed conflict with an annual death range between 
25 and 999, with a minimum of 1000 battle-related deaths in the course of the entire 
conflict; and war with a minimum of 1000 battle-related deaths annually. 120 The 
concept of `minor armed conflict' is helpful in terms of categorisation, but it does not 
reveal very much about the dynamics and nature of conflict. Moreover, minor armed 
conflict as defined here hardly fits the context of the type of violence considered in this 
study, which sometimes does not result in up to 25 battle-related deaths within a year. 
There also has to be an indefinite wait for the conflict to be fully resolved and the figure 
of overall death determined to understand the category of the conflict. 
Other criteria for classification have been suggested, using an idea-individual spectrum, 
and whether or not the state is contested. Jan Angstrom uses these two criteria to 
distinguish between ideological conflicts fought by the armed forces of at least two 
parties over the way the state is ruled; resource conflict over a contested state, with the 
aim of not changing the rule of the state, but of personal economic enrichment; 
leadership conflict over the leadership of the state; and ethnic conflict involving the 
armed forces of at least two ethnic groups of which at least one is not representing the 
state. "' Kumar Rupesinghe and Sanam Anderlini base their typologies on the most 
prevalent causes, including resource-based conflicts, conflict over governance and 
authority, conflict over ideology and conflict over identity. 122 Yet, these taxonomies of 
internal conflicts may be suitable in a setting of conventional armed conflict. Resource 
conflict and ethnic conflict come close to describing the context of violence by militias 
as important actors. However they do not neatly describe the kind of context of crisis 
66 
where militias play multiple roles as protection forces or as private armies for a 
diversity of political, ideological and economic interests. 
a way out of this problem of taxonomy has been attempted by Charles Tilly in his more 
embracing concept of collective violence. Tilly argues that individuals and groups 
engage in collective violence as a consequence of shielding from routine state 
violence. 123 The concept of collective violence is useful because it is sensitive to the 
multipurpose operations of civil militias in crisis-prone environments. Ted Gurr 
advances a psychological and social framework for understanding collective violence, 
using the theory of relative deprivation. 124 In a more recent work, Gurr sees collective 
violence at the community level as arising from inequalities among social groups where 
such inequalities coincide with communal cleavages and where social barriers are 
consciously put in place by dominant groups. He also identifies the tradition of 
hostilities and clashes among ethnic groups as a second factor. 125 Relative deprivation 
throws up the whole issue of structural violence (social inequality and alienation) 
previously identified in the literature of civil-military relations as a prevalent condition 
in places where militias are endemic. The tradition of hostilities among groups is 
equally important, most especially because it has implications for the background to the 
militarisation of whole societies. These issues form an important part of the analysis 
and are fully discussed in the empirical chapters of this study. 
Considerable analysis has also been done on economic factors of civil violence, within 
which there are many strands and arguments over the role of natural resources, 
economic development and the global market. On natural resources, much of the study 
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has resulted in conflicting findings. Some findings show a negative relationship 
between natural resources and conflict. 126 Others have suggested a positive relationship 
by arguing that violence is motivated by greed for profits from the illegal markets in 
natural resources 127, or that natural resources only provide the opportunity to sustain 
rather than motivate conflict, which is essentially driven by grievance. 128 Others more 
show that the link between natural resources and conflict is conditioned by the state of 
macro-economic development. 129 Michael Ross warns that dependence on natural 
resources by a state invokes the `resource curse', which includes the curse of civil war, 
by producing the `rentier effect', which weakens the state and creates the conditions for 
rebellion. 130 This is corroborated by other studies which show that mineral exports 
dependence sharply heightens the risk of civil war. 131 The most controversial of 
mineral resources is petroleum oil, which has been closely associated with political 
instability in producing countries. One of the most powerful arguments about the 
politics of oil has been advanced by Terry Karl, who observes that countries whose 
economy depends on revenues from oil exports, regardless of cultural differences, 
experience a `paradox of plenty' in which the inflow of vast amount of petro-dollars 
produces deep social and political crisis (including riots, conflicts and civil wars) rather 
than an opportunity for surmounting the obstacles to development. 132 In a more recent 
study by Matthias Basedau and Wolfram Lacher, these thoughts have been further 
developed to show that dependence tends to play a major role in political instability 
when income per capita from oil exports is relatively low. This study demonstrates that 
while countries with low revenues per capita from oil exports are more likely to suffer 
considerable political violence, high-income oil states are largely spared by violence. 
This is because oil rents in low-income petro-states are often distributed through 
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patronage networks, which increases rent-seeking and competition and, consequently, 
the probability of violence. 133 The crucial issues of the rentier state and the weakness of 
the state have potential implications as they create the political climate conducive to 
generating collective violence by civil militias. The link to dependence on natural 
resources, particularly oil, is also worthy of note as many African states depend on 
resources, which has the capacity to determine the nature of the state in relation to 
politics and civil militarism. 
More broadly, development issues have been linked to civil violence. A variant of this 
analysis suggests that the processes of modernisation in the third world are likely to 
produce anarchy and communal violence. 134 Another variant argues that the root cause 
of conflict is the failure of economic development, including the conditions of poverty 
and social exclusion. 135 With regards to the African context, Jackie Cilliers qualifies 
this situation as that of `general disorder' conditioned by the structural factors of 
political and social alienation and inequality that have produced `the erosion of norms, 
emergence of gangs and warlords, and undermined the normal restraints on violence'. 136 
To this Paul Rich adds an important observation that these private forces represent 
`desperate and militarised segments of society'. 137 This reinforces the importance of the 
linkages of the structural conditions of inequality and exclusion to the militarisation of 
society, which generates non-state armed actors, even though militias are not 
specifically mentioned. Security and development have always gone hand in hand, and 
it is important to examine the role of development as a context within which 
demilitarisation and militia violence are shaped. Interestingly, all the issues raised 
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concerning inequality, alienation, state weakness and the rentier effect are also integral 
to social and economic development. 
The State and the Privatisation of Violence 
Shifting attention from classification, causes and correlates of internal conflict, other 
analyses have generated relevant insights on the privatisation of violence by non-state 
actors. The literature on privatisation in the field of security include those that consider 
private companies providing security and military services on commercial basis on the 
one hand, and those that focus on informal security actors on the other, and a good 
attempt has been made to disaggregate this dual trend of privatisation. 138 Private 
military and security companies (PMSCs) are increasingly being seen as traditional 
mercenaries reinvented under new conditions as guarantors of post-Cold War stability 
in unstable countries, particularly those in Africa. 139 These companies have become 
relevant for filling the security vacuum as a response to demand for security. As 
conflicts persist, and the international community remains reluctant to intervene, these 
corporate actors will continue to fill the security gap. '4° The growing privatisation of 
security since the 1990s has also generated ethical concerns among scholars. 141 
However, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, mercenaries and the corporate security 
sector are not the concern of this study, even though they are an important element of 
non-state violence. The focus is rather on informal security actors, particularly civil 
militias. 
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On the analysis of informal actors in internal violence, a number of authors agree that 
the rise and growth of non-state self-protection groups are a characteristic of fragile 
states - the growing weakness of the state to provide the legal guarantees of physical 
security to citizens from abuses, crime and physical violence. 142 This creates the unrule 
of law which is one of many manifestations of a wider problem of governance failure 
deriving from the crisis of authority. 143 Private protection by subaltern groups has 
become endemic throughout Africa and Eastern Europe, where this is seen as a 
reflection of the growing needs of elites to protect themselves from internal rivalries 
where the state has failed to uphold the rule of law and provide adequate security for 
all. 144What makes a state a state, as has been argued, is the extent to which it is able to 
wield firm control over standing armies and police forces while eliminating non-state 
controlled armies, militias and gangs. '45 In practice, the ability of real states to 
approximate this Weberian ideal notion has varied markedly, both in temporal and 
spatial dimensions. This empirical variation has been identified as the basis for 
classification between strong and weak states. Strong states have been able to `extract, 
penetrate, regulate, and appropriate' within their territories and over their populations; 
and have been able to neutralise opposition against their drive towards the accumulation 
of power. On the contrary, weak state leaders have been unable to achieve 
predominance in large areas of their countries and face impenetrable barriers to 
accumulate power. '46 Joe Migdal aptly uses the concept of social control to capture this 
distinction. Strong states, therefore, are those with a high level of social control, while 
weak states have a low level. 147 It follows then that the privatisation of the means of 
violence in the hands of informal security forces is a critical indicator of state weakness. 
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The anatomy of this condition of state weakness has been the subject of a very 
illuminating academic analysis among scholars of security in the Third World. An 
aspect of this analysis attributes the weakness discussed above to the nature of the 
society - the social structure, of which the state is only a part. Joe Migdal argues that 
post-colonial states faced immediate challenges to their claims of predominance, even in 
the midst of and since independence. The strength of the state is thus conditioned by 
the society which is composed of what he calls a `melange' of social forces - families, 
clans, Multinational Corporations (MNCs), domestic enterprises, tribes, patron-client 
dyads - and the fundamental conflicts between them works against the emergence of the 
archetypal Western nation-state. 148 Mohammed Ayoob has joined forces with Migdal 
by arguing that these social forces in the post-colonial state are competing foci of 
authority, which, though usually weaker than the state in terms of coercive capacity, are 
equal to or stronger than the state in terms of legitimacy as far as the perceptions of the 
substantial portions of the state's populations are concerned. 149 
Caroline Thomas blames the state and associates the problem of state weakness with the 
state's institutional capacity. This is made up of the state's despotic power (the force to 
impose rule on the population), and the infrastructural power (the strength of the state's 
bureaucracies and their reach within the territory). While effective infrastructural power 
gradually eliminates the need for excessive exercise of despotic power in strong states, 
weak states are unable to move beyond reliance on crude coercion to enforce unwilling 
compliance. '50 Brian Job adds another dimension of national cohesion, or socio- 
political cohesion which is lacking in weak states and creates the insecurity dilemma by 
which efforts by individuals and groups to protect themselves against perceived threats 
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results in an environment of increased threat and reduced security' for all in society. 151 
Barry Buzan captures this more sharply in his position that weak states `either do not 
have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and social consensus of sufficient 
strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in 
the domestic life of the nation'. 152 A conclusion that can be drawn from these 
observations is that the lack of institutional capacity to exercise sustainable social 
control and to build national cohesion in societies characterised by competing foci of 
authority define weak states, and create the conditions for privatised violence. 
The points raised above are particularly relevant for Africa, where state weakness is 
seen as a product of prolonged fiscal and economic crises. This condition erodes the 
state's revenue base, its effectiveness and physical presence in outlying areas, and 
forces the state to cede its monopoly of coercive force to militias, and vigilantes with 
criminal connections. 153 Under such conditions, individuals seek personal substitutes 
by attaching themselves to the so-called `big men' who are capable of providing 
protection or even advancing their personal interests at the expense of others. '54 Again, 
this is a crucial observation, and one that is explored further in the case studies. What is 
important here and considered further in the study is the role of elites in the exploitation 
of state ineffectiveness to pursue narrow agendas for which the instrumentality of 
militias is a rational calculation. 
The role of political elites as rational actors in the weakening of the state, particularly in 
Africa, has been illuminated in the literature. It has been observed that while 
independence was achieved with euphoria and high expectations in sub-Saharan Africa, 
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the dualism of the colonial era - the coexistence of non-formal traditional institutions 
and formal state structures - was not addressed by the new national elites. Rather, they 
maintained the artificiality and remoteness of the colonial state. '55 This failure 
undermined the ability of the post-colonial state to meet expectations and prompted the 
disengagement of sections of the population from the state. One important form of this 
disengagement is the parallel systems or what Alice Hills calls the parallel universe, 
which offers alternative outlets for needs that remain unfulfilled by official channels. '56 
An important element of these parallel systems is privatised violence, which in turn 
deprives the state of revenue and consequently weakens its capacity to accumulate 
wealth and capacity. 
Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz argue that the state and politics in Africa operate 
on the basis of elites using `disorder as political instrument. ' In other words political 
elites operate the state informally and deliberately choose not to instutionalise political 
practice as well as state bureaucracies so as to enhance their narrow interests. In such 
circumstances, the manipulation of violence becomes a profitable resource for elites. 157 
This observation is a further development of the neo-patrimonial model of the African 
state by which the formal institutions of the inherited colonial state is said to have been 
de-bureaucratised by post-colonial rulers, so that the state operates through informal 
processes. Invaded by the patrimonial sphere of personal relations, public services 
operate through the informal networks of clientelism and nepotism in the 
neopatrimonial model. Under such conditions rulers allocate political office to their 
clients on the basis of patronage rather than any criteria of bureaucratic 
professionalism. 158 
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In some cases, it has been observed that it is the criminalisation of the state by its elites 
that significantly cripples its bureaucratic effectiveness. This process involves the 
entrenchment of criminal practices at the heart of the institutions of government, 
including the private use of the public security forces, the privatisation of violence and 
participation of rulers in the semi-clandestine economy. Powerful elites are, in such 
cases, part of an informal network that includes militias and armed groups to constitute 
the vectors of criminalisation. 159 The operation of politics in such clandestine networks 
has prompted some commentators to observe that Africa is characterised by what they 
qualify as the `rhizome state' or the `shadow state', where warlords are the dominant 
political actors. 160 While warlords certainly do not control the majority of states in 
Africa, the analyses above provide a powerful tool for understanding the role of elites in 
the informal operation of politics and the weakening of the bureaucratic state. One 
aspect of these analyses that is crucial to this study is the way in which the interaction of 
politics and the clandestine world shape the legacies of militarism in Africa's new 
democracies and its implications for demilitarisation. 
Other factors have been associated with the weakness of the state in creating the 
conditions for the privatisation of violence and the emergence of civil militias. Bruce 
Baker points to the combination of state weakness, the context of danger, state predation 
and poverty. This combination blurs the boundaries between state and non-state law 
enforcement, and between criminal and rebel lawlessness in Africa. In such a context 
where citizens would naturally care more about their protection rather than who the 
provider is, they are left to their own devices of private law enforcement and self- 
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defence with low stake in conforming to the rule of law. 161 In addition, global forces of 
change have been held responsible for aggravating state weakness by undermining the 
capacity of the state to address social problems. The example is given of the rise in 
vigilante killings in Indonesia and in the rest of East Asia in association with the 
financial crisis that began in the late 1990s. '62 Ulric Shanon points out that the ceding 
of the state's monopoly over the use of violence to non-state actors is an emerging 
global phenomenon, by which irregular forces - terrorists, mercenaries, guerrillas, 
warlords, militias, etc - on a global scale are eroding the legitimacy of the state as the 
guarantor of security and economic development. 163 Robert Mandel adopts a multi- 
level analysis of the privatisation of security to argue that the shrinking of defence 
assistance by the end of the Cold War gave rise to two directions of privatisation of 
security: a top-down outsourcing of security to private companies; and a bottom-up 
pressure from militias, self-defence forces, vigilantes, neighbourhood watches and 
gangs. 1M The retreat of superpower influence from the Third World is said to have 
exposed the lack of `empirical' legitimacy of these states (derived from the ability to 
secure authority at the local level) and permitted warlordism. 165 This phenomenon 
emerged gradually before the end of the Cold War as local factional leaders adapted 
their role in longstanding conflict areas to meet the changing environment. 166 A more 
eclectic approach holds that the combination of post-Cold War withdrawal of 
superpower security guarantees, neo-liberal economic restructuring, global 
demilitarisation (retrenchment of military resources), and the surge of democratic 
pressures from the civil society; undermine the hegemony of the state, and create a 
vacuum which warlords seek to manipulate. 167 Yet, while the privatisation of violence 
is a global trend, nowhere has this been more pronounced and more sharply contrasted 
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to the strength of the state than in Africa. Moreover the proliferation of militias as a 
unique or specific form of the privatisation of violence in African states requires a 
deeper look at the nature of the state in the region. 
The process of democratisation has also been identified as one of the principal causes of 
insecurity. Observing the internal armed conflicts of the 1990s in Eastern Europe and 
Africa, analysts have associated political violence with the initiation of political 
liberalisation and democratic transition. 168 Also in Latin America it is observed that 
democratic transition has seen the `democratisation of violence', which has increasingly 
become an option for a multiplicity of societal actors. 169 One explanation for this 
linkage is that democratisation permits the expression of ancient hatreds among rival 
nationalist groups in divided societies. 170 Another explanation offered by Kumar 
Rupesinghe holds that it is not just the process of democratisation but its occurrence in 
fragile states that generate new conflicts . 
17 1 However, Jack Snyder has observed that 
such conflicts typically arise in the earliest stages of democratisation and decline as 
democracy consolidates. This is because at the early stages, elites use nationalist 
doctrine to contain popular pressure for democratisation and exclude internal opponents, 
which in turn provokes violent conflict. This is most likely to happen when elites are 
threatened by rapid political change and when the expansion of participatory politics 
occurs before the emergence of strong civic institutions. 172 This position has been 
supported by a comparative study, which shows that the risk of violent conflict is high 
where democratisation is incomplete as opposed to dictatorships or consolidated 
democracies. 173 Thus it is the subversion of the transition process by state elites who 
are threatened by democracy and the legacies of authoritarianism that spark off violent 
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conflict in the course of democratisation rather than the process itself. 174 While this 
research does not deal directly with the conventional internal armed conflict considered 
in the foregoing analyses, the link between democratisation and insecurity deserves 
closer attention in the analysis. This is so because the demilitarisation of politics is in 
itself a consequence of the transition to democratic politics, and it is important to 
understand the interaction of civil militias with these two processes. 
The New Violence 
A useful way of looking at militia violence is to consider the dynamics or changing 
nature of conflict in which actors similar to militias have become prominent. The 
conventional view (of Kaplan or van Creveld) that sees conflict as essentially irrational 
behaviour, chaos or disorder has been challenged by a new way of thinking about its 
functionality. Rather than reflecting a breakdown of an orderly system, militia violence 
is seen as the `emergence of an alternative system of profit and power', representing a 
reconstituted system in which some of the functions of the state are being taken over by 
regional warlords. 175 Warlord activities also bear on politics involving rulers who 
control markets to enhance their power against domestic contenders. 176 Non-state 
armed groups, in general, have also been associated with the primary objective to force 
their way back onto the social system from which they have been excluded. '77 Thus the 
growth of warlords and non-state violence are also seen as characteristics of what is 
called the `post-modem conflict'. 178 This changing face of conflict suggests the gradual 
emergence of a post-Westphalian age, in which the state is no longer able to interfere 
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with local armed actors who operate by holding local territories and acting politically 
and financially in the global system. 179 This introduces another dimension to the debate 
- the dynamics of conflict, particularly the changing face of conflict and, with 
it, 
changes in the character of collective violence. An important element of this change is 
the way in which local actors adapt to state weakness to create their own order, and this 
is linked to the opportunistic role of elites in the employment of militia violence in 
society considered earlier. 
This changing face of conflict has been characterised by others as a `new war'. The 
new war thesis attempts to qualify the type of conflict that enveloped large parts of 
Africa and Eastern Europe with the end of the Cold War. It is argued that the new wars 
are defined by identity rather than ideology, and blur the distinction between peace, war 
and organised crime. Furthermore, they occur in states where the monopoly of 
legitimate organised violence is weakened by the process of globalisation. 180 The 
erosion of the authority of the state is accompanied by violent war economies where the 
globalised economy and violence are mutually reinforcing, and in which illegal 
commercial entrepreneurship, private armies, and warlords are dominant features. 181 
Here private armies and non-state forces are presented as features of the new face of 
conflict in changing global economic conditions, but what is important for this study is 
the merging of conflict, peace and organised crime, and the way this linkage relates to 
the emergence of civil militias in post-authoritarian regimes. 
The `new violence' has also been diagnosed as an affliction of societies in the post- 
authoritarian period. At the heart of this new violence are conditions of deeply 
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ingrained social inequality and exclusion, thwarting the expectations of improvement in 
security and the rule of law that had been heightened by the return to democracy. 
However, it is claimed that the new violence is unleashed when inequality and social 
exclusion combine with the legacy of multiple centres of justice. 182 This combination 
leaves a wide array of criminal and social violent actors who fill up the security vacuum 
left by the failure of the rule of law. Yet the existence of multiple centres of justice 
itself is a manifestation of the crisis of the state. It reveals the inability of the state to 
exercise its hegemony as the sovereign authority within its territory. For this reason the 
strength of the state within the context of post-authoritarian transition forms a central 
aspect for analysis in this study. 
The claim that the face of conflict is changing has however faced some intellectual 
challenges. Opponents contend that the `new war' thesis is an exaggeration of the 
empirical realities of armed conflict, which have been present for a century. What is 
believed to have changed is not so much the nature of war as the growing academic, 
policy and political attention being given to the horrifying features of civil wars. '83 
More poignantly, it is contended that warlords have been present for centuries and have 
emerged historically when central political-military control breaks down. 184 These 
build on the work of other analysts who advance the thesis of state collapse as the 
context which produces warlord politics. 185 Yet much of these analyses rely on the 
concepts of warlords and state collapse, which do not correspond exactly to the main 
concerns of this study. The term, warlord, is used mainly to describe an individual who 
controls a particular group or area through the possession of significant military power 
to exploit fragmenting states in pursuit of private interests. Yet, apart from Somalia, 
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Liberia and Sierra Leone the majority of sub-Saharan African states cannot be qualified 
as collapsed states. Overall, as conventional civil wars began to decline from the late 
1990s the phenomena of state collapse and warlords have gradually ceased to be the 
defining elements of the crisis in many states in the region. 
Instead of state collapse and warlords, the concepts of state weakness and civil militias 
are used in this study. The concept of militia has been found to be analytically more 
useful than that of warlord, which focuses narrowly on individual actors, and fails to 
clarify the dynamics of conflict and security. 186 Militias in Africa are also said to 
operate where the state is fragmenting and where official state forces have broken up. 187 
Fragmentation more accurately defines the context of militias in Africa than collapse, 
yet militias also operate in African countries, which are not fragmenting, and so a more 
general term is needed to capture the range of contexts. This informs the preference for 
the concept of state weakness, more so that state weakness most accurately defines the 
two cases selected for this study. Nigeria and South Africa represent post-authoritarian 
societies where civil disorder is increasingly aggravated by informal armed forces in the 
form of civil militias. The conclusion below draws together the salient insights derived 
from the review, which are relevant to demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism in 
the context of post-authoritarian transition. 
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Conclusions 
This chapter examined the existing analysis of civil-military relations and that of 
internal armed conflict under four related bodies of literature that touch upon the central 
concern of this study, which is the relationship between demilitarisation and civil 
militarism in post-authoritarian regimes. The four bodies of literature considered 
include those of military-society relations, societal militarism, the privatisation of 
violence, and the new violence. A number of crucial insights were provided by these 
groups of literature, which are relevant to understanding the linkages between 
democratisation, demilitarisation, post-authoritarian insecurities, the legacies of 
militarism and civil militarism in post-authoritarian states. 
A most important idea suggested, particularly by the more recent literature on civil- 
military relations, is the paradox of demilitarisation. It is observed in this body of 
literature that the demilitarisation of politics and the state may actually contradict the 
demilitarisation of the civilian society and lead to its militarisation. Although this 
observation is central to the problem of this study, the way in which this contradiction 
works is not clearly explained in the literature. 
In relation to demilitarisation, the literature also point to the legacies of militarised 
politics, which are present in the wider society after the formal termination of the 
political prerogative of the military. Here, a more comprehensive strategy of 
demilitarisation that goes beyond military disengagement from politics and deals with 
the legacies of militarism in the wider society is suggested. This observation speaks to 
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the third research questions of this study, which seeks to explore policy options for 
minimising the risk of civil militarism in the course of demilitarisation of politics in 
post-authoritarian new democracies. 
Equally important, the process of democratisation was linked to internal armed 
conflicts. Although democratic transition is said not to cause conflict in itself, the 
literature strongly suggests that the early stages of democratic transition can be very 
traumatic and generate collective violence within the country involved. At this stage, 
the role of political elites in restricting successful transition is identified as the cause of 
conflict. Even though democratisation is not linked directly to militias, armed conflicts 
provide one of the most conducive political contexts for civil militia activities. 
The literature also points to civil militarism as part of the legacies of militarism in post- 
authoritarian societies. Here civil militarism is a continuation of resistance against 
prolonged state violence before the transition or against authoritarian residues in the 
new political climate of semi-democracy. Other legacies of authoritarianism pointed 
out in the literature are the issues of structural violence such as social exclusion, 
deprivation, poverty and the failure of development. While these conditions do not go 
away with authoritarian rule, they create the conditions that drive the prevalence of 
militarism in society. Specifically, it is suggested that entrenched social exclusion and 
alienation due to authoritarian rule erode social norms, dialogue, compromise, and 
accommodation, while producing a culture of violence in which non-state forces 
emerge. 
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Finally, civil militarism is considered as a particular form of the privatisation of 
violence, which is associated with weak states. The literature identifies this condition of 
state weakness as providing the political context of crisis in which militias emerge and 
operate. Such a context may not necessarily be a conflict situation, but may involve a 
situation of violence where conflict, peace and crime co-exist. Under such conditions 
the state is unable to resolve normal social tensions, while its weakness creates the 
space for opportunistic use of violence to serve various interests. Furthermore, militias 
both provide protection and challenge the authority of the regime under such conditions 
of state weakness and are therefore real actors to be reckoned with in civil-military 
calculations. This means that any meaningful strategy of demilitarisation has to account 
for civil militias in the contexts where the authority of the state is fragmented. 
The examined literature provides initial support to the major factors identified in the 
conceptual framework in Chapter 1 in relation to the emergence of civil militarism in 
post-authoritarian regimes. These factors include demilitarisation, democratisation, the 
legacies militarism, structural violence, and the fragmentation of state authority in weak 
states. The contradictory linkage between demilitarisation at the political level and at 
the societal level suggested in the literature strengthens the working hypothesis of this 
research. The rival hypotheses of the study were also supported in the literature. The 
utility of the central hypothesis and the rival hypotheses is therefore explored in the next 
two chapters (4 and 5), which examine the case studies of Nigeria and South Africa 
respectively. Emerging findings from these case studies are compared in a cross-case 
analysis under Chapter 6. Chapters 4,5 and 6 therefore constitute the main analysis of 
this study and aim to prove whether or not any relationship exists between 
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demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism, how this relationship works, and the 
implications for the search for a new approach to demilitarisation that minimises the 
risk of civil militarism. 
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Current Map of Nigeria Showing the Regional States 
A 
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A Historical Map of Nigeria Showing the Three Federal Regions 
Created by the British Colonial Administration in 1954 
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Map of Nigeria Showing Major Ethnic Groups and Minority Areas 
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Chapter 4 
Civil Militarism and Demilitarisation of Politics in Nigeria 
Introduction 
This chapter contains the report of the field research conducted in Nigeria to explore the 
relationship between civil militarism and the demilitarisation of politics. It begins with 
a brief history of military rule and the emergence of civil militias in the post- 
authoritarian dispensation in the country. This is followed by a discussion of the nature 
of the Nigerian state which forms the contextual background for the militarisation. The 
discussion of the context centres on issues of national socio-political cohesion, the 
political economy of petroleum oil, and social control under military rule. The chapter 
proceeds to examine the specific ways in which the militarisation of the state and 
politics occurred, and how this process developed into the militarisation of the wider 
society. The main analysis in this chapter deals with the democratic transition in 1999 
and the strategy of demilitarisation implemented by the civilian administration. The 
focus of this analysis is the effect of the transition and demilitarisation on the rise of 
civil militias in post-military Nigeria. Other extraneous and intervening variables are 
discussed in order to attend to rival explanations. The chapter concludes with the 
discussion of the O'odua People's Congress (OPC) as the main militia used for analysis, 
although examples of other militias in the country are used in the discussion of the 
OPC. The main argument of this chapter is that while the OPC first emerged as a 
pressure group, the demilitarisation strategy of the government in 1999 weakened social 
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control and therefore created the space for the group to be hijacked and transformed into 
a militia. 
The militarisation of the political process in Nigeria commenced almost with the 
historical emergence of the country as a post-colonial state. While the country became 
independent in October 1960, it took just over five years for the military intervention in 
the political process to commence. This involvement took the extreme form of direct 
military seizure of governance in January 1966 through a violent coup d'etat and the 
consequent termination of the fledgling democratic order. This event was epochal in the 
political history of post-colonial Nigeria as it marked the beginning and entrenchment 
of a long era of military rule and violent state repression. Although there was an 
interregnum of civilian rule between 1979 and 1983, the militarisation of politics was so 
far-reaching that the attempted democratic transition could not last more than four years 
before it was replaced by the second and more ferocious phase of direct military rule. 
In all, military rule generated internal resistance, which was sometimes violent. Some of 
this resistance was also sometimes national and sometimes factional in its mobilisation, 
but was prevented from escalation through military repression. While it brutally 
prevented the collapse of the state, the violent response of the state to political pressures 
created the conditions under which the civil society became gradually militarised. 
In spite of the political culture of incessant coups and counter-coups, the transition to 
democratic rule in 1999 has not been punctuated by direct military intervention of the 
past, but has since progressed through a democratic change of government in 2003 
through elections. Interviews with observers and military officers in Nigeria indicate 
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that the military hierarchy has since been disposed to remain in the barracks rather than 
intervene in domestic politics. 188 Although there is still discontent at the lower level of 
the officer corps, the cooptation of the military hierarchy by the political elites has made 
the transition more durable than earlier attempts, even if slow, and minimised the 
probability of reversal to military rule. 
The transition itself represented a non-violent pact between the military and political 
elites, even though resistance from the organised civil society was a dominant source of 
pressure against military rule. From the standpoint of the outgoing military leadership, 
the transition was an attempt to depoliticise the military institution. But from the 
standpoint of the political elite, it marked the demilitarisation of the polity, an issue of 
great concern to the civil and political society. The weight of this concern was 
demonstrated by the new civilian government that came to power in 1999, as it 
promptly began to seek ways to neutralise the political disposition of the military 
hierarchy. 189 
The transition has proceeded with a decreasing emphasis on the state violence of the 
past, carried out by state security forces. Ironically, the new democratic space has also 
revealed an increased dimension of the militarisation of civil society, generated by the 
repression of the era of military rule. The manifestation of this has been the emergence 
and proliferation of civil militias of various characters, starting from the last few years 
of military rule to the present. These militias include the O'odua People's Congress 
(OPC) operating in Yoruba-speaking states of the southwest, the Bakassi Boys in the 
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Ibo-speaking states of eastern Nigeria, and the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force 
predominantly in the Ijaw-speaking parts of the Niger Delta, among other less popular 
groups. These militias are structured organised formations that determine and enforce 
their own order in a way that is not accountable to the state or complementary to the 
security and order that the state seeks to provide. On the contrary, lacking in 
constitutional mandate, they have been involved in many incidents of extreme violence 
that threaten public security and order, and generate fear in the communities where they 
operate. 
The presence of the conditions described above motivated the selection of Nigeria as a 
case study for exploring the relationship between the demilitarisation of the political 
process and civil militarism in Africa. In pursuit of this exploratory study, an empirical 
research was conducted in Nigeria in order to generate the relevant data for analysis. 
The data were sought on the specific questions of the original research questions of the 
study, as specified in Chapter Two. The main techniques used for gathering the data 
were interview, documents and direct observation. 
This chapter presents the report of the field study. The report begins by setting the 
historical background to political militarisation and discussing the contextual conditions 
which impact on the provisioning of public security and order in Nigeria. The report 
goes on to discuss the process and extent of the militarisation of the political process. 
The policies and actions of the state in order to demilitarise politics are examined as 
well as the metamorphosis of civil militias as alternative security providers. The 
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analysis centres on examining whether or not there is a link between the demilitarisation 
of politics and civil militarism. 
Historical and Contextual Background 
The militarisation of Nigeria took place in the context of a country that was ridden with 
internal crises and contradictions from the beginning. Inter-group tension over the 
allocation of power and wealth had already become an important feature of the 
country's political economy before the end of colonial rule, and these crises constitute 
part of the crucial challenges that confronted the new independent state and state 
builders from 1960 onwards. The failure of post-independence state elites to manage 
and resolve these crises drove the military to intervene and seize the control of political 
power from 1966. However, militarisation aggravated the national crises rather than 
control them. Within a few months of the first coup, the military as an institution itself 
was caught by the vortex of the national crises and became one of the most glaring 
theatres of social conflict. The disintegration of the military into factions and the 
resultant cycle of coups and counter coups not only mirrored but aggravated the 
contradictions embedded in the foundations of the state. 
The decolonisation process and the hard political bargaining and ferment it generated 
among a highly diverse national population and elites lay at the roots of the immediate 
post-colonial crisis. With ethnicity, region and religion as crucial indicators, this 
diversity provided a veritable catalyst to the fundamental social conflict over the control 
and management of national power and wealth. This social conflict and the crisis of 
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governance generated thereby are symptomatic of a more structural condition of state 
weakness, that is, the inability of the state to accumulate sufficient power and wealth to 
meet the requirements of human development and security. This weakness provides the 
socio-political climate both for the historical militarisation of politics and the 
contemporary emergence of civil militias in social conflicts. It is therefore crucial to 
examine the nature of the state in Nigeria and the political economic conditions 
embedded in the state as determinants of state violence and militarism in society. 
The State and the Politics of Division 
Nigeria has always been a weak state. With regards to security, this weakness has been 
evident in two dimensions. One is the failure of state elites to create the conditions for 
national cohesion among the country's multifarious social groups. The second is the 
failure of the state to provide adequate public protection of citizens from physical 
violence. However, the failure to promote national social cohesion among the different 
identities within the country represents one of the most fundamental factors underlying 
the militarisation of politics and this factor is discussed further below. 
Although Nigeria is composed of over 300 ethnic groups, the political history of the 
country has been dominated by a somewhat controversial discourse of geopolitical 
dichotomy between the North and the South. 190 This dichotomy itself is a legacy of the 
regional system of colonial administration, which structured the vast country into a 
federation of three relatively strong regions - the Northern, the Western and the Eastern 
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Regions. This structure was maintained at independence and, by 1963, a fourth region 
was created known as the Mid-West. The four regional structures were maintained until 
1967 when General Gowon's Government restructured the federation into twelve semi- 
autonomous states. 191 In spite of the division into four regions, the Western, Mid- 
Western and Eastern Regions were geographically situated in what was regarded as the 
southern part of Nigeria and were thus seen as elements of a larger South. In 
consequence, beyond just administrative structuring, the concepts of the North and the 
South came to be socially accepted as the two most important regional identities that 
dominate the competition over national wealth and political power to date, long after the 
abandonment of the regional structure. 
This division is controversial in the sense that it does not follow any naturally occurring 
geographic or demographic criteria or those that are socially determined. Rather the 
dichotomy represented a merging of geography and political calculations that embodied 
serious structural contradictions. In the first place, northern Nigeria as colonially 
constructed is much bigger than southern Nigeria, in terms of landmass. The second 
factor, which is related to the first, is that the North contains more population of people 
than the Southern region. 192 A third contradiction is the nearly polar distribution of 
religion along this dichotomy. While majority of Moslems in the country live in the 
north, the south is home to the majority of Christians. This arrangement created an 
uneasy coincidence of religion and ethnicity. A fourth problem with the structure of the 
state was that the boundaries of the regions coincided with the boundaries of the major 
ethnic groups. 193 The Hausa/Fulanis controlled the Northern Region, while the Yorubas 
and the Igbos controlled the Western and Eastern Regions, respectively. This meant 
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that the regions were in fact ethnic states. A fifth factor has been that the north and the 
south are respectively dominated by large ethnic groups in such a way that the 
dichotomy does not reflect the multiplicity of the subaltern minority groups. In the 
north, the Hausa/Fulani group is the largest and dominant among a vast array of 
minority groups. Also in the south, the Yoruba and the Igbo groups are the two largest 
and dominant groups among a large number of minority groups. Ironically, the 
minority groups put together are by far larger than the three groups mentioned above. 
These structural contradictions have had crucial implications for the history of social 
conflict and the crisis of governance in the country. 
One major implication of these contradictions is that, given the geographical and 
numerical superiority of the north, the region has continued to control the central 
government and dominate national politics since independence. The north had a greater 
number of seats in the national parliament and so continued to enjoy a majority in the 
first two general elections of 1959 and 1964.194 Sir Abubakar Balewa who became the 
first Prime Minister in 1960 and who also won the second elections was of 
Hausa/Fulani extraction in the north. The third and fourth general elections of 1979 
and 1983 mirrored a similar pattern to the two previous ones. The north controlled the 
majority in the national parliament, while the President Shehu Shagari emerged from 
the north. 
This political unevenness and the inability of the central government to skilfully 
manage the mutual animosities generated between the north and the south resulted in 
bitter controversies over the second general elections and the national census of 1965. 
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In the West, regional elections were marred by violent protests as the central 
government was accused of manipulating the results to the advantage of the ruling 
party, which was predominantly a northern party. In addition, the results of the national 
census were rejected in the West, where the central government was suspected of 
manipulating in favour of the north to maintain its political dominance. In the face of 
disorder and dangerous ethnic competition as well as corruption among the political 
elites, the military seized power to restore democratic order and political stability. 195 
This was to be achieved through the elimination of the corrupt political class so as to 
halt ethnic politics. 
Yet the ethnic composition of the leaders of the coup, its execution, its aftermath and 
the way it was interpreted in different parts of the country resulted in the exacerbation 
of the deepening mutual ethnic and regional hostilities among the peoples of the north 
and the south. Most officers who led the coup were Igbo-speaking from the south. 
Whether by design or accident of history, the majority of political leaders killed during 
the execution of the coup (the Prime Minister and other prominent leaders) were 
northerners, while most of their counterparts from the south escaped death. Although 
the coup failed the most senior military officer, Major General Aguyi Ironsi, who 
rightly assumed the leadership of the country was incidentally of Igbo extraction. This 
deepened the interpretation of the coup as an ethnic agenda by the Igbos against the 
Hausa/Fulanis, and led to an organised massacre of Igbos living in the north by northern 
military officers. The counter-coup of July 1966, involving the murder of General 
Ironsi, was perceived as the furtherance of this agenda of ethnic vendetta. 196 By this 
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time, the military, seen as the guarantor of national political stability, was beginning to 
succumb to the pressures of the politics of division. 
Furthermore the second coup generated bitter political tension between the Eastern 
Region (which was home to the Igbos) and the north, which also controlled the central 
government. Apart from displacing the Igbos from leadership, another round of 
deliberate massacre of the Igbos in the north took place during the counter-coup and 
continued into 1967.197 The felt injustice in all of those tragic events led to the failed 
bid for a separate state of Biafra in 1967 by the Eastern Region and the violent civil war 
of 1967-1970. 
A very complex coincidence of religion, ethnicity and regionalism has also had serious 
implications for political order in the contemporary history of the country. Communal 
conflicts since independence have featured the deliberate targeting of religious groups 
and institutions. Violent attacks on Christians and churches in numerous communal 
conflicts in the north and reprisals on Moslems in the south clearly point to the 
dominance of religion in the history of communal conflict in the country. However, the 
fact that many southern Moslems living in the north were also targeted during such 
conflict reveals the limitation of religion in the understanding of social conflict in the 
country. The trend appears to suggest a central importance of ethnic identity in the 
conflicts. 
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After all, conflicts have also occurred among the minority peoples of the north as well 
as those of the south. The Tiv Riots of the early 1960s, the Tiv-Jukun conflict, the 
Modakeke-Ife conflict, and the variegated current conflicts in the Niger Delta area are 
among the many examples. 198 These conflicts are mostly engaged in by groups with 
different ethnic constituencies, which however share common religious beliefs such as 
the Warri crisis. 199 This trend not only lends credence to ethnic identity in relation to 
religion, but also adds to the complexity of the nature and causes of communal conflict 
in the country. A very prominent strand these conflicts occurs between the so-called 
indigenes and settlers. Indigene-settler conflicts over the control of resources in a 
particular territory between indigenous and settler ethnic categories which may or may 
not share a common religion. Good examples of these complex communal conflicts 
include the Ife-Modakeke, Tiv-Jukun, Zango-Kataf, Warri, and Ijaw-Ilaje conflicts. 00 
This complexity is made more difficult when the role of regionalism is also considered. 
In most of the conflicts, some northern Moslems from the southern fringes of the north 
have been targeted while minority groups from the far north are not targeted in 
communal conflicts in the north. This introduces an element of regionalism in the 
understanding of the phenomenon and exposes the limitation of ethnicity as the central 
issue. 
The social divisions in the Nigerian society are therefore multiple and complex. These 
divisions have been in existence before independence and have generated the history of 
frequent communal conflicts that expose such prominent factors as ethnicity, religion, 
resources, and the manipulation of these factors by political elites. This complex 
interaction of religion, ethnicity and regionalism, makes it difficult to grapple with the 
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nature of communal conflict in the country and the way in which this conflicts have 
been played out since independence. Nevertheless, the conflicts continue to reveal 
lingering tensions embedded in very complex north-south, Moslem-Christian, and 
indigenous-settler dichotomies across the country. The culmination of all these crises 
produced an environment of political instability and disorder, which in turn provided the 
conditions for the militarisation of the political process through military involvement in 
politics. 
Nigeria as a Petro-State 
Nigeria has vast deposits of petroleum oil and has generated enormous financial 
revenues from the exploitation and export of this natural endowment since the late 
1950s. From the early 1970s, when the global energy crisis shot oil prices up four 
times, oil became the single most important foreign exchange earner for the country. 
The export components of other sectors, including agriculture and manufacturing, 
considerably dwindled and the country gradually progressed into a monolithic economy 
depending nearly solely on petroleum oil for national revenues. The primacy of oil has 
remained an endemic feature of the economy with recent figures showing oil as 
constituting nearly 50% of GDP, over 90% of export earnings, and over 80% of total 
government revenues. 201 Oil has therefore generated considerable rents for the Nigerian 
economy since the early 1970s, and has provided the prospects for transforming the 
post-colonial state into a strong modern state capable of generating the conditions for 
human security and development for its population. 
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Ironically, however, much of the political instability, violence and conflict in Nigeria 
have been closely associated with petroleum oil and its exploitation. More poignantly, 
oil has been identified as the theatre of conflict within which politics in Nigeria is 
played out. 202 A highly oil-dependent country, Nigeria has continued to manifest 
serious political crises that characterise countries suffering from the so-called `resource 
curse'. 203 The contours of these oil-related political crises or the political dimensions of 
the resource curse, in the context of Nigeria have been defined by violent conflict, 
authoritarianism, social inequality and political corruption or prebendal politics. 
Although regional and national struggle for political power in Nigeria has been 
characterised by violent conflict since independence, the most significant incident of 
violent conflict are the Biafran Civil War of 1967-1970 and the current spasmodic but 
endemic low-level conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta, in terms of their duration and 
cost. Incidentally these conflicts have been fuelled by the country's dependence on oil, 
even though the root causes of some of them are known to lie elsewhere, including 
ethnicity and the way it is politicised . 
204 The conflicts therefore present very useful 
points where oil and politics in Nigeria mix. 
Yet it is not just dependence on oil, but its abundance (measured by the level of income 
per capita from exports earning) and the way in which earnings from its exports are 
distributed, that provides the most striking links with conflict and political instability. 
2002 figures show that although Nigeria earned $13.7 billion as rents from oil exports, 
per capita income from such rents for the same year stood at miserable $140 as against 
$3071, $14790, $5640, $9777, and $7506 for the equally oil-dependent but more 
politically stable Arab states of Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Brunei, the United Arab Emirate, 
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respectively. In addition to higher abundance, these Arab states have tended to spend 
their huge oil rents through large-scale distributive policies. 205 In contrast, oil rents in 
Nigeria are distributed through networks of political patronage. It is therefore the low 
per-capita income from oil rents (occasioned by a high population burden) and the neo- 
patrimonial distribution of oil revenues that have put Nigeria among the category of 
conflict-prone petro-states. 06 However, patrimonial distribution is not limited to oil 
resources, but is rather a manifestation of the nature of politics and of the state into 
which oil rents are inserted. 
As discussed in the preceding sub-section, Nigeria at independence inherited a weak 
federal system bedevilled by ethnic-based and regional political competition, which 
frequently assumed violent proportions. It is into this existing political landscape of 
contending sub-national forces that the curse of oil rents as centralised resource was 
inserted. 207 As oil rents gained ascendancy in the Nigerian economy, the personal 
income tax system was abandoned and the derivation principle (discussed below) which 
government distributed revenue among the constituent units of the federation came to 
be replaced by the Federation Account in 1966.208 The Federation Account, made up of 
the Federal Government, State Governments, and Local Governments (since 1979), 
serves as the pool from which oil rents are distributed to the federating units by the 
central Federal Government. 
At independence the revenue allocation formula was based on the principle of 
derivation, by which a certain proportion of revenue from natural resources was retained 
in the region of their origin while the rest was collected by the central government. 
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Fiscal centralism was made possible through the authoritarian logic of military rule 
rather than a result of negotiation and consensus between the regional states and the 
central government. This has made the states increasing more dependent on the centre 
for their economic survival, and reinforced post-colonial neo-patrimonial politics. As 
regional states became completely dependent on central patronage from the Federation 
Account, they also became the most important mechanisms for distributing oil revenues 
to regional political elites and clients of the ruling patrons. Thus the creation of more 
states and Local Governments became a major trigger for intense political competition 
and conflict over revenue allocation among ethnic groups and their elites. 09 This 
explains the intense agitation for more states and local governments, and the rapid 
proliferation of states from 12 in 1967 to 36 in 1996. The centralisation of the vast oil 
rents therefore enabled ruling elites to enhance their relative power position through 
skilful maintenance of patron-client networks, while exacerbating poverty, social 
inequality and conflict, including in the Niger Delta where most of the country's oil is 
exploited. 
The Niger Delta has the highest incidence of poverty in the country, according to 1996 
statistics. It is also populated by minority ethnic groups, which have suffered 
disproportionately from the developmental costs of oil extraction. 210 Combined with 
the fact that the oil industry tends to generate huge rents for the state and the oil 
companies, while employing relatively few local workers, these conditions create high 
social inequality and consequently the structural conditions underlying the current 
violence in the Niger Delta. 
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Centralisation of oil rents has also been closely associated with the political culture of 
corruption for which Nigeria is very much known. The Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI) of Transparency International has consistently ranked Nigeria as one of the most 
corrupt countries in the world, and politics have continued to be dominated by pervasive 
incidents of corruption. 11 According to Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission, the country lost US $380 billion between 1966 and 1999 to state 
corruption. 212 Political corruption became a rampant institutional issue with the oil 
boom of the early 1970s, culminating in the personalisation of political power and well- 
known massive looting of centralised oil rents by the regimes of General Babangida 
(1985-1993) and General Abacha (1993-1998)213 Yet this political culture has 
persisted after military rule. Most federal and state institutions, including the 
Parliament, the Police and State Governors, have been indicted and sometimes 
convicted of looting state funds since after 1999. Even the Presidency has not been able 
to escape this pandemic. The President and Vice-President are currently subjects of an 
on-going bitter in-fighting in which each side has accused the other of monumental 
mismanagement of huge sums of money belonging to a Petroleum Technology 
Development Fund (PTDF). 214 Meanwhile the Senate has just concluded investigations 
of the PTDF affair and indicted both President and Vice-President in its report. 215 The 
PTDF is a special fund established for the purpose of training and education in the 
petroleum and gas industry, and preliminary Senate investigation has revealed the 
complicity of the President and the Vice-President in misappropriation of the fund and 
its distribution to their respective political clients. 
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Corruption in successive federal governments has also resulted in official neglect of the 
Niger Delta, and consequently the failure of development in the region. Given the 
relative importance of national income generated from the region, the failure of 
development has left the region with appalling conditions of underdevelopment that 
aptly capture the `paradox of plenty'. 216 This pattern is no less visible at the state and 
local government levels, where credible recent findings have revealed the politics of 
corruption involved in the distribution of oil rents. 217 These findings also show how the 
struggle for access to oil rents as a source for political power has become a source of 
conflict at community levels, particularly in the volatile Niger Delta. 218 Furthermore, 
the failure of development in the midst of plenty has fuelled a cumulative and pervasive 
sense of injustice and deprivation, which underlie the history of resistance to oil 
exploitation by the federal government. 
Furthermore, because oil rents discourage tax and lead to high patronage, it has made 
the state less accountable and more repressive. This mechanism fosters authoritarianism 
and works against democratisation and democratic development. 219 The militarisation 
of the political process and the entrenchment of authoritarianism in Nigeria have 
important links with petroleum oil. As host communities mounted more pressure for 
local control of oil resources, the Nigerian state has responded with increasing 
repression in collaboration with the powerful multinational oil companies operating in 
the Niger Delta. This became more obvious in the turn of the 1990s, when the Military 
Government commenced a systematic crackdown and open violence against community 
restiveness in the Niger Delta. 220 This trend culminated in the Ogoni crisis and the 
brutal killing of Ken SaroWiwa and his co-activists in 1995 by the Military Government 
107 
of General Abacha. 221 From this point, the state became increasingly brutal, particularly 
in the Niger Delta where it relies on the use of the military to secure oil extraction. 
Federalism under Military Rule 
Much of the crises afflicting Nigeria is associated with the way in which the structure of 
federalism has been distorted after independence. The main distortion of the structure 
and practice of the Nigerian federal system has been the over-centralisation of 
authority. 222 Federalism was adopted by the British colonial administration in 1951 in 
response to fears by minority ethnic groups of domination and exclusion by the major 
competing ethnic groups in the imminent post-colonial order. 223 In the context of ethnic 
and regional competition (or animosity), the establishment of federalism was an attempt 
to decentralise state authority and create local control and management of political 
power and economic wealth. The ultimate goal of this arrangement was to diffuse the 
existing political tension and conflict among the various ethnic groups in the country. 
Thus the early post-independence regions had autonomy in the control and management 
of wealth and power within their territories, and were the dominant political forces in 
relation to a weaker Federal Government at the centre. 
The first major distortion of the federal system was the centralisation of political power 
with the intervention of the military in governance. Admittedly, the federal system had 
started showing signs of imperfections from independence. Minority agitations over 
marginalisation continued as indicated by the demand for the Mid-Western Region and 
the Tiv riots of 1960 and 1964 224 These agitations stemmed from the fact that the 
federating regions coincided with the boundaries of the major three ethnic groups, as 
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discussed earlier in this chapter. This meant that the minority groups in each of the 
regions had no space to realise their political aspirations, as they were eclipsed by the 
major groups. What was needed was a further devolution of powers to the grassroots in 
such a way that responded to the aspirations of the minorities. The incursion of the 
military into politics in 1966 did the exact opposite of that, and federalism became one 
of the first casualties of the militarisation of politics. 
Through Decree No. 34 of 1966, the General Ironsi military government abolished the 
federal regions and reconstituted them into provinces within a unitary state. 225 Even 
though the military regime of General Gowon returned the country back to a federal 
structure comprising states (rather than regions), 226 the core principles of federalism 
were progressively eroded. Under military rule the states were governed by military 
administrators who were appointed by and accountable only to the Head of State. 
Further more the constituent states were created on the basis of patronage and contained 
the potentials for conflict 2 27 This meant that, as opposed to the principles of 
decentralisation and devolution in a federation, the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as it 
has been known even under military rule) embodied a structural contradiction in which 
political power was concentrated in the centre. 
The centralisation of power in an ethnically diverse Nigeria with a history of inter- 
ethnic and regional rivalry was bound to aggravate social conflict rather than reduce 
them. This was demonstrated by the proliferation of communal conflicts throughout the 
duration of military rule in Nigeria. Most of these conflicts were underpinned by the 
intensification of the historical mistrust among the various ethnic groups. The 
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centralisation of power under military rule exacerbated ethnic animosity as the control 
of the central government by any group meant the control of the entire country and fear 
of political exclusion by others. For instance, because nearly all the military Heads of 
State were of northern origin, most of the national crises, including the civil war of 
1967-1970, centred on the overbearing dominance of the north as perceived by the other 
ethnic-based regions. Below the level of the central government, many of the states 
mirrored the structure of majority-minority divide at the centre and were transposed into 
the indigene-settler distinction at the roots of the majority of the communal conflicts in 
the country. 228 
The second and perhaps a more fundamental distortion of the federal structure has been 
the concentration of wealth and economic resources at the centre. Again, this was 
created by the military in government as a deliberate state policy. The centralisation of 
power required a commensurate centralisation of wealth to bolster the economic base of 
a hegemonic centre, and this was done through the monopolisation of land and mineral 
resources, which were under the control of the regions and communities. 
At independence, Nigeria practiced fiscal federalism as enshrined in the constitutions of 
1960 and 1963. National wealth was distributed through the `derivation principle', by 
which a certain proportion of federal revenue generated from natural resources 
(including petroleum oil) was given back to the regions and communities where it was 
derived. Within this period, 50% of the revenue from mineral resources was given to 
the region from where the minerals were extracted; 30% was put in a distributable pool, 
which was divided among all the regions including the producing region. Only 20% 
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percent went to the Federal Government. 29 However, from 1969 onwards, just as 
petroleum oil began to assume strategic economic importance, the derivation principle 
was progressively replaced by fiscal centralism by successive military regimes. 
Through the Petroleum Decree 51 of 1969 and the Land Use Act of 1978, the ownership 
of all lands and the control of resources contained therein (including oilfields) were 
vested on the Federal (Military) Government. 230 As shown in the table below, the 
progressive centralisation of wealth involved a decline of the proportion of the 
derivation from 50% to 3% and an increase to the current 13%. 
Table 1 
Distribution of Oil Revenues in Nigeria 
Years Producing State (%) Federal Government (%) Distributable Pool 
(%) 
1960- 50 20 30 
1967 
1967- 50 50 - 
1969 
1969- 45 55 - 
1971 
1971- 45 minus off-shore 55 plus off-shore proceeds - 
1975 proceeds 
1975- 20 minus off-shore 80 plus off-shore proceeds - 
1979 proceeds 
1979- - 100 - 
1981 
1982- 1 and half 98 and half - 1992 
1992- 3 97 - 
1999 
1999- 13 87 - 
Source: Adapted from Sagay, 1. E., (2001) 
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In the context of strong ethnic and regional animosities, the centralisation of national 
wealth and its distribution unsurprisingly became one of the most important sources of 
tension and conflict. Couched in terms of demand for fiscal federalism, the struggle for 
a fairer and more equitable distribution of revenue from mineral resources, particularly 
petroleum oil, has remained an enduring legacy of militarism. The demand for local 
control of oil resources has been forceful from the start of military rule as demonstrated 
by the Isaac Boro-led rebellion of February 1966 against the Federal Government. In 
this rebellion Boro's Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) mounted a violent demand 
for local control of resources and a separate existence as an independent Niger Delta 
Republic in the Ijaw-speaking areas of Nigeria. 231 The NDVS thus became the first 
militia to question the structure and practice of Nigeria's federalism. 
Yet the attempted rebellion was launched two months into the beginning of military rule 
and suggests that Isaac Boro and his communities were acting against what was 
perceived as external exploitation of their locally based resources through the 
instrument of central military control, especially at a time that oil was beginning to gain 
ascendancy in national wealth. The militarisation of politics therefore created 
immediate and well-placed fears in the operation of the federal principle. These fears 
were later confirmed by the monopolisation of land and oil resources from 1969 by the 
militarised Federal Government at the centre. In addition, the government at the centre 
was seen as being controlled by the north, and this strengthened suspicions that fiscal 
centralism was a tool for exploitation of oil revenues and relative deprivations by the 
north232 Although successive military governments brutally suppressed these agitations 
the grievances have escalated over the decades, including the Ogoni uprising of the 
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early and mid-1990s, and the demand for genuine fiscal federalism has assumed more 
violent expressions since the end of military rule. 
While Nigeria's federalism was intended to foster national cohesion in a pluralist 
society, its perversion through military centralisation defeated that goal and embodied 
one of the most serious though suppressed grievances during the military era, namely 
the National Question. 33 Concerned with how to structure the Nigerian federation in 
order to accommodate the interests of and guarantee access to power and equitable 
distribution of resources among ethnic groups, the national question has generated 
strident calls from various parts of the Nigerian society since 1992 for a Sovereign 
National Conference to fashion out a fundamental restructuring of the state. 34 The 
distortion of the federal structure of the state through military centralism represented 
one of the most crucial conditions under which militarisation and social conflict were 
mutually reinforced. The next section examines the specific processes by which the 
political process was militarised and how those processes relate to the conditions that 
supported the emergence of militarism in the civil society. 
The Militarisation of State and Politics 
Militarisation of the state began with the coup of 1966 and involved the imposition of 
military control over the political, economic and social aspects of Nigeria. However in 
this study this form of militarisation is considered as essentially political with social 
implications and is assessed in two major dimensions. The first is the extent to which 
the structures of political power and governance were controlled by armed and security 
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forces, and the second is the extent to which the civilian society had been penetrated by 
armed and security forces to maintain social control since 1966. 
Throughout the period of military rule the process of governance, development and 
implementation of state policy, including security policy, was taken over by the military 
hierarchy. In order to maintain effective social control the state relied heavily on brutal 
and paramilitary policing. From 1966, a Supreme Military Council (SMC), under the 
leadership of the military Head of State, was established as the highest decision making 
organ of the state. 235 All democratic structures were dismantled, including the 
Parliament and the Constitution. While the Constitution was replaced by decrees and 
edicts, the core democratic processes of elections and public debate were also 
outlawed. 36 This arrangement was mirrored in the regions where Military 
Administrators oversaw the implementation of the SMC's decision. 
This involvement in and penetration of governance is a crucial indicator of the 
militarisation of politics as it replaced governance by popular consent with governance 
by coercion to back up decrees. Furthermore it commenced a process that excluded the 
majority of the population from the decision making process, which generated its own 
social contradictions. Genuine agitations for re-democratisation combined with the 
ethnic and regional understandings or interpretations of successive coups became a 
source of tension and threat to the stability of incumbent military regimes. 
The suspension of democratic structures and processes foreclosed dialogue and political 
bargaining among the diverse groups within the country in two major areas. They 
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prevented frank democratic debate over the resolution of existing tensions and over the 
control and use of resources and political power. This control was sustained with the 
threat of decisive military response to any form of challenge. 237 The necessary 
enforcement of such threats to maintain militarised order fostered a tradition of state 
violence with military regimes, which became a most critical source of insecurity. 
However, the incidence of such tensions has increased since the end of military rule, as 
the new democratic atmosphere has permitted their expression through violent conflict. 
The Policymaking Environment under Military Rule 
Military rule itself represents the militarisation of the state and politics as it involves the 
direct control of all the structures of governance and management of the political 
process by the military. The control of policymaking and implementation by the 
military hierarchy through the SMC, later renamed the Armed Forces Ruling Council 
(AFRC), was the highest expression of militarisation. In addition to the proscription of 
the institutions of democracy, the constitutional judiciary was undermined and court 
decisions were frequently flouted by subsequent military regimes. The real institutions 
of the judiciary were not the courts but special military tribunals set up all over the 
country since the Special Military Tribunal Decree of 1976238 These tribunals, backed 
by decrees, dealt not only with alleged offences within the military but also civil and 
criminal cases involving civilians, and so the legal and judicial systems were 
extensively militarised. 
Apart from governance, the military also complicated and as well became entangled in 
the pressures of social conflict embedded in the state. As showed earlier in this chapter, 
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the first military coup heightened inter-ethnic suspicion which generated the counter- 
coup and the subsequent Biafra War. Furthermore the military advantage of the north 
meant that successive military rulers emerged from the region and this continued to fuel 
grievances in other regions over perceptions of political exclusion and domination by 
the north. As rightly observed, under those political conditions, conflict pressures 
continued to build up and escalated through the decades 
239 The restriction of the 
democratic space through military rule reinforced existing inter-group tensions and the 
incidence of identity-based communal violence increased with the era of military 
rule 240 The exacerbation of previous communal conflicts and the rise of numerous new 
ones throughout the duration of military rule indicate the mutually reinforcing 
interaction of the militarisation of politics and public insecurity in the country. 
By the time the counter-coup of July 1966 took place, it became obvious that the 
politics of social division plaguing the nation had infected the military. The organised 
massacre of Igbo settlers in the north and Igbo officers before and during that coup by 
federal troops have been discussed earlier. Yet, apart from the partisanship that 
developed rapidly, competition over personal interests among officers became a source 
of the chain of coups led by northern officers against northern officers. Thus violence 
became the only means for changing government as long as the military remained in 
power. 
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The Militarisation of Law and Order 
Day-to-day law and order was equally militarised. Admittedly the police in Nigeria had 
been militarised since colonial period. Under colonial rule, they were raised as military 
units, commanded by army officers, possessed artillery and designed as occupation 
forces against a restive populace241 They were therefore very brutal and exploitative 
and this continued into the post-colonial period. 42 However, the period of military rule 
further militarised the police and exacerbated the history of brutality. Protracted military 
rule relied on joint operation task forces comprising military and police personnel to 
combat violent crimes 243 From the late 1980s and through the 1990s, the military 
governments of the states established anti-crime squads comprising of military and 
police personnel which were very brutal in dealing with suspected armed robbers. 
These operations were ostensibly meant to deter and combat violent crimes such as 
armed robbery through stop-and-search operations as well as rapid response to distress 
calls from victims of crime, they increasingly became symbols of a militarised polity. 
Crime fighting took very violent dimensions, one of which was the frequent gun battles 
between the joint patrol teams and criminal gangs in the streets and on the highways. 
Gun battles associated with serious casualties, including death, on both sides became a 
common experience of ordinary citizens in the last phase of military rule 245 With long 
experience of such vicious joint operations, the normal civilian police itself became 
increasingly militaristic and acquired the character of a cruel and imperious force. An 
enduring consequence of this is the eventual adoption of military and paramilitary 
methods in law and order policing, which in itself was an indication of the militarisation 
of politics. 
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Yet militarisation of law and order eroded the efficiency of the police in crime control. 
Joint operations with the military were in themselves a manifestation of institutional 
neglect suffered by the police at the hand of successive military regimes. Saddled with 
lack of resources and protracted embargos on recruitment, the police displayed 
increasing brutality but lacked the capacity to control crime on their own. In many 
cases, the police were out-gunned by armed robbers who wield far more sophisticated 
weapons. 246 Thus the militarisation of law and order concealed a condition of 
inefficiency in the police to discharge their constitutional role of providing public 
security and order beneath the veneer of increasing brutality. 
The Militarisation of Civil Society 
In various parts of the country, the contradictions of protracted military rule generated 
increased social tensions. From the late 1980s, these tensions were manifest in 
increasing political demands from the civil society and escalation of violent conflicts 
and were threatening authoritarian social control. The need to maintain militarised 
social control against these threats informed a gradual militarisation of the civilian 
society. 
Societal Restiveness and Militarisation 
Resource control has since been a central issue in violent community agitation. This is 
particularly so in the Niger Delta which is home to the vast reserves of petroleum. 
Since the NDVS rebellion of 1966, agitation for greater local ownership and control of 
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oil resources in the Niger Delta became a perennial threat to the authority of military 
control. This pressure took on an increasing militant form, as military repression 
became more totalitarian, with communities becoming part of a total mobilisation for 
violent resistance against central exploitation of local resources. Although the NDVS 
rebellion was crushed immediately, a number of popular movements have emerged in 
the Niger Delta since the dawn of the 1990s, including the Movement for the Survival 
of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), and the Ijaw National Congress (INC). In the case of 
MOSOP the pressure was much popular and well organised, leading to the successful 
eviction of Shell from Ogoniland in 1993, through peaceful resistance. The gradual 
expression of violence by these movements during the climax of military repression in 
the 1990s only goes to reveal the process of reproduction of violence in a civil society 
that was being militarised through military occupation and violent repression. 
The demands for resource control by the Ogonis were frustrated by brutal state 
repression that involved the deployment of military troops in the Niger Delta on a 
permanent basis. Heavy military occupation of Ogoniland from 1992 by the Babangida 
regime led to a chain of violent tensions, which culminated in the execution of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa and eight other leaders of MOSOP by the regime of General Sani Abacha in 
1995 247 This was followed in 1998 by the military invasion of Kaiama, an Ijaw 
community in the Niger Delta, where youth civic organisations under the umbrella of 
the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) had mounted concerted demands for resource control 
through the famous `Kaiama Declaration'. 48 The militarisation of the Niger Delta was 
also taking place at a time that the state was battling with the crisis of legitimacy, 
following the infamous annulment of the June 12 general elections 1993. 
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Nearly all the critical sectors of society had been mobilised for civil disobedience to 
protest the annulment by mid-1994. The banks, the universities, the political class, 
petroleum workers, trade unions and civil society groups all joined in the resistance to 
reverse the cancellation, mainly in the southwest 249 State response of rising popular 
pressures for democratisation and political liberalisation became ferocious with the 
national political crisis following the annulment of election results. State security 
agencies became more confrontational in dealing with this political pressure, while 
prominent political figures were assassination by the regime's death squad known as the 
Strike Force 25° Military force was also applied to prevent political gatherings and 
paramilitary forces deployed to universities to crush restive student unionism, which 
had become an integral part of the struggle. Moreover, military personnel were 
deployed to man essential services that were being sabotaged by uncompromising 
industrial actions. 51 Increasingly, from the mid-1990s, the militarisation of the civil 
society had escalated from the initial occupation of communities to near total control of 
civil affairs, especially in the cities. 
The Militarisation of Social Conflict 
In response to the growing occurrence of communal conflict, Nigeria's military regimes 
relied on violent internal security operations and enforcement of order by the military in 
the affected communities. In the context of ineffective law and order policing, and the 
absence of democratic structures for conflict transformation or resolution, elements of 
the armed forces were constantly deployed to forcefully quell communal violence. 52 
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However, in many cases of such internal operations, the military maintained a 
protracted presence in the communities and committed brutal violations against the 
population. 253 
While this strategy involved reactionary containment of the expression of violence in 
communities, it did not address the underlying causes and motivation of conflict. The 
implication has been that protagonists in these conflicts were forced to live under 
conditions of militarised or armed peace, in which the structural grievances remained 
and constantly found violent expression whenever military suppression was relaxed. 54 
In a few cases where the state had interest, special military-styled tribunals were set up 
to try perpetrators in communal conflicts. However the trials themselves were held in 
secret and in dubious circumstances. 55 This made the verdict always controversial and 
fuelled tension in the communities, rather than seeking to comprehensively resolve 
them. The nature of these tribunals reflected the military justice system, which tried 
failed coup plotters, and reflected a further militarisation of civilian communities. 
From the foregoing, it is not surprising that by the time military rule ended in 1999 the 
militarisation of the Nigerian state and its politics had produced a legacy of state 
violence and endemic violence in the wider society. In addition to the brutality of 
security forces, the post-military legacies of societal militarism were essentially the 
restiveness in civil society over structural grievances and the intensification of 
communal violence. The transition to democracy in May 1999 provided the momentum 
and political space for the newly elected government to reverse these legacies of 
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militarism and to demilitarise the state and society as a guarantee for a more secure and 
safe political order. 
Democratic Transition and Civil Militarism 
Political liberalisation commenced in mid-1998, following the sudden death of the Head 
of State, General Sani Abacha, and precipitating a sudden and brief process of transition 
to multi-party democracy in May 1999. As discussed earlier, the militarisation of the 
political and societal spaces unleashed state violence and pervasive fear that became the 
main sources of insecurity throughout the period of military rule. The provision of 
adequate public security therefore required a political climate that allowed for the 
conscious transformation of the state from being the source of violence to the protector 
of the citizenry from violence. 
The principle of popular participation inherent in democratic governance, at least in 
theory, meant that the process of the transition itself would feature intense pressure 
from the political and civil societies to reform the state and deal with the legacies of 
militarism. This is important because the end-state of a safe and secure post- 
authoritarian social order depended critically on the degree to which the transition 
process addressed the major issues of violence and insecurity. This section examines 
the actual process of the post-Abacha transition and the extent to which it addressed the 
legacies of militarism in the polity. It is important to examine the impact of the 
transition on the legacies of authoritarian rule in order to understand the tentative 
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implications of the latter for the rise of civil militarism and the associated problems of 
public insecurity after the inauguration of democracy in 1999. 
The Transition Process and the Legacies of Militarism 
At time that the transition to democracy began in 1998, militarisation had left a legacy 
of violence in both the state and society. State security forces had become extremely 
brutal in their operations in relation to civilians and were deployed permanently in parts 
of the country where resistance to state authority was manifest, particularly the Niger 
Delta. This included the armed forces, intelligence forces such as the State Security 
Service (SSS), and the police. In the wider society, communal conflicts had escalated in 
frequency and spread, with ethnic, religious and resource dimensions. 256 In addition, 
growing resistance to state authority had created an atmosphere of community 
mobilisation and radical protests, particularly in the Niger Delta and the Lagos area. In 
the former, the annulment of the 1993 elections was seen as an act of injustice against 
the Yoruba, and the struggle to reverse that annulment was slowly escalating from 
protest to violent uprising. In the latter, the execution of the leaders of MOSOP by the 
state in 1995 radicalised youth militancy in the resolve to break state control of oil 
resources of the Niger Delta by the junta. 257 Although growing violence in the society 
did not produce standing militias before 1998, many communities in different parts of 
the country had been mobilised for violence expression of perceived grievances. 
The transfer of power from the military to elected civilians on 29 May 1999 only 
marked the beginning and not the culmination of democratic transition in Nigeria. This 
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is so for some important reasons. One of these is the sudden way in which military rule 
ended. Until this time the military regime of the late General Abacha had succeeded in 
foreclosing genuine transition to multi-party majority rule. 258 Although the presidential 
election of 12 June 1993 was unilaterally cancelled by the military government, it was 
allegedly won by the late Moshood Abiola, who was from the Yoruba ethnic group in 
the southwest. A significant political implication of that election therefore was the 
perceived shift of power from the north to the south. 
Given this background, June 12 was seen as the first attempt to shift political power and 
the control of the centre from the north to the south since 1960 259 Although General 
Obasanjo from the same southwest had ruled the country between 1976 and 1979, he 
became the head of state because he was the second-in-command in the military 
government of General Mohammed who was killed in a failed coup. Obasanjo 
therefore stepped in to complete the transition programmes of his late master, and so the 
administration was not seen as his. The cancellation of results of the general elections 
of 1993 by General Babangida, a man of northern origin, was therefore easily seen in 
the south as yet another act of aborting the political aspiration of the southwest. Seen as 
a continuation of the politics of exclusion, the cancellation further reinforced existing 
ethnic and regional tensions embedded in the federal structure of the state. 
The sudden death of General Abacha in June 1998 forced a hasty transition programme, 
which lacked thoroughness and broad inclusiveness. To start with, this event allowed 
the emergence of a pro-democracy military leadership represented by the new Head of 
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State, General Salami Abubakar. 260 Accordingly, the transition was driven largely by 
the military high command, which loathed the `misadventure' of the military into 
politics and suddenly wanted to rediscover the military's constitutional role under 
democracy. 261 The overriding goal of the transition between 1998 and 1999 therefore 
was not to address the fundamental dysfunctions of the state, but rather to end the 
history of military politics. 62 This meant that the structural issues of alienation, 
deprivation and domination, which underlie the history of violence and militarism in the 
national society, as well as the issues of violence and insecurity, were never addressed 
during the transition period. 
Admittedly, the national political mood following the death of General Abacha and the 
liberalisation of the political space by General Abubakar centred on the need to redress 
the injustice inherent in the cancellation of June 12. Since the winner of that election, 
Abiola, had died in detention in July 1998, the only way to appease the southwest was 
to allow for the first post-military presidency to emerge from zone 263 Yet, although 
this helped to diffuse the mounting tensions at the time, it only proffered solution to an 
instance of and not to the fundamental structure of the contradictions in the society. 
Nor did the 1998-1999 transition seek to address the perceived or real problems of 
economic deprivation and exploitation. Put succinctly, the transition did not attempt in 
any way to deal with the distortions in the structure and practice of federalism, which 
had remained the most fundamental crisis of the Nigerian state. On the contrary the 
transition passed on this fundamental structural crisis to the democratic dispensation. 
This meant that militant communities involved in agitation against the state were not 
demobilised, nor were the incentives for such demobilisation created. 
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Furthermore, the transition was guided and managed almost entirely by the military 
government with minimal or no participation from the political and civil society. A key 
indicator of the lack of popular participation is the current 1999 Constitution, which was 
drafted and approved by the outgoing military government. On 11 November 1998, the 
Justice Niki Tobi led Constitutional Debate Co-ordinating Committee (CDCC) was set 
up by the General Abdulsalami government to propose a constitution for the incoming 
civilian administration. Made up of 25 members, the CDCC was ordered to submit its 
report to the Head of State by 31 December 1998 2 Within this period of six weeks 
the Committee, rather than open a national broad-based debate, did some minor 
adjustments to the 1979 Constitution, which was then submitted as its report. 265 The 
lack of popular participation excluded the possibility of a frank and comprehensive 
national debate over the structural causes of political crisis from the transition process. 
Consequently the vexed structural issues of ethnicity, resource control and the structure 
of the federal system, which were at the roots of crisis and violence, were clearly 
avoided in the course of the transition and were left to fester in the post-military era. 
The sudden and hasty nature of the transition and the fact that it was dominated by the 
military also excluded the question of direct state violence. No doubt, the military 
government released virtually all political detainees and prisoners in an attempt to 
improve human rights. However, there were no policy changes or institutional re- 
arrangements to deal with the militarisation of social control, nor were there any 
political debate on the issues. Over all, the thinking of the outgoing military 
government seemed to be to `disengage' from politics as quick as possible and so to 
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leave all the problems of the country for the in-coming civilian administration to deal 
with. Key issues of police brutality, internal deployment of the military and the 
institutional capacity for public security did not feature either in policy pronouncements 
or public debates throughout the period of the transition from military rule in 
1998/1999. 
The implication of all these was that the legacies of militarism were not dealt with by 
the transition, nor were there any attempts to do so. The result has been the 
continuation and escalation of ethnic and regional conflict over the control and 
distribution of economic resources and political power since the end of military rule. 
The escalation of these crises since 1999 has created the context in which the 
democratic climate has also coincided with the new phenomenon of civil militarism, in 
which (un)civil militias have emerged as dominant security actors in the country's 
historical conflicts. The failure of the transition process to address the problems of 
militarism created a gap in the quest for a secure democratic order, and the new 
government sought to fill this gap through strategies of demilitarisation. The next 
section examines the strategies of demilitarisation adopted by the new democratic 
government after 1999. It assesses the approach used by the post-military state in 
addressing the legacies of militarism inherited from the history of military 
authoritarianism. 
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Demilitarising the State and Politics 
The approach to demilitarisation adopted by the Obasanjo government from 1999 has 
been that of coup prevention, and hence has focused essentially on the armed forces and 
how to secure their loyalty and commitment to civilian rule. This is expectedly so 
because of the history of rampant military coups since 1966, as well as the political 
influence of the military hierarchy and their entrenched economic interests. The process 
of reversing the militarisation of the state and the political process is examined here in 
terms of changes in government policy statements, new institutional design, and the 
actual practice of the civilian government. What is measured here is the extent of 
reduction in the role of armed and security forces in the control of governance structures 
and processes, and in the maintenance of social control. 
Control of Defence and Security 
The inauguration of the elected government in May 1999 was the critical first step to 
demilitarising the domestic politics of Nigeria, apart from constitutional provisions. In 
the 1999 constitution attempt is made to foreclose the incident of military coup. Section 
1 (2) prohibits the seizure and control of the state by unconstitutional means, thus 
providing the legal safeguards against direct military rule and a fundamental basis for 
demilitarisation. The constitution also provides for executive control and Parliamentary 
oversight of defence and security forces and policy, including a clear definition of roles 
for the security sector. 266 However, the new civilian government was aware of the need 
to move further with steps to neutralise the political power and influence of the military, 
owing to the antecedents of the latter's political adventures which always violated the 
constitution. 
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A very important policy decision of the Obasanjo government on assumption of office 
in 1999 was to announce a compulsory retirement of all military officers who had held 
political appointments during the military era. 
267 This was part of a broad programme 
of military reform articulated by the president in a speech given in July 1999 at the 
graduation of the Course Seven students of the National War College, Abuja. 
268 Other 
important elements of the envisaged programme included retraining of members of the 
armed forces on civil supremacy over military power. Interviews with informed 
observers and military officers in Nigeria reveal that this strategy was informed by the 
necessity to prevent the possible occurrence of coups. 
269 This appears to be a strong 
position of the Presidency as a similar statement was issued by the Vice President in 
September of the same year, in which the proposal to subordinate the military to civil 
authority featured prominently. 270 With the end of military rule some of these officers 
had returned to regular service to work together with their less privileged counterparts 
who had not enjoyed the same privilege of influence and wealth in the era of military 
rule. 
With regards to social control and law and order, the civilian government took steps to 
reduce military penetration of civil society and state violence. The government ceased 
using lethal force to suppress non-violent political activities. Furthermore, military 
personnel detached to the paramilitary anti-crime units were returned to their barracks in 
1999, and this lessened the presence of military forces in society. 71 In response to 
communal violence, government decided to allow the police to deal with civil 
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disturbances in the first instance, sending in military reinforcements only when the 
police were unable to restore order. 
Assessment of the Demilitarisation Strategies 
A marked outcome of this strategy has been the complete physical disengagement of 
active military officers from direct governance. In terms of policymaking, including 
that of the security sector, the direct role of the military and security forces has 
completely been removed with the democratic transition. Of crucial importance, the 
Federal Executive Council (FEC), which is the highest state policymaking body, is 
made up of an elected President, the Vice President (who is jointly elected with the 
president) and ministers who are appointed by the president. This is a departure from 
the military order where all the members of the Ruling Council were senior officers of 
the armed and security forces. Furthermore, a civilian has been the Minister of Defence 
since 1999, and this is the same with the police where a civilian minister is in charge of 
Police Affairs. The operational headquarters of defence and police are directly 
accountable to these ministers, respectively. 
The democratic government has taken many practical steps to effect civil control of the 
armed and security forces in line with its policy articulations. The retirement of 
political military officers announced by the government was implemented with 
immediate effect. To this effect, over one hundred senior officers, including generals, 
were retired by the President a few weeks after assuming power. 272 In a further effort to 
assert civil authority and control over the armed forces, the Chief of Army Staff and the 
two other service chiefs (Navy and Air Force) were retired and immediately replaced in 
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May 2001 over policy disagreement with the President 273 The Chief of Army Staff, 
General Victor Malu, particularly led the opposition of the service chiefs to 
government's decision to bring in the US Military Professionals Resources Incorporated 
(MPRI) to handle the restructuring of defence in a way that was deficient in 
legitimacy. 274 The government has also instituted a series of military training, and 
seminars aimed at political education, particularly inculcating the doctrine of civil 
supremacy over military power. These programmes have been held for selected middle- 
level officers, with the hope that what is learned would be passed on to other officers 
and men. 275 
However, in spite of these changes in institutional arrangements and policy orientation, 
the demilitarisation of the political process in practice has been half-hearted, narrow and 
shallow. In the first place, the democratic transition itself was initiated by the military 
as discussed earlier. The military hierarchy allowed the political transition in 1999 
because it needed a democratic environment for the military to rediscover itself after 
decades of political misadventure, which eroded professionalism. 276 Because of this 
narrow objective, the framework and momentum for demilitarisation set by the military 
was limited. In addition the current constitution was drafted by the out-going military 
government and lacked broad-based consultation and public debate. Rather, the 
constitution reflects a civil-military bargain in which the military secured the space for 
its continued political relevance in the new democratic order. The constitution is 
ambiguous on the exercise of parliamentary oversight of the security sector, especially 
in the areas of budgets and maintenance of law and order. 
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Apart from this deficient legal foundation, the demilitarisation strategies of the new 
civilian administration lacked legitimacy and popular support. Lacking in consultation 
and input from the public and security institutions, the strategies lacked the legitimacy 
to sustain the limited momentum created. 77 This has led to the observation that what 
has been achieved is `presidential control' of the armed forces, rather than civil 
control 278 The controversy and resentment generated by the intervention of the MPRI 
within the defence headquarters itself, and the civil-military tension that resulted from 
this are indicators of the narrow legitimacy base of the strategies. 
Executive control of armed and security forces is still tenuous. Informed observers have 
pointed out that the military has stayed out of power in self-restraint and not as a result 
of any deliberate reform being undertaken by the civilian government. With low 
morale, evident in a surge in voluntary retirement; a lack of conviction about civil 
supremacy among the lower ranks; and an army that was still restive in late 2004, 
evident in the rumours of coup, the military has hardly been brought under effective and 
secure civil contro1279 
The influence of the military constituency in the security policy making process is still 
high; the penetration of society through internal security operations has remained; and 
the military tendency towards unilateralism and non-consultation has attended 
government's decisions in relation to defence and security matters since the transition in 
1999. The fact that the President is a retired army general who had ruled the country as 
military Head of State in the past has cast much doubt on the extent to which the policy 
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process has been demilitarised. Together with the appointment of retired senior military 
officers into key positions of oversight, this has underlined the endurance of the military 
approach to the policy process in the security sector. Until 2003, the Ministers of 
Defence and Police Affairs were retired army officers, General Danjuma and General 
Jemibewon. To date the Chief Security Adviser to the president is also a retired 
general, while a retired colonel heads the State Security Service. Policy making in the 
security sector has therefore largely remained exclusive to this group of retired military 
officers, reminiscent of the era of military rule. This has led some to observe that the 
President operates the military style of leadership in governance. 280 
Critical actors, which have continued to be excluded in the demilitarisation strategies, 
are the parliament and civil society groups. For instance, the deployment of troops for 
law and order maintenance has never been referred to the parliament for debate, 
approval and regulation. 281 The parliamentary institutions and mechanisms of oversight 
of defence and security have been inactive since 1999. The relevant standing 
committees in the parliament have never debated on any related issue and have never 
scrutinised budget implementation in the sector. The only parliamentary discussions on 
security issues occur when ministers defend budget proposal for appropriation. 82 The 
lack of transparency in defence budgets also contributes to the weakness of 
parliamentary oversight. For instance, while the parliament continues to pass the 
defence appropriation bill, in reality the actual money released to defence headquarters 
after the yearly appropriation act is overhead budget. The money for capital projects is 
never released from the executive to the headquarters, and the parliament has never 
questioned this trend. 283 
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Current internal security operations by the military reinforce the limitation of the depth 
of the demilitarisation strategies. The penetration of society by military and 
paramilitary forces, and their use of violence against citizens have persisted through 
1999. Acting under instructions of the President, military troops massacred hundreds of 
unarmed civilians in Odi in 1999 and Zalci-Biam in 2001. In spite of the widespread 
condemnation of these acts, the military has enjoyed impunity and none of its personnel 
has been brought to justice. 284 This trend suggests that political control has not 
translated into demilitarisation of politics. It shows rather that either control is being 
used by the democratic state in an undemocratic way; or that civil control may only 
have been achieved at the strategic and operational level, but not yet at the tactical level 
of day-today relations between security personnel and civilian members of society; or 
the combination of both. The US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, in 
its Country Report on Human Rights in Nigeria for the year 2000, argued that armed 
and security forces continued to commit extra judicial killings and used excessive force 
to quell civil unrest and ethnic violence throughout 1999, although they did so less 
frequently than under previous military governments 285 The frequency has however 
increased since 1999 and law and order maintenance had become a source of citizens' 
insecurity in itself. 
Between 1999 and the present, military forces have been deployed for numerous 
internal security operations in many locations of conflict. By 2001, army troops were 
already maintaining order in Kaduna, Benue, Taraba, Bauchi, Plateau, Kano and 
Nassarawa States. 286 The costs of these operations have been very high in terms of the 
security of citizens. Between then and now, troops have invaded and levelled many 
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communities across the country. The most publicised among these raids include the 
November 1999 levelling of Odi community in Bayelsa State by the army, resulting in 
the killing of several hundreds of people; the invasion in October 2001 of Zaki Biam in 
Benue State, which destroyed much of the town and killed about 200 civilians; the 
raiding in February 2005 of the town of Odioma in Brass Local Council of Bayelsa 
State by soldiers. Fifteen civilians were killed in this operation and many houses were 
burned. 287 All these operations were authorised by the democratic state and portrayed a 
scenario of warfare between the state and the society, in which the military the military 
has continued to play a dominant role. 
A much more serious case of militarisation of social conflict is the case of the Niger 
Delta. In response to growing violent agitation for resource control and communal 
conflict in the region the government commenced a military operation code-named 
"Operation Restore Hope, " a joint task force consisting of approximately five thousand 
army, navy, air force, and mobile police personnel under the command of an Army 
General. The task force has remained in the region to date and has been accused of 
employing lethal force in the communities. 88 In all of these violations no soldier has 
been held accountable by the state. This, combined with the above facts, shows that the 
political process, particularly the maintenance of law and order, remains militarised 
regardless of the transition to democracy. 
Some have even argued that the militarisation of law and order has become more 
intense than in the era of military rule. A senior military intelligence officer pointed out 
that there have been more military deployments to quell civil disturbance and to 
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maintain law and order since 1999 to present date than there were under military rule. 
289 
The power of the military to take autonomous political decisions or to challenge civil 
authority may have been curtailed, coups may have been prevented, and the government 
may possess political control of the security sector, but the military has continued to 
maintain an enduring presence in civil society. 
The enduring militarisation of law and order is also manifest in policing in the 
democratic dispensation. Decades of joint operations by police and military personnel 
have transformed the character of policing to paramilitary operations, which remained 
the practice to date. The Nigeria Police Force has not been reformed from paramilitary 
organisation into a modern civilian police governed by the rule of law. Policing is still 
governed by the colonial Police Act of 1943, which assigns military functions to the 
force. 290 Until January 2005 the government maintained a national anti-crime taskforce 
known as `Operation Fire-for-Fire', which was responsible for numerous human rights 
abuses in previous years. It involved the use of high firepower in crime prevention and 
combating. On December 28 2004, the then Inspector-General of Police, Tafa Balogun, 
announced that the police killed 1,694 "suspected armed robbers" during the year. The 
police also announced in 2002 that they killed more than 1,200 criminals in the year, 
while about 41 civilians were killed accidentally in the crossfire between police and 
criminals. 291 Apart from anti-crime operations, other victims of police brutality include 
protesters, detainees and convicted prisoners. 292 Even with the end of `Operation Fire- 
for-Fire' police brutality has persisted and this is acknowledged by the police 
themselves. 93 Paramilitary policing, as it is practiced, reveals a tremendous weakness 
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in the democratic control of the security forces and thus constitutes derogation from the 
strategy of demilitarising the political process. 
Furthermore, intelligence forces were completely left out of the demilitarisation process. 
In spite of the central role of intelligence personnel in the history of coup-making and 
state violence, the sector has been left intact and the tradition of secrecy of the military 
era still shrouds their operations 294 Particularly, the structures of the two most 
notorious services, the State Security Service (SSS) and the Directorate of Military 
Intelligence (DMI), have not undergone any known changes. 295 All attempts to obtain 
information on the intelligence services in the process of research were unsuccessful, 
and this itself reflected the continued lack of openness on intelligence matters. 
Militarism has therefore remained an important feature of the political process in 
Nigeria, despite the strategies of demilitarisation that have been implemented since the 
transition to democracy in 1999. Yet it is not only in the realm of the state that 
militarism is manifest in contemporary Nigeria. The wider society has also become 
increasingly militaristic, particularly since the end of military rule. Although conflict 
has been occurring in different parts of the country before and after independence, 
informal armed groups and security forces that are structured and autonomous of state 
control began to emerge within the last few years of military rule. This period has seen 
the emergence of violent vigilante groups, ethnic, religious, and party militias, all of 
which threaten the sovereign authority of the state and human security, as well as 
constitute parallel security forces outside state control. The most prominent ones, 
which are also the most violent, include the O'odua People's Congress (OPC), the 
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Bakassi Boys, the Egbesu Boys of Africa, the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force, 
and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. 
296 As discussed in Chapter 
2, these groups are referred to in this study as civil militias for the purpose of analysis, 
even though they differ in some respects. 
Furthermore, it is this pervasiveness of these non-state unregulated security formations 
in the society that is referred to as civil militarism in this throughout this study, and this 
has already been discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. This study is concerned with the 
emergence of civil militarism at the time that the realm of the state is being 
demilitarised, and thus seeks to understand the association between the two. Due to the 
multiplicity of civil militias groups, only the OPC was chosen for the study. Although 
the militias in the Niger Delta have been the most dangerous groups, given their current 
campaign of kidnapping, hostage-taking and bold confrontations with government 
troops, it was both difficult and unsafe to hold discussions with them in the course of 
fieldwork. Other groups such as the Bakassi Boys had crumbled in terms of their 
structure. Only the OPC had visible standing structures that were willing to grant 
interviews openly and under safe circumstances. 
Post-Military Civil Militarism 
Although communal conflict has been endemic in Nigeria since independence, such 
conflicts were not characterised by militia organisations. The emergence and endurance 
of militias embedded in society became a feature of the post-authoritarian era. The 
most visible and durable of these militias were the OPC, Movement for the 
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Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Bakassi Boys, the Niger 
Delta Peoples' Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND), and a host of other less known militant groups in the Niger Delta. 
These groups are distinct from other actors in communal violence in Nigeria in two 
important respects. One, they are organised into structured standing forces and are 
mobilised on a near permanent basis. The second factor is that these groups use 
violence for different purposes and appear as parallel security structures, adapting their 
functions to various security challenges as they emerge. 
It is difficult to make clear-cut distinctions between the various militia groups in 
Nigeria, and attempts to do so have created more difficulties in the conceptual 
understanding of the phenomenon. Most keen observers have regarded them as ethnic 
militias, and this is understandable because many of the militias operate within ethnic 
boundaries and their membership is virtually ethnically homogeneous297 Yet of these 
observers, some have attempted to distinguish the so-called ethnic militias from violent 
vigilantes, 298 while others have lumped violent vigilantes and militias together under the 
name of ethnic militias. 99 The problem of these conceptual ambiguities has mainly 
stemmed from the combined use of the terms ethnic and militia. Although, ethnicity 
represents a most readily available instrument for social mobilisation in Nigeria, the 
relationship between ethnicity and militias in Nigeria is not straightforward just as the 
distinction between militias and violent vigilantes is artificial. 
There are indeed few ethnic militias in post-transition Nigeria and the only clearly 
visible of them is the MASSOB. Formed on 13 September 1999, MASSOB articulates 
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a plan to establish a separate state for the Igbo-speaking people of present Nigeria and 
has mounted series of violent operations in the pursuit of this goal. 300 Although there 
are other socio-cultural groups such as the OPC, the Ijaw National Congress (INC), the 
Igbo People's Congress (IPC) and the Arewa People's Congress (APC), those that are 
violent did not articulate ethnic and militia agendas simultaneously. For example at the 
time that OPC was formed as an ethnic umbrella for Yoruba interests, it functioned only 
as a pressure group and had not become a militia organisation. The INC, IPC and the 
APC are pressure groups clearly mobilised to advance ethnic interests, but do not 
operate as militias. 
The only ethnic group that eventually became a militia is the OPC and its militarisation 
involved a process that should be understood in detail. This is because at the time that 
the OPC became a militia, it lost its popular legitimacy among the Yoruba and therefore 
ceased to be an ethnic organisation, in the sense of representing the ideals of progress 
for the Yoruba. Furthermore, not all acts of OPC violence have been ethnically 
motivated. Many of the conflicts involving the OPC have been among the Yoruba and 
victims of its violence have included Yoruba. 301 The other well-known militia groups 
such as the MEND, NDPVF and the Bakassi Boys, though mobilised along ethnic lines, 
do not articulate ethnic objectives and cannot be said to be ethnic militias. On the 
contrary, they canvass for the economic interests of the Niger Delta region, even though 
some of their activities relate to criminality in the process. Most importantly, the Niger 
Delta is not culturally homogeneous but is composed of vastly diverse ethnic identities, 
which have fought one another in protracted conflicts. 
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In the case of violent vigilantes, the distinction is equally not straightforward. Non- 
violent vigilantes, which carry out anti-crime activities in collaboration with the state 
police, have been a historical feature of policing in Nigeria. 302 However, the anti-crime 
groups that emerged after the transition in 1999 differ markedly from the normal 
(traditional) vigilantes. The post-1999 anti-crime groups are highly structured, well 
armed and operate as parallel security forces. The most known violent anti-crime 
organisations are the Bakassi Boys and the OPC, and these groups have been engaged in 
many violent confrontations with the police. Apart from the police, they have also been 
involved in violence with other social groups, resulting in many instances of extreme 
violence and killing 303 Thus, the post-1999 violent anti-crime forces cannot be 
categorised as vigilantes. Rather, their structure and activities mark them out clearly as 
militias, even if crime control was an essential factor in their emergence. 
The post-1999 militias therefore started as different forms of pressure groups driven by 
the structural crisis of the Nigerian state. The main indicators of state crisis, which 
provided the focal point for the mobilisation of these groups, have been the inability or 
the failure of the state to address the legacies of exclusion and exploitation that underlie 
the history of conflict, and the failure of the state to supply adequate public security 
from violent crime. 04 Yet, even this distinction is sometimes artificial. As the pressure 
groups developed into militias, both the crime control motive and the political economic 
motive appeared to be present simultaneously. Again, the OPC is the most obvious 
example of a cultural pressure group, which later added anti-crime operations as a 
cardinal objective. Furthermore, all the militias, whether they emerged as anti-crime 
groups or socio-cultural groups, became political in nature and operated as instruments 
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of violence used by political elites in such a way that undermines the role of ethnicity 
and social alienation. They became involved in civil disputes and were used to settling 
scores among politicians of the same ethnic and regional origins. 305 A more 
comprehensive factor is the crisis of state weakness, which became more obvious and 
generated more societal pressures on the state after the transition to democracy. This 
informs the use of civil militia as a more appropriate category, which accommodates the 
various shades of parallel security forces emanating from the civilian society with 
various motives. 
In order to understand the process by which what began as social movements developed 
into civil militias in the context of post-authoritarian transition and demilitarisation, a 
detailed examination of particular cases of militia organisations is required. The OPC is 
selected for this purpose and the next section of this chapter deals with the militarisation 
of the organisation after the end of military rule 1999. 
The Case of the O'odua People's Congress (OPC) 
The use of military force against society by previous military regimes did succeed in 
imposing social control on a restive population in the short term. However, that model 
of social control depended on the immediate fear it imposed on the population without 
resolving the structural causes of restiveness in society. The result has been the 
persistence of structural social contradictions, which found several opportunities for 
violent expressions. The most devastating of such violent expression in Nigeria so far 
was the three-year Biafra War. Notwithstanding the many violent expressions of social 
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conflicts and democratic pressures, such violence did not produce civil militias 
throughout the period of military dictatorship. Civil militias as political actors began to 
emerge with the weakening of military dictatorship, and began to increase in number 
and intensity with the advent of democracy. This trend represents a paradox whereby 
the demilitarisation of the state appears to open spaces for militarisation by civil actors. 
OPC was founded in August 1994 as a pressure group to advance the interests of the 
Yoruba ethnic group through non-violent means. 06 Central to this agenda is the 
objective of defending the Yoruba ethnic group from what was felt as injustice and 
marginalisation within the federation. 307 This position was also corroborated by the 
local leadership of the organisation in Lagos, which declared the objective of the 
organisation as defending the socio-cultural heritage of Yoruba. 308 Set in the 
background of the wider national political context of mutual ethnic mistrust, and the 
immediate cancellation of the results of presidential elections of the previous year, 
complaints of injustice and marginalisation were bound to evoke passionate sentiments 
in the southwest. The presumed winner of the elections of 1993 was the late Chief 
Abiola (a Yoruba person), and the struggle for the re-validation of that electoral 
mandate provided the impetus for addressing this felt injustice. 
It has been noted elsewhere that the democratic struggle to realise the electoral mandate 
of June 12 was the clear-cut aim of the organisation at formation 309 However elements 
of OPC leadership have revealed that a crime-free society is part of the cultural heritage 
of the Yoruba, which the organisation seeks to defend. Although it was prominent in 
the pro-democracy protests and public demonstrations in the southwest that attended the 
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controversial cancellation of the election, OPC did not transform into a militia until 
after the death of General Abacha (which ended the most brutal era of military rule) and 
installation of the democratic government in 1999 310 It began to operate as a vigilante 
organisation committed to fighting crime in the context of a weak criminal justice 
system that had long failed to deal with the crime problem in the country, particularly 
armed robbery. 
In the pursuit of this objective, OPC meted out extremely violent methods of justice to 
alleged criminals, including raiding, shooting, beheading, mutilation, crucifixion and 
burning of properties of armed robbery suspects, starting from 1999 311 At this stage, 
the organisation began to shift focus from its original agenda of defending the alleged 
Yoruba interests as well as fighting the alleged marginalisation of the group. It was 
increasingly assuming security functions in a way that did not compliment public 
policing but sought to replace it. 
OPC leaders justified this new security role with the argument that the state's criminal 
justice system had failed to prevent armed robbery and that they were filling the security 
vacuum thus created. 312 However, this rational became tenuous as OPC moved on 
beyond crime-fighting and began to assume the form of an army involved in violent 
operations against members of other ethnic nationalities living in Lagos and in the 
southwest, particularly members of Hausa and Ijaw ethnic groups. 313 OPC has denied 
being an ethic militia, and argued that clashes with other ethnic communities in Lagos 
were triggered when such communities rose to the defence of their members who were 
arrested by OPC as crime suspects. 314 Yet such violent conflicts between OPC and 
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other ethnic communities had increased in number and spread beyond the city of Lagos 
to other locations in South-western Nigeria. While the entire Yoruba people did not 
endorse OPC as an ethnic army to engage other ethnic nationalities in violent conflict, 
this trend equally defies the explanation given by OPC leaders. 
Soon the state also became one of the targets of OPC violence. The expanding security 
and military remit of OPC brought it into confrontation with the police and the courts. 
Although police repression against OPC's pro-democracy activities had been mounted 
since 1996 when its president was arrested and detained, violent reprisals against the 
police began in 1999 just before the inauguration of the civilian government. These 
operations included attacks on law courts, police stations, vehicles and personnel. In 
such operations, police personnel were killed, abducted, maimed, and bathed with acid. 
They also seized large amounts of arms and ammunition from the police and 
indiscriminately released many detainees from police cells, including OPC members 
and armed robbery suspects. 315 The war against the state, the seizure of weapons and 
release of detained criminals appeared more like urban terrorism than anti-crime 
vigilantism that the OPC claimed. Although the organisation still enjoyed sympathy 
from segments of the Yoruba group, its urban terror tactics was already causing fear and 
insecurity within Lagos city and its environs and revealed its transformation into a 
militia. 
The combination of violent vigilantism, ethnic violence and urban terror tactics of OPC 
undermined its initial moral authority to defend the interests of the Yoruba ethnic group 
and as a democratic pressure group. By the middle of 1999 it was abundantly clear that 
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OPC had become a noble idea that had gone out of control, and that needed to be tamed. 
A study of the trajectory of OPC's development is important for understanding the 
factors for its loss of initial focus and metamorphosis into a civil militia. 
Two years after formation, OPC was embroiled in a bitter leadership struggle within its 
own ranks. Led initially by a medical professional and a moderate, Dr Fredrick 
Fasheun, OPC began to witness the infiltration of more radical and militant but hardly 
educated elements between 1996 and 1998. The arrest and detention of its president 
within that period by the Abacha government created the opportunity for this 
infiltration. By the time the president was released after the death of General Abacha in 
1998, the militant elements had hijacked OPC leadership and steered it in the direction 
of violent confrontation. The new leader, Ganiyu Adams, a carpenter and commercial 
motorcyclist, with the support of prominent Yoruba leaders managed to supplant 
Fasheun. 316 It is at this stage that OPC became militant and began to shift focus from its 
original noble ideal of democratic struggle to defend Yoruba interests. However 
Fasheun promptly denounced this violent posture as `hooliganism' and rejected the new 
leadership after his release. 17 From 1999 onwards this ideological difference between 
the two rival leaders and their respective followers had split OPC into two factions, 
resulting in the breakdown of command and control as well as accountability of 
members' activities. The transformation of OPC into a militia therefore did not occur in 
a vacuum. Rather it occurred in the context of this internal leadership crisis and the 
consequent emergence and prominence of the more radical elements within the 
organisation. 
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While the failure of the criminal justice system to deal with violent crime added a 
significant dimension to OPC violence, it certainly does not explain the transformation 
of the organisation into a militia. OPC had existed with a different agenda before it 
went into crime fighting and violence. Admittedly, the crime rate was high in Nigeria at 
the time that OPC vigilantism and other similar organisations emerged. The crime rate 
had started to increase since the early 1980s as a result of urbanisation and declining 
socio-economic fortunes of the population and the state criminal justice system had 
been too weak to deal with this challenge. 318 Yet, this did not result in the emergence of 
militias or violent anti-crime organisations. There were, of course, traditional vigilantes 
and neighbourhood watches that operated since colonial times, particularly in rural 
Nigeria, as community anti-crime initiatives. 319 However these initiatives served their 
communities in collaboration with the police, and did not engage in the kind of extreme 
violence associated with the OPC and similar militias 320 Third, the fact that its 
founding national leader denounced violent methods indicates that security functions 
were not part of its original mandate. 
In addition, OPC operatives were also involved in acts of criminality themselves, 321 and 
lack the moral authority to fight crime. Furthermore it is difficult to see any evidence to 
suggest reduction in the level of violent crime as a result of OPC crime-fighting 
activities. OPC claimed that it has seriously reduced the violent crime rate in its areas 
of operation. However informed observers have maintained that violent crime has been 
on the rise, particularly in the Lagos area. 322 Finally, OPC did not have to become 
militant and adopt terror tactic to fight crime. Rather its military operations, methods 
and tactics defy the principles of crime fighting. 
147 
The understanding of OPC's militancy lies in the process of its development from 
formation to the present. It had a noble objective at the time it was formed - defending 
the Yoruba against marginalisation within the federation. However between 1996 and 
1998 the organisation was hijacked by some political elites, who restructured and 
transformed it for purposes other than the original interests of the entire Yoruba people. 
This is a position strongly held in the national headquarters of the Nigeria Police 323 
Political opportunism has also become a trend in the emergence of civil militias in the 
country. In a comparative study of other civil militia groups, including the NDPVF, the 
Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) and the Bakassi Boys, this trend was identified as 
prominent. 
Leaders of the NDPVF revealed that they had existed as part of community youth 
structures of popular pressure for resource control, which political elites began to 
exploit for their narrow interests as the country moved from military to democratic 
rule 324 They held that national political elites from their constituencies hijacked these 
structures during elections and used them to secure electoral victory through violence 
and intimidation of the opposition and voters. The politicians would arm them with 
deadly weapons and promise to reward them with jobs, houses, cars, and other material 
rewards after elections. These politicians not only always failed to keep their promises, 
but also failed to disarm the youth after the elections. A consequence of this is the loss 
of control of armed groups and the gradual transformation of a youth structure for 
collective action into a violent militia. 325 In the Niger Delta, the Rivers State Governor 
has been linked to the instigation of the series of violent conflict between the NDPVF 
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and the NDV since 2003 326 Similarly, the Governors of Anambra and Imo States took 
over control of the Bakassi Boys and employed them as their private armies against 
political opponents. 27 Incidentally such militias become a readily available instrument 
for use to a variety of interests. 
The fact that at the time that OPC leadership was taken over by the radical faction, the 
central grievance of injustice and marginalisation was being addressed meant that the 
new OPC leadership had an ulterior agenda. The most crucial indicator of 
marginalisation cited by the OPC leaders when it was formed was that the Yoruba was 
perpetually being denied the political leadership of the country since independence 328 
The only Yoruba person who had led the country by this time was General Olusegun 
Obasanjo who ruled as a military head of state between 1976 and 1979. However he 
only ruled for three years and it was rather fortuitous that as second-in-command he had 
to step into the office of the Head of State, who was assassinated in the abortive coup of 
February 1976. The facts that General Obasanjo stepped in only to complete the 
democratisation programme of his late master, and that the period of his tenure was 
relatively very short, were sufficient reasons to feel a sense of political marginalisation 
in a multi-ethnic state. 
The 1993 presidential election, which was presumably won by Chief Moshood Abiola, 
would have installed the first Yoruba president with executive powers and would have 
served to redress this felt marginalisation. However, the cancellation of the results of 
that election by the military government truncated that opportunity and heightened the 
feeling of injustice. Yet at the time OPC started its militant campaigns, the national 
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political mood was already sympathetic to the Yoruba cause. The marginalisation was 
being redressed and the OPC would have become less combative and reciprocated the 
national political rapprochement if it was not representing another agenda. After all the 
era of the worst military dictatorship had just ended with the death of the Head of State, 
General Abacha in 1998; the more benign interim military government of General 
Abdulsalami had committed itself to democratic transition to be completed in less than a 
year, and had released most political detainees (including Yoruba politicians); and all 
the political parties had agreed to allow only Yoruba candidates to contest the 
presidential election. 
OPC violence even intensified after the inauguration of President Olusegun Obasanjo, a 
man of Yoruba ethnic origin, in May 1999 and has persisted to date. This persistence 
after seven years of uninterrupted Yoruba presidency shows that OPC became a militia 
organisation when political opportunists and conflict entrepreneurs hijacked its 
structures and reoriented its mission to achieve some personal, rather than community 
or Yoruba ethnic agenda. This opportunistic takeover was achieved through the 
propping up of radical youths who lacked the professional and moral authority to 
provide leadership for the Yoruba people. By training and profession, the militants who 
usurped the leadership of OPC were unskilled labourers. 329 They therefore could never 
have qualified as leaders of the highly educated Yoruba people, but rather represented 
street boys who were willing and capable of doing the dubious bidding of political 
opportunists. 
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Conclusions 
State Weakness, Demilitarisation, Opportunism and Civil Militarism 
Political opportunism and the militarisation of OPC did not occur in a political vacuum. 
Political opportunism may have occurred in different forms under different political 
conditions, but did not necessary generate structured and organised civil militias in 
Nigeria until after the end of military rule. The emergence and proliferation of civil 
militias, including OPC and the many others, began to occur at a time when the political 
process was being democratised and demilitarised. What then is the connection 
between the democratic transition, demilitarisation of politics and the emergence of civil 
militarism? 
It has been shown earlier that the process of democratic transition itself marked the first 
step in the process of reversing the militarisation of the state and the political process. It 
has also been demonstrated that militarisation and the logic of violence by which 
decades of military rule survived had created much structural contradictions in the 
Nigerian state, including the centralisation of power and resources. Given the history of 
deep divisions among the various social groups in the country, these contradictions had 
aggravated the social tensions and grievances within the society and between the state 
and the society. However, these grievances were violently suppressed through 
authoritarian social control measures, although the grievances remained unresolved and 
found expression through a number of violent conflicts. The liberalisation of the 
political system in 1998 and the transition to electoral democracy in 1999 therefore 
created a new political climate, which allowed for free expression of these grievances in 
various parts of the country. 
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The transition had required political liberalisation and guarantees of people's 
fundamental freedoms. The last military government therefore repealed the most 
repressive decrees, which impinged on human rights on the eve of transfer of power to 
the new civilian government, as well as released all political prisoners and detainees 330 
In furtherance of this liberalisation, the demilitarisation strategy of the new civilian 
administration, which reduced the employment of military force in the civil society, 
helped to relax the existing repressive social control. However the relaxation of social 
control exposed the suppressed structural contradictions in society and emboldened a 
flurry of intense political pressures on the democratic state to address such 
contradictions. 331 Examples of such pressures include the explosion of communal 
conflicts and the widespread call for sovereign national conference to renegotiate the 
terms of the Nigerian federal system, for decentralisation of policing and for local 
control of natural resources since the end of military rule. 
The new political pressures themselves generated a situation of serious political 
complexity, which the state proved too weak to grapple with. The sheer number of 
these demands was an important indicator of this complexity. During the sittings of the 
Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission (also known as the Oputa Panel) set 
up by the new government in 1999 to investigate human rights abuses of the past, many 
of the petitions submitted came from various ethnic groups, which complained of 
various injustices that needed to be redressed comprehensively. Most of the 
memoranda received by the panel from ethnic nationalities centred on the national 
question and the future of Nigeria's federalism. 332 The gravity of such demands was 
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also a source of this complexity. Many of the demands threatened the very existence of 
the state, and would require a very skilful political management. For instance the 
demands to allow all the ethnic and religious groups to renegotiate the basis and terms 
of coexistence as a single Nigerian state and to allow decentralised policing could go 
badly for a country that was deeply divided if granted, unless such demands were well 
managed with extreme political skill. 
Worse still, the new democratic state lacked the capacity to respond appropriately to 
these demands. Its democratic experience to handle complex political emergencies was 
poor. Its first democratic experience was between 1960 and 1966. The next time it 
made attempt at democratic governance was between 1979 and that was terminated in 
1983 by military intervention, which lasted until 1999. The president himself did not 
have a very rich democratic credential. As a retired general, he had served as a military 
head of state and had been more used to military solutions to social problems 333 This is 
demonstrated in the failure of the government to create the conditions for broad-based 
national debate on these sensitive political issues since the end of military rule 334 This 
complexity did not help in building the necessary confidence in a political system where 
mutual mistrust had been endemic. Rather the depletion of such confidence provided 
various opportunities to various political actors. 
The relaxation of social control in 1999 has also been accompanied by escalation in the 
rate of violent crime, particularly armed robbery in the major cities and on highways. 
Statistics on crime rates are difficult to obtain, as they are almost non-existent. Yet 
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there is widespread perception that armed robbery is increasing frequency. Official 
crime statistics remain highly inaccurate due to inadequate crime reporting, lack of 
proper recording even where crime is reported and official manipulation of records to 
satisfy political and institutional interests 335 However, a criminal victimisation survey 
conducted in Lagos in 2005 revealed that robbery is perceived as one of the most 
prevalent crimes. 336 Most of the keen observers interviewed in the course of research 
indicated that the rate of armed robbery has been increasing before and after the 
democratic transition. 337 The escalation of the crime, most importantly in terms of its 
perception, also helped to intensify the pressure from the society on the state to deliver 
more effective security, and thus exacerbated the complexity with which the new 
democracy was confronted. 
Demilitarisation not only permitted the expression of accumulated social pressures on 
the state, but also exposed the weakness of the state in a very significant way. As the 
pressures for greater security and state restructuring intensified, it became obvious that 
the state lacked the capacity to exert an acceptable level of social control that was 
required to maintain order in a democracy. It became obvious that without the use of 
military force, the institutions of the criminal justice system, particularly the police, 
could not control social pressures such as mass actions, demonstrations and violent 
crimes. Due to the cumulative neglect of the police, associated with the militarisation 
of law and order, the demilitarisation of policing in 1999 revealed the weakness and 
inadequacy of the police in coping with its statutory responsibilities of maintaining law 
and order. 338 The cumulative neglect of this vital security organ had eroded every 
aspect of the force, including their physical condition, morale, knowledge, and 
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materials. The judiciary did not fare better, as years of neglect and intimidation by 
military regimes had compromised the judicial process through corruption and led to the 
a situation where the courts themselves subverted and slowed down the course of 
criminal justice 339 The new democratic space required the courts and the police to 
respond efficiently and adequately to the demands of social disorder in 1999, but the 
demilitarisation strategy exposed the lack of capacity in these institutions to meet those 
expectations. In a way, this failure helped not only to radicalise the frustration in 
society, but also created opportunities for elites to pursue agendas that impact on the 
state of public safety and security. 
The reduction in the penetration of society by military forces and the failure to quickly 
replace it with sustainable social control measures exacerbated the complexity of 
societal pressures and security challenges faced by the state from 1999. Although the 
police have continued to rely on paramilitary tactics in law enforcement, the use of the 
military in direct policing through joint task forces with the police was drastically 
reduced in 1999. While the soaring crime rate and the inability of the police to deal 
with it has forced the return of joint military operations, the suspension in 1999 of the 
ubiquitous military patrol teams, roadblocks, and the fear they created in society helped 
to relax social control. The, the infiltration, hijacking and politicisation of community- 
based mass movements and pressure groups occurred from the time when military 
social controls were relaxed. It was from this point that the pressure groups gradually 
transformed into militias, or began to operate as militia organisations. This political 
opportunism was employed in the hijacking of OPC structures and it radicalisation from 
a pressure group into a civil militia as an organised and structured force in 1999. 
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Chapter 5 
Civil Militarism and Demilitarisation of Politics 
in South Africa 
Introduction 
The transition from apartheid rule to multi-party democracy in South Africa by the end 
of April 1994 has probably been the most significant political event in Africa in recent 
history. This is because the historic elections and the ascendancy of the African 
National Congress (ANC) under President Mandela not only ended decades of 
authoritarianism and political violence in the South Africa. Most importantly, these 
events aborted the spectre of war in the country as well as accounted mostly for the 
decline of conflict, militarism and political instability in Southern Africa. All of these 
issues were of major concern to the United Nations and the defunct Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU), particularly given the fact that decades of violence, militarism 
and instability had become a formidable obstacle in the quest for human development 
and security in the region. 
Particularly for South Africa, the end of apartheid marked the end of history in a highly 
militarised political system and created the enabling environment for peace building and 
development. Through the militarisation of politics, apartheid rule had created the 
conditions of public insecurity for the vast majority of the population through the brutal 
use of the armed and security apparatuses of the state against the anti-apartheid 
pressure. Like the case of Nigeria examined in Chapter 4, this militarisation was 
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characterised by political repression and state violence, which generated its own 
violence in the wider society. Thus the end of apartheid and the transition to multi- 
party democracy was accompanied by a deliberate reversal of the militarisation of 
politics by state elites. Yet the demilitarisation of the political process did not reduce 
the condition of insecurity in the wider society. Rather the period of the demilitarisation 
process witnessed the emergence of a number of non-state security forces, which posed 
considerable human security predicaments for the new democracy. 
The militarisation of the political process was itself intimately associated with the 
contradictions of the ideology of apartheid, which, as a state policy, began to take its 
roots from 1948. The roots of these contradictions lie in the history of political and 
social exclusion of the black majority of the population by the white minority since the 
formation of South Africa in 1910. The crisis of identity resulting from this exclusion 
therefore became a defining feature of politics in the new state right from the start. 
Although the security forces had always been an exclusive political asset of the white 
minority, it was not until 1948 when racial exclusion was institutionalised through the 
policy of apartheid that the militarisation of South Africa became a clear state objective. 
From this point on the military was constantly deployed jointly with the police in 
internal security operations mainly to impose the apartheid order in the face of growing 
resistance. 
However, the 30 years between 1948 and 1978 can be seen as the first phase of 
militarisation, characterised by ad-hoc use of state violence to put down the black 
struggle against apartheid. This was mainly because the struggle itself was more or less 
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non-violent within this period, involving fragmented and episodic protests, rallies, 
marches, sit-ins and labour strikes. As the struggle shifted from protest to more 
coordinated and enduring violent resistance, the militarisation of politics was taken into 
the second phase from 1978 up to the dismantling of apartheid in 1990. This second 
phase exposed the dominant power and influence of the security establishment in 
steering the state's policy direction. This period coincided with an intensification of 
the national political crisis generated by apartheid rule to which the state sought to 
respond through a comprehensive reform encapsulated in the Total Strategy. 340 As 
security concerns increasingly became the central issues of national politics, the Botha 
government relied on Total Strategy to counter what was perceived as an emerging 
revolution and systematically incorporated the military as the dominant constituency in 
the policymaking environment. This was achieved through the establishment in 1979 of 
the National Security Management System (NSMS) initially as the mechanism for 
management and co-ordination of national security, and later as an instrument solely 
responsible for implementing the objectives of the counter-revolutionary strategy from 
the turn of the 1980s. 341 Dominated by the security forces, particularly the military, 
NSMS became the ultimate symbol of the militarisation of the apartheid state. 
Through the instrument of the NSMS, troops from the armed forces and police were 
deployed to black townships and maintained bases there as occupation forces. In many 
cases the menacing presence and activities of the security forces during this occupation 
of the civil space provoked the mobilisation of communities for collective opposition to 
the state, and this increasingly assumed a violent nature as the military siege on society 
continued. It therefore became obvious from the mid-1980s that the violent penetration 
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and occupation of society by military had reproduced violence and militarised the civil 
space, as the armed resistance from the oppressed communities became more structured 
and insecurity became widespread. 
Consequently, the political liberalisation opened up by the new government of de Klerk 
in 1990 necessitated the reversal of the involvement of the security forces in the 
political process as an essential condition. Thus the demilitarisation of the political 
space was one of the high points in the political negotiations between 1990 and 1994, 
when the first multi-party elections were held, and became a central concern for the new 
democratic government of Nelson Mandela. The dark history of the military 
establishment during the decades of authoritarian rule generated the need for the 
transformation of the defence sector and a series of other measures aimed at 
demilitarising the political process as an integral part of the post-apartheid democratic 
transition. 
The demilitarisation strategy started with a swift termination of the direct involvement 
of the military in policymaking and proceeded with gradual reduction of internal 
security operations by the military and paramilitary forces, as well as the 
democratisation of governance of the security sector through and beyond the transition 
period. The process of demilitarisation has thus produced the establishment of 
relatively strong democratic control over the security forces and their operations in 
relation to the society. However, while the strategy has helped in controlling state 
violence, the militarisation of the civil society continued into the democratic 
dispensation and became a dominant threat to public security in the new democracy. 
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Non-state armed and security forces in the form of party militias and extremely violent 
vigilante groups emerged in the immediate post-transition years as indicators of 
increasing civil militarism. Examples of these groups are party-affiliated self-defence 
units (SDUs) and self-protection units (SPUs), extreme right-wing groups and vigilantes 
such as the People Against Drugs and Gangsterism (PAGAD) and Mapogo a 
Mathamaga, each of which became a source of terror to citizens in the communities 
where they operated. 
Although South Africa has managed to bring these forces under relative control years 
after the transition, the paradoxical occurrence of demilitarisation and civil militarism 
makes the country a very important case for this study. This chapter is the report of the 
case study of South Africa. It examines the context of the case, the militarisation of the 
political process, the demilitarisation of politics as well as the metamorphosis of civil 
militias. 
Historical and Contextual Background 
The most striking feature, and thus the defining element, of South Africa's violent 
political history has been the crisis of identity and the intense competition generated 
among social groups in a multi-racial society. This conflict had already emerged before 
the state attained independence from British colonialism, and was not immediately 
resolved by state elites. Rather this crisis was later to determine the violent nature of 
politics in South Africa and the pre-eminent position of the military in the conflict. 
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British colonial rule was finally established after many wars with the Boers (Dutch 
settlers) and with the indigenous African populations, who also fought many ferocious 
wars against Boer domination. The victory of the British in the last war of 1899-1902 
witnessed the commencement of full colonial rule, though not without continuous 
violent resistance. The post-colonial state that came into being in 1910 was a 
compromise solution to this crisis as political power was shared between the Boers and 
the English settlers. Yet this compromise produced its crisis as the black (African) 
majority population was excluded and the independence constitution kept all political 
powers in the hands of the whites. A most crucial element of this exclusion was the 
disenfranchisement of the black population. Moreover, the white population was not 
monolithic as the Boers (also known as Afrikaners) saw the compromise as a threat to 
the Afrikaner culture and political identity. 342 Thus the prerequisite national socio- 
political cohesion that makes stable and well-governed states was already lacking at the 
formation of the South African state, laying the basis for the history of social conflict 
and the militarisation of the political space. 
Apart from political violence, the contradictions of apartheid politics also developed a 
complex relationship with criminal violence, which is relevant to the understanding of 
civil militias in post-apartheid South Africa. The complex relationship between politics 
and crime in South Africa were located in the politicisation of crime and the 
criminalisation of politics. During the conflict, the state employed violent gangs against 
anti-apartheid groups in the townships. Conversely, the anti-apartheid movement saw 
the apartheid system as crime, and treated acts of collaboration with the state as such. 
In addition, crime began to grow rapidly in the early 1980s and peaked during the years 
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of the transition to democracy. 343 It is instructive that this period coincides with the 
most violent period phase of the political conflict over apartheid rule. The ways in 
which criminal violence interacts with the militarisation, the process of demilitarisation 
and the emergence of militia and violence are important for this study and are examined 
in a separate sub-section below. 
The State and the Politics of Exclusion 
Although the exclusion of Africans from the political process had commenced with 
colonial rule 344 and had progressed through the decades since independence, racial 
exclusion became an official state policy from 1948 when the National Party (NP) came 
to power. Formed to advance the political interests of the minority Boer population, NP 
began to pursue the Afrikaner nationalism as soon as it took over power through a series 
of laws and policies aimed at excluding blacks socially and politically. 
The state policy of racial exclusion, or apartheid, commenced with a systematic legal 
segregation of the races within the country. Through the Prohibition of Mixed Marriage 
Act of 1949 and the Immorality Act of 1950, sex relations between whites and blacks 
were outlawed 345 In 1950, the Government enacted the Population Registration Act, 
which helped institutionalise racial separation by entrenching the categorisation of the 
national population in accordance with criteria established by the Government. 
Following this racial categorisation, the Government enacted the Group Areas Act in 
1950, which permitted the establishment and enforcement of separate residential areas 
for the different racial categories. 346 Within two years of assuming state power, the NP 
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completed the legal framework for the social and spatial segregation of the national 
population, as a prelude to the full implementation of apartheid rule. 
The next stage in the imposition of apartheid rule involved the translation of the legal 
segregation into unequal access to state facilities and services among the racial 
categories through another set of legal frameworks. The Reservation of Separate 
Amenities Act was enacted in 1953 to establish the legal foundation for the maintenance 
and promotion of a range of segregated and unequal state facilities. In addition, the 
Bantu Education Act was enacted in the same year to allow the Government to promote 
what has been qualified as `inferior training among Africans', in line with what the 
government perceived to be the future occupational status of the blacks. 347 Thus the 
necessary legal basis for unequal access to basic public facilities and services were 
consciously established and institutionalised through legislation within the first five 
yeas of the Nationalist government. 
With racial segregation and inequality secured, the implementation of the apartheid 
policy progressed to the stage of separate or parallel development, starting from 1958 
when Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd assumed office. This stage involved the 
development of separate political institutions in separate territories ostensibly to `cater 
for the political aspirations of the excluded black Africans or Bantus'. By 1959, the 
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act was passed to safeguard the evolution of 
separate development. 348 Through this policy Africans were to find political expression 
and rights of citizenship within these geopolitical entities designated as their native 
homelands, with each homeland representing each of the `nations' into which the 
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African population had been categorised. The policy embodied considerable structural 
distortion of the society, as it was a unilateral decision of the government and a 
derogation from the political and economic aspirations of blacks to participate as equal 
citizens in a unitary South African state. As a critical instrument for stemming the tide 
of African migration into the cities to take advantage of economic opportunities, the 
homeland system weakened the economic base of the black population in order to 
bolster the tenuous social control by the minority Government. 
This structural distortion became more obvious in the implementation of separate 
development from the early 1960s. Starting from 1963, ten homelands were created and 
granted some degree of internal self-government, with a view to gradually nurture them 
towards final independence. However, the homelands created were predominantly rural 
and consisted of less than 13% of the total area of the national territory, despite the fact 
that blacks constituted 70% of the national population 349 Furthermore, the 
implementation of this policy led to the infamous forced removals of Africans from the 
urban areas to segregated black townships and the homelands. The implication of all 
the above was a dire condition of poverty, overcrowding and general lack of resources 
in the homelands. 350 With a form of internal self-government, the homelands were 
essentially no more than dumping grounds of a disempowered African population to 
emasculate black political aspiration and to strengthen the dominance and control of the 
white minorities. 
Separate development was monitored through a system of `influx control'. This system 
involved the application of restrictions and pass regulations, which were enforced by the 
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security forces. Passes were issued to establish criteria for employment and housing in 
the cities with the goal of removing majority of blacks who could not meet the criteria 
to the homelands and to reverse black urbanisation. The legal framework of separate 
development was completed with the passing of the Black Homelands Citizenship Act 
of 1970. This law forcibly made blacks citizens of the homelands and cancelled their 
South African citizenship 351 Consequently the forced removal of Africans from white 
South Africa, which began since the early 1960s, intensified through the 1970s and 
proceeded into the early 1980s. The denial of citizenship to blacks, combined with the 
overcrowding in the townships and the condition of poverty there, in juxtaposition with 
the concentration of wealth in white South Africa, exposed the extent of the 
contradiction in the structure of the state and the precariousness of its foundations. 
Separate development embodied the necessary conditions for the intended final stage of 
apartheid rule, which was the establishment of a pure white South African state where 
blacks would be foreigners. This policy objective was clearly articulated in a speech 
addressed to Parliament by the Minister of Plural Relations and Development, Connie 
Mulder, on 7 February 1978: 
If our policy is taken to its logical conclusion as far as the black people 
are concerned, there will be not one black man with South African 
citizenship.... Every black man in South Africa will eventually be 
accommodated in some independent new state in this honourable way 
and there will no longer be an obligation on this Parliament to 
accommodate these people politically. 352 
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The homelands were designed to develope into independent states apart from the white 
South Africa for Africans to exercise their citizenship and realise their political 
aspirations. The goal of apartheid therefore was to resolve the historical crisis of 
cultural and political identity, which the Afrikaner people had faced since settling in 
southern Africa in the mid-seventeen century. 353 As a minority race in an alien 
environment of predominantly black native population, the Afrikaner people had always 
struggled to retain this identity. This struggle found historical expression through the 
many wars with the traditional African political institutions and with the British colonial 
authority, the formation of the two Afrikaner republics of the Orange Free State and the 
Transvaal, and the creation of the exclusive Afrikaner National Party after independence 
to capture political power. 
The state that came into being in 1910 therefore embodied unresolved historic structural 
contradictions in the form of identity crisis among racial groups as the actors. 
Apartheid rule helped to formalise and institutionalise these contradictions by 
generating a security dilemma where the security of Afrikaner identity threatened the 
very existence and identity of the African population. The political aspiration of 
Africans to majority rule within a single republic also threatened the ideology of 
Afrikaner supremacy. The violent struggles resulting from this dilemma produced a 
low-intensity conflict and created the conditions for the militarisation of the internal 
political process of South Africa. This conflict featured a central role by the military 
and produced a pattern of civil-military relations in which the military and security 
establishments remained dominant factors in politics until the end of apartheid. 
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Security Forces in Historical Social Conflict 
It has been pointed out that in every struggle between white dominance and black 
resistance, the security establishment was a constant decisive factor. 354 The precarious 
position of the minority government in the balance of power among social and political 
forces necessitated a constant fusion of military, intelligence and police forces on one 
hand and political authority on the other as guarantee for the survival of minority rule. 
Thus the militarisation of politics in South Africa, short of direct military rule, involved 
a fusion of the military and political elites and a strong influence of the military on the 
policymaking process to respond more coercively to the growing black resistance 
against apartheid. 
The implementation of apartheid from the late 1940s generated immediate resistance 
from the African population, as it formalised the history of deprivation and structural 
violence they have since suffered. Although African resistance to official 
discrimination and exclusion had been mounting since the beginning of post-colonial 
white minority rule, this resistance became more intensive and organised from the 
1950s as the implementation of official apartheid took its toll on the black population 355 
The first of such coordinated resistance was the Defiance Campaign of 1952-1953 in 
which non-violent protests, burning of passes, boycotts and civil disobedience were the 
main tactics. Organised by the African National Congress (ANC), this campaign 
involved a nationwide mobilisation aimed at defying the new apartheid laws. By 1958, 
a broad coalition of anti-apartheid democratic movements called the Congress 
Movement successfully organised a general strike to protest parliamentary elections, 
which excluded blacks 356 By the end of the decade, black resistance had mobilised 
170 
enough moral force to threaten the stability of the apartheid state, and necessitated the 
use of state violence to impose social control. 
However as the resistance hardened the state began to rely on the use of armed and 
security forces for internal law and order functions and suppression. The 1960 bold 
protest against the most hated Pass Laws357 in Sharpville, during which the police 
massacred 69 blacks and the consequent mass demonstrations that spread throughout 
the country, immediately signalled the inadequacy of the police alone. Starting with the 
banning of black political organisations such as the ANC and the Pan-African Congress 
(PAC), and the arrest of their leaders after the Sharpville massacre, the state began to 
impose emergency regulations and increasing deployment of the South African Defence 
Force (SADF) troops in the cities and the homelands. From 1960, SADF began to 
embark on joint internal security operations with the South African Police (SAP). 
However throughout much of the 1960s, suppression of black resistance was handled 
mainly by the SAP's Security Branch, with limited involvement of military intelligence, 
particularly the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), 358 
The combination of sustained black resistance with a constellation of other factors in the 
wider Southern Africa region at the turn of the 1970s heightened the threat to the 
survival of Afrikaner supremacy. The military, being the last bastion of defence, 
became an integral part of the next level of state response to this threat. The second 
stage of militarisation began in the late 1970s, by which time SADF had transformed 
into an active participant in policymaking in wider security matters 359 By the mid- 
1980s the militarisation of politics reached its climax through not just the control of 
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security policy by SADF, but also its complete penetration and occupation of the wider 
society. This penetration in turn militarised the wider South African society as black 
resistance escalated from non-violent political pressures to violent sabotaging of the 
authority of the state. Large segments of the African society were therefore militarised 
as daily confrontation with heavily armed SADF troops and militarised police units 
intensified. 
With increasing number of youths joining the ANC's underground military wing, the 
militarisation of the wider society further manifested in the use of state-sponsored black 
vigilantes. These establishment vigilante forces unleashed brutal violence on anti- 
apartheid forces and became a major source of fear and insecurity until the end of the 
decade when the political liberalisation started by de Klerk in 1989 brought about a 
gradual dismantling of the state violence. The de-linking of the security establishment 
from vigilante militias became necessary as it had become a core issue in the conflict 
and in the negotiations, which paved the way for the transition to democracy. 
The Crisis of Criminality 
Apart from state and state-sponsored violence, crime has been a critical source of 
insecurity in South Africa. The coexistence of criminal violence with the history of 
political violence and its endurance to date further illustrate the weakness of the state, 
mostly highlighted in the period of the transition to democracy and its immediate 
aftermath. Also the complex interaction between criminal and political violence noted 
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in earlier sections was an important factor in the context within which demilitarisation 
and militia violence interact. Criminal violence has always been an endemic part of the 
history of South Africa, particularly gang related violence. 360 However the 
development of violent crimes assumed a crisis proportion from the early 1980s when 
the anti-apartheid struggle escalated into violent uprisings. 
Throughout the decades of apartheid rule, the criminal justice system was not efficient 
in dealing with crime as a public security issue, particularly in black and coloured 
townships. The overriding dominance of political violence drove a narrow concern of 
the apartheid police with counter-revolutionary policing and repression. 361 State 
protection from crime only occurred in white settlements, while crime was left to fester 
in the vast non-white segments of the population. 362 The narrow concern with political 
control and the suppression of the anti-apartheid resistance across the country led to the 
neglect of normal anti-crime policing. The police and the courts were therefore 
enforcing apartheid laws instead of apprehending, trying and punishing criminals. 363 
The result of this was that the criminal justice system was not designed or prepared to 
respond effectively to crime. The police particularly lacked the necessary training and 
resources to implement the new (changed) procedures of democratic civilian policing. 364 
The operational weakness of the SAP in relation to crime has been captured succinctly 
as follows: 
Apartheid police were primarily concerned with liquor or 
pass raids and the suppression of dissident political activity; 
they were chronically ineffective in controlling everyday 
crime365 
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The problems of operational incompetence and lack of capacity in relation to anti-crime 
policing were also compounded by corruption in the police. In particular the police 
were known for colluding with known criminals in the townships to perpetrate unlawful 
killings. 366 By the time the transition had commenced it was obvious that the state, 
hiding beneath the veneer of a tough and restrictive entity, was too weak to provide the 
basic conditions of public security for all of its citizens. 
In addition, the institutions of the apartheid criminal justice system were physically 
distant from black communities, in terms of crime control. 367 Thus beneath the more 
visible atmosphere of politics, crime had always been a source of insecurity to the 
majority of South Africans during apartheid and an outcome of the politics of exclusion. 
Furthermore, the failure of the criminal justice system to deal with this insecurity again 
illustrates the structural weakness of the state, which became more manifest in the 
transition period. 
The exacerbation of criminal violence from the early 1980s exposed this linkage to 
politics. As the challenge to apartheid rule became more violent at this time, political 
offences were classified as crime. 368 Also from this time, as the struggle intensified, 
both the state and the opposition employed and armed known criminal gangs against 
each other. 369 The political direction of the formal criminal justice system and the 
neglect of conventional crime policing was another indicator of this linkage. The 
criminalisation of the political struggle and the political instrumentalisation of crime 
therefore were two ways in which crime and conflict were linked in the politics of 
apartheid rule, and these linkages provide useful insights into the militarisation of 
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politics and the emergence of civil militarism. The next section explores the key 
dimensions, which characterise the militarisation of South Africa's politics from the 
early 1980s to the end of apartheid. 
The Militarisation of State and Politics 
As stated the background section, the military and security forces had always been 
involved in the politics of apartheid and the struggle against it. They had always been 
an instrument employed by apartheid elites for suppression and a source of fear in non- 
white South Africa. However, the systematic militarisation of the state became obvious 
from the late 1970s, with the formal dominance of the security establishment in both the 
formulation and implementation of national policy. 
Although SADF and domestic politics had been intertwined since 1910, the systematic 
and total penetration of state and politics by the security and military establishments 
commenced from the mid-1970s. Until this time, the armed and security forces had 
always existed as instruments of white rule. As observed by Grundy, these forces had 
tended to be identified closely with the policies of the dominant wing of the ruling 
party. 370 As political forces they were redesigned to provide the critical coercion 
needed to secure the unpopular dominance of Afrikaner political identity. This design 
was achieved gradually from 1948 when the predominant English-speaking officer 
corps of the armed forces was systematically replaced with Afrikaner officers in 
preparation for a more proactive political role. However, until the dawn of the 1970s 
such political interventions were infrequent and ad-hoc. 
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The combination of growing international isolation and the abrupt collapse of 
sympathetic white minority rule in the immediate Southern Africa sub-region coincided 
with escalating domestic resistance to apartheid policies in the early 1970s. The 
combinations of these developments threatened to undermine the authority of the state 
and brought its survival to a crisis point. 71 With apartheid social control increasingly 
waning into the middle of that decade, the state became desperate and elevated the 
security establishment, dominated by the military, into positions of developing and 
coordinating state policy. The imposition of coercive forces onto the political space in 
preference to political dialogue as a means of maintaining effective social control 
further signalled the growing weakness of the state. Two key dimensions of 
militarisation embodied in this political ascendancy of the military and security forces 
were the control state policymaking, and the militarisation of law and order functions. 
Political Ascendancy of the Security Forces 
The new role for the military in policymaking is better understood in the context of the 
erosion of apartheid social control. The massacres, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and 
imprisonments of black activists, as well as numerous discriminatory state social and 
economic policies, had increasingly brought the era of black protest campaigns to its 
climax in the early 1970s. In 1973, the first major black labour strikes for more than a 
decade broke out in protest of the general dehumanising conditions under which black 
workers were forced to work. This was followed in 1976 when a wave of student and 
worker demonstrations was triggered by the infamous massacre of students in the 
Soweto township of Johannesburg. 72 By the end of that decade, ANC had renewed its 
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campaign of guerrilla insurgency against the state. As the state failed to resolve the 
escalating crisis through dialogue and became more repressive, the anti-apartheid 
pressure became more national in spread, more enduring and more organised towards 
the end of the decade and into the early 1980s, overwhelming the capacity of the police 
for social control. 
Overall, the victory of the Soviet-backed insurgency campaigns of the liberation 
movements in the Southern Africa, the international isolation of apartheid, and the 
escalating domestic crisis of apartheid social control not only heightened the real threat 
to Afrikaner supremacy, but was also perceived by the state as the beginning of 
communist Total Onslaught by the Soviet Union. 373 The violent reaction of the state to 
these threats provided the political space for the ascendancy of the military 
establishment in the policy process. The development of the concept of Total 
Onslaught by the SADF and its adoption by the state marked the first major step in 
prioritising military objectives in national security. Embodied in the 1977 White Paper 
on Defence, and amplified by the revolutionary changes in the immediate sub-region, 
Total Onslaught was accepted by the government as the basis for the state's counter- 
threat strategy. 374 Instructively, the facts that the most critical security threats to the 
apartheid state were internal and that the state's threat analyses were carried out only by 
SADF meant that internal security had essentially become a purely defence issue. 
Embodied in the same 1977 White Paper on Defence a comprehensive strategic doctrine 
was developed by SADF to guide the state's response to Total Onslaught. Known as 
Total National Strategy, this response called for the `marshalling of all state resources to 
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combat revolutionary warfare while simultaneously engaging in substantive domestic 
reforms'. 375 Again the adoption by government of SADF's official doctrine of Total 
Strategy for counter-insurgency clearly indicated the military's gradual takeover of the 
state's policy environment. 
It is also important to note that the most senior civilian state official advocating the 
concept of Total Onslaught from the late 1960s to the early 1970s was Pieta Botha who, 
incidentally, was the Minister of Defence at the time. 376 This suggests that the 
development of Total Onslaught and the resultant Total Strategy in the 1970s involved a 
gradual fusion of the military and political elites in response to the deepening crisis of 
apartheid control. This suggestion is strengthened by the fact that Total Strategy was 
not implemented until Botha became the Prime Minister in 1978. 
As a response to the growing national crisis, Botha undertook a comprehensive national 
reform strategy, the essential part of which was the establishment of the National 
Security Management Strategy (NSMS). At the apex of the NSMS was the State 
Security Council (SSC), which replaced the Cabinet in 1972. Although the SSC had the 
Prime Minister as its head, it was dominated by senior military experts, particularly 
from the DMI, and it was the SSC that ran the state from 1978 to the collapse of 
apartheid in1990.377 Through the NSMS, the military had direct control of decision- 
making down to the local level. At the regional level, the Joint Management Centres 
(JMCs) of the NSMS which coordinated local COIN strategies was composed nearly 
completely of SADF officers. 378 The Twelve-Point Programme of the reform 
announced by Botha in August 1979 clearly indicated the intention to integrate the 
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armed forces in the process of administration. The eleventh point of that programme 
called for `the maintenance of effective decision-making by the state, which rest on a 
strong defence force and police force to guarantee orderly government.... ' 379 The 
NSMS thus became the most important policy instrument for the implementation of 
Total Strategy and took over the policy formulation and execution as well as centralised 
decision-making under the military and security establishment. 380 As it later became 
obvious, the NSMS provided the policy framework for the military penetration of 
society through internal security operations from the middle of the 1980s. 
The Militarisation of Law and Order 
The second dimension of the militarisation of politics was the assumption of internal 
law and order functions. The intensification of state structural and physical violence 
from the late 1970s and early 1980s forced an immediate shift in the anti-apartheid 
resistance. The economic deprivation of the majority of black township residents, the 
escalation of rents and of the costs of services in those areas, the de-legitimisation of the 
Black Local Authorities, and the continued educational segregation and 
denationalisation of blacks culminated in the gradual escalation of the protests into 
violent confrontations in the second half of 1984.381 This phase of the struggle involved 
the total mobilisation of entire communities against deepening socio-political 
marginalisation. 
ANC campaigns of sabotage on security, economic and infrastructural targets increased 
in frequency and sophistication. Local civic associations which first emerged in 1979 in 
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some black communities to take up issues of a local nature soon spread throughout the 
townships and became linked up formally in 1983 to provide the initial broad-based 
coalition for the national resistance. By September 1984, violence finally broke out in 
the townships and spread throughout the country. Led by the United Democratic Front 
UDF) and the National Forum (the new anti-apartheid coalitions), which had strong 
links with the ANC, the violence became increasingly coordinated and developed into a 
formidable uprising in the townships between 1984 and 1986. The uprising itself was 
spontaneous response to rising rents and, subsequently, to the call by ANC to `render 
the townships ungovernable' and to set up alternative structures of `people's power' 382 
The uprisings combined with the intensification of ANC guerrilla insurgency to mount 
an unprecedented physical challenge to the apartheid state. 
With the SAP lacking the capacity to maintain social control in the face of escalating 
uprising, and the SADF deployed into the townships to help the police, an era of 
military penetration and occupation of society commenced. The state's counter- 
insurgency (COIN) strategy placed the SADF and security forces at the centre of 
managing the conflict. The COIN strategy involved the imposition of states of 
emergency and emergency laws. As the uprisings broke out, the NSMS was 
transformed into an instrument of the COIN strategy and given the responsibility for 
implementing the daily tasks of the emergency laws. 383 As argued somewhere else, the 
ability of the NSMS to respond to the uprisings enabled its officials and structures to 
play a pre-eminent role within the state and in the management of conflict at all 
levels. 84 This pre-eminence provided the policy platform for the penetration and 
occupation of black townships by military and police troops. 
180 
Through Operation Palmiet, launched in October 1984, and the states of emergency of 
1985 and 1986-1988, the military troops launched operations to regain control of the 
townships 385 The military deployed jointly with the police in heavily armed violent 
In 1985 alone, raids, house-to-house searches, and joint-patrols in armoured vehicles 386 
SADF had deployed 35,372 soldiers in 96 African townships, while many were 
conscripts put on standby. 387 Empowered by emergency legislations, many permanent 
army bases were established near large townships, SADF and SAP troops mounted 
roadblocks, conducted arbitrary arrests and detentions, shot and abducted activists with 
impunity, prohibited and dispersed gatherings that were deemed `unlawful', patrolled 
and sealed off black urban areas, and maintained a presence in and around black school 
premises. In schools, students were forced to study with SADF officers sitting in their 
classrooms and sometimes serving as teachers. 388 A crucial result of this strategy was 
the politicisation of military and intelligence forces, and consolidation of a culture of 
violations. 
Equally serious was the militarisation of the police. The internal deployment of the 
SADF on a permanent basis and their joint operations with the police was bound to 
militarise policing in many ways. An important process worthy of mention was the 
involvement of the SAP in fighting conventional military warfare. Through its COIN 
unit, SAP personnel fought along SADF officers in the Angolan Civil War in 1976, 
among other internal military operations against ANC guerrillas. 389 It was therefore not 
surprising that the SAP adopted what has been termed as `fire-force' policing, directed 
against political opponents of the state 390 Thus the military penetration of society was 
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total as armed personnel controlled and regulated nearly every facet of social 
interaction. 
The Militarisation of Society 
Although the direct occupation and penetration of the society by the armed and security 
forces resulted in crushing the uprising, the control of the township was not fully 
regained. Individual activists and organisations within black communities continued to 
oppose apartheid in addition to continued insurgency mounted by the ANC 
underground. This informed a shift to new forms of social control involving a two- 
pronged strategy: the withdrawal of the security forces into the background and 
sponsoring of black conservative groups in brutal attacks against anti-apartheid activists 
and organisations in black communities towards the end of the 1980s. This strategy was 
accompanied by immediate reproduction of violent armed groups in the wider society, 
and signalled the militarisation of civil society as a function of the militarisation of the 
state. 
Establishment Vigilantism 
The use of black vigilante groups against the resistance marked the third dimension by 
which the security forces maintained their dominance of the political space. However, 
this strategy involved the use of forces within society, and so marked the beginning of 
militarisation of the civil space. Black vigilantes and black police forces were formed, 
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trained and armed by the SADF and police to unleash a spate of bloody assaults on 
structures of township rebellion to regain control of the vast black areas of the 
republic. 391 The use of establishment vigilantes from late 1985 produced a spiral of 
what is frequently referred to as black-on-black violence in the township and proved to 
be a more efficient counter-revolutionary strategy. 392 Enjoying impunity and state 
support, these armed groups openly carried firearms, perpetrated indiscriminate assaults, 
searches, abductions, arsons and killings, all directed against UDF and ANC-affiliated 
youths. 393 The most notorious of these were those affiliated to the Inkatha Movement in 
Natal, whose vigilante activities precipitated a cycle of violence involving the killing of 
528 people in the Pietermaritzburg township of Edendale Valley between September 
1987 and March 1988. This figure represented almost two-thirds of unrest-related 
killings nationwide within the same period. 394 State-sponsored vigilante violence and 
the counter violence it reproduced represented the most crucial site in the last stage of 
the militarisation of state and society. 
This phase climaxed from 1987 when two newly formed black police forces, the 
municipal police and the police auxiliaries (known as kits-konstabels) gradually began 
to absorb the vigilantes. The goal was to complement the recovery of full control of the 
townships. These forces were more brutal in policing the townships than the security 
forces and succeeded in creating pervasive fear in the townships through series of 
criminal activities and violations with impunity. 395 In these conflicts, the indirect role 
of the military involved the use of the local JMC to guide Inkatha militants and SAP in 
joining forces to wipe out ANC/UDF supporters in 1988 396 The political leaning of 
these conservative black forces was so obvious that they were observed to have less to 
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do with crime prevention and more with political pacification. 
397 The withdrawal of 
troops from the townships and their replacement by conservative forces of 
establishment vigilantes and black auxiliary police formations was, therefore, in line 
with the increasing militarisation of the society through the infiltration and splitting of 
the resistance. It is known that Chief Buthelezi, the leader of the Inkatha movement, 
formed in 1975 as a liberation movement, was initially a member of the ANC Youth 
League before being made the Chief Minister of the KwaZulu Homeland that was 
created in 1977 398 Yet the same Inkatha was used as a counter-revolutionary force to 
challenge the activists of ANC/UDF activists in order to break their control on black 
communities in the late 1980s through extreme violence. 399 The creation of proxy 
forces in the communities laid the foundation for the party militias that featured 
prominently during the difficult years of the transition. 
Apart from state-sponsored vigilantes and the black conservative forces there were 
right-wing white armed groups committed to preserving Afrikaner supremacy. The 
most prominent of these was the Afrikaner Werstandsbeweging (AWB), which emerged 
at the time of the collapse of apartheid by the end of the 1980s. Compared to the black 
conservative forces, the less violent AWB were not involved in serious acts of actual 
violence, but were more concerned with maintaining their economic interests 400 The 
violence associated with white conservative forces was related to the fear of social 
exclusion of the white minority by the imminent black majority government in post- 
apartheid South Africa. 
Political Violence in the Transition Period 
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The most intense manifestation of the militarisation of the wider South African society 
occurred in the transition period between the end of apartheid in 1990 and the 
installation of democracy in 1994. Within this period, violence between the ANC and 
the new Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) erupted and escalated to civil war proportions. As 
a reaction to the brutal violence of state armed vigilantes, the townships had formed 
their own militias at the behest of the ANC and the UDF to defend their communities. 
Known as Self-Defence Units (SDUs), these militias operated as `organs of people's 
power' in the townships from late 1984 and targeted the state-sponsored black 
conservative forces until 1990 401 However, following ANC suspension of armed 
struggle in 1990, the SDUs shifted their targets to IFP-controlled armed hostel dwellers 
that had been receiving training and support from SADF Special Forces and the right- 
wing AWB since the mid-1980s. 402 IFP-affiliated Self-Protection Units (SPUs) 
emerged from 1993 as an organised militia in response to the SDU challenge, 
particularly in the KwaZulu Natal area. 
Although both the state and ANC had agreed to end violence, the SDUs and SPUs 
precipitated such a level of violence from 1990 that marked the transition period out as 
the most violent of the country's history. Backed by the so-called third force (elements 
in the security forces which used Inkatha as a counter-revolutionary force against 
ANC/UDF), SPUs launched a string of violent attacks against ANC and its supporters 
in the townships 403 From this point, rivalry between the IFP and ANC supporters 
assumed the level of civil war in the Natal Midlands. 04 
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Political violence and the transition process were therefore intimately related, but in a 
two-way direction. Most of the violence that occurred during the negotiations period 
was aimed at shaping the political outcomes of the transition itself rather than aborting 
i015 Yet it was this violence that played a crucial role in fuelling ANC's persistent 
demands for government to restrain the security forces, 406 which culminated in the 
pressure from the ANC and the civil society to demilitarise the political process and rein 
in the security forces. 
A Militant Civil Society 
Beyond the immediate conflict, but in relation to it, organised militarism had also been 
present in the wider civil society before 1990. This was reflected in the militarisation of 
the informal justice mechanisms and civic structures of people's power established in 
black townships during the uprisings of the early and mid-1980s. The police and the 
entire formal criminal justice system lacked legitimacy and served as tools of repression 
against political expression. In response, communities developed their own justice 
structures, including the makgothla (traditional practice of restorative justice), 
neighbourhood watches, and street committees, culminating in the People's Courts. 407 
The People's Courts, which emerged in the mid-1980s, emerged as alternative 
structures of governance in response to the absence of the formal criminal justice 
services and the ANC call for ungovernability. 
The People's Courts were essentially new forms of social ordering in black 
communities, where they served to control `normal' crime and addressed civil 
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matters. 08 However, from the mid-1980s when the uprisings started, the Courts began 
to adopt extremely violent and arbitrary methods of justice, particularly against 
`political' crimes. Blacks suspected of collaboration, informing, sell-out or those who 
served in local administration as police and councillors were targeted by the Courts 409 
In total, about 900 people were burnt to death between 1985 and 1994 through the 
popular justice of the People's Courts 410 Although the Courts virtually collapsed under 
state persecution in the late 1980s due to their affiliation with the radical opposition, 
they re-emerged in 1990 as civic organisations for social ordering in the absence of 
capable state institutions to provide public safety. 
Criminal violence peaked in these critical years of political transition, having started to 
build up from the mid-1980s when the township uprisings began. Between 1990 and 
1994 recorded assault increased by 18%, rape by 42%, robbery by 40%, and burglary by 
20%. For the same period, the rate of reported murder was 30 citizens per 100,000 of 
the population, while the daily number of victims of stabbings, beatings, and shootings 
was 2,500.411 Thus, as the thorny political issues associated with the apartheid history 
were being resolved in the negotiations, crime was increasingly becoming an issue that 
was to assume a crucial place in the quest for public security under democracy. 
However the overriding importance of political violence in the negotiations precluded 
the appreciation of criminal violence as a major security issue, even though the timing 
of the rise in the level of reported crime underscores the association between crime and 
politics mentioned earlier. 
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The deep divisions generated by apartheid and the consequent militarisation of various 
factions in the last years of the conflict meant that violence became a valuable tool for 
the various stakeholders in shaping the outcomes of the transition process, especially in 
the pre-election phase of negotiations. Furthermore, even outside the context of the 
political conflict, violent vigilante activities undertaken by informal armed and security 
forces also became a critical feature of the security environment at the climax of 
political militarisation. Thus at the time of political liberalisation in 1989, the 
militarisation of politics by the apartheid state had created a highly militarised society. 
The combination of the penetration and occupation of civil society by security forces, 
the armed resistance against apartheid, the arming and use of establishment vigilantes 
and conservative forces had left a mishmash of armed actors with violent dispositions. 
Democratic Transition and the Legacies of Militarism 
Although the militarisation of politics through apartheid had created conditions of 
violence and public insecurity decades before the transition, the period between 1990 
and 1994, during which the transition took place, has been observed as the most 
politically violent period of the country's history. 412 Political violence became not only 
a driver for the transition, but the main obstacle to the transition as it exacerbated the 
condition of pervasive insecurity. Violence therefore became a serious concern of the 
main parties in the transition (the government and the ANC), and the control of such 
violence became a central issue in the process of the negotiations. 
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This was the case because while political liberalisation became inevitable by the end of 
the 1980s, violence became a vital tool for shaping the outcome of the ensuing 
democratic transition by the various social actors (principally the NP government, ANC 
and IFP). Conversely, the transition was about the control of violence, both the 
structural violence of political exclusion and racial inequality, and the direct violence of 
the state security forces, which underpinned political exclusion. 
The exclusion of the majority black population from political participation, with its 
various socio-economic implications, was at the roots of the social conflict and 
militarism until the installation of democracy in 1994. This was reflected by the core 
ANC objective of majority rule within a unitary state right from the start. It was the 
incompatibility of this aim with that of minority rule that created the crisis in which the 
use of direct violence became politically expedient. 413 Forced by the crisis and 
unsustainability of minority rule, the transition was essentially about transforming the 
state into a multi-racial system that was governed by the majority and that served the 
entire national population without discrimination. This meant that the issues of violence 
and public insecurities, which underpinned and were produced by the structure of 
exclusionary politics, needed to be addressed in the transition process. This section 
examines the transition process between 1990 and 1994, and the way in which the 
problems of violence and public insecurity were dealt with. 
State Armed and Security Forces 
The legacy of state security forces and the control of the violence associated with them 
were given prominent attention in the negotiations. This was driven mainly by the 
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history of brutal security forces, exacerbated by the complicity of the security forces in 
the IFP-initiated political violence from 1990 414 The concern over state security forces 
was focused mainly on the SADF, the Homeland armed forces and the SAP, as they 
constituted the major instruments of state violence. The two main concerns of the major 
negotiating parties, particularly the ANC, were the integration of the various security 
forces and their political control. These two challenges were to be addressed by the 
multi-party Transitional Executive Committee (TEC) that was set up in 1993 to manage 
the transition in the course of the negotiations. 
In relation to the armed forces, the TEC established a Joint Military Coordinating 
Committee (JMCC), which managed the integration of the various armed forces - the 
SADF, the liberation forces, and the armies of the homelands - into the new SANDF 
that emerged on the eve of the elections in 1994 415 While integration of forces was 
being achieved, civil political control of the armed forces remained the most difficult 
objective, particularly for the ANC (the main negotiating party in the transition) 416 In 
pursuit of this the ANC, under the Pretoria Minute signed on 6 August 1990, agreed to 
promptly suspend all armed actions unilaterally. 17 ANC had mounted pressure for 
demilitarisation by calling for a dismantling of the NSMS, strengthening of legislative 
oversight and civil control of the armed and security forces. 18 In fact the question of 
civilian political control of the armed forces became a subject of heated argument 
during the JMCC's Sub Council on Defence deliberations. 419 However this was not 
sufficient to achieve political control in the early years of the transition, as the various 
armed forces had not been integrated, more so that the government still retained firm 
control of the most brutal armed forces in the context of a high level of mistrust 
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between the negotiating parties. The ANC was therefore limited to exerting intense 
political pressure on the government to control the violence of the various security and 
armed forces and their covert links with conservative forces. This pressure involved 
threats to boycott the negotiations and revert to non-violent mass action, some of which 
were actually carried out. 20 By threatening to pull out of the negotiations and revert to 
mass action against the state, the ANC managed to extract commitments from the 
government to rein in the security forces and wielded some indirect control over SADF 
until the integration process was completed on the eve of elections in 1994. Despite this 
relative progress, the changes that were made were not institutionalised and had not 
resulted in structural changes in the security architecture. Institutionalisation and 
restructuring were later to form the core of the demilitarisation strategy of the Mandela 
Administration. 
The control of the police received the earliest attention in the transition process. This 
was because by the early 1990s, the SAP had acquired a reputation for brutality, and 
had been linked to covert sponsorship of black on black violence. However the main 
focus on policing in the early transition period was on human rights violations, and so 
the imperatives were to build legitimacy for the police, introduce a culture of human 
rights, demilitarise the SAP, establish effective political control over them, and improve 
relations with communities 421 The National Peace Accord of 1991 (established to 
address high levels of political violence in the early transition period) set up systems for 
monitoring and investigating police misconduct and violence. It also set up a code of 
conduct for the police and gave local communities a role in monitoring of the police. 22 
The emphasis on human rights and police-community relations led to the establishment 
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of the first community policing structures in the early 1990s, which were also provided 
for in the Interim Constitution of 1994 423 Despite the genuine concern with human 
rights issues in relation to the SAP, the transformation of the police from a paramilitary 
force did not occur throughout the transition period. 
A significant obstacle to changes commensurate to the integration of the armed forces 
was the fragmentation of the police. Integration of the various police forces was far less 
significant in the negotiations compared to that of the armed forces, even though there 
were 11 police forces, including the SAP and the police forces of the Homelands. The 
homeland police were subject to significant control by the SAP, which controlled their 
access to finance and technical resources despite nominal independence 424 
Furthermore there was far less interest in police service by the opposition groups. On 
one hand the SAP was a dumping ground for whites who could not secure jobs in other 
sectors and was unattractive for employment. 25 On the other hand, the liberation 
movements did not have police services and so did not generate the pressure for 
integration. 26 Under such conditions, the parties settled for an arrangement in which 
political control over the police was exercised by the government, while the 
communities were involved in monitoring until the inauguration of democracy in 1994. 
The Conservative Forces 
As discussed in the preceding section, the conservative forces of state sponsored black 
vigilantes and white right-wing armed groups emerged to defend the precarious political 
position of the minority white, just as the apartheid system was collapsing. The fears of 
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political revenge and black domination in the imminent event of political victory for the 
ANC fuelled the violence that was intended to prevent such an outcome. These fears 
were sufficiently dealt with early in the negotiations and as the transition proceeded, 
these forces became increasingly insignificant and disappeared. The Record of 
Understanding (ROU) signed between De Klerk and Mandela on 26 September 1992 
played a crucial role in addressing white minority fears. A major agreement, among 
others, between the NP and the ANC under the ROU was a broad parameter of a new 
constitution, including the creation of an interim Government of National Unity. 427 
Once this commitment was secured from the ANC, the fundamental fear of black 
retaliation after the transition was so seriously weakened that conservative militias lost 
their political relevance. 
ANC/IFP Militias 
The violent conflict between the ANC and IFP was driven largely by the latter's 
campaign of violence against ANC supporters. However, IFP strategy of violence 
against ANC supporters in collaboration with the security forces during the transition 
was not to frustrate the process, but rather to prevent their exclusion from the 
negotiations 428 This was because in the course of the negotiations a close relationship 
developed between ANC and National Party politicians, and it was becoming clear that 
the new rapprochement was working to the political advantage of ANC as the party 
dictated the direction of the negotiations. 
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The above categories of militias were functions of apartheid politics and the violence 
associated with it. They were closely associated with the conflict over political 
exclusion, and they gradually disappeared as the fundamental question of exclusionary 
politics was being resolved. Although the ANC renounced violence in 1990, it had no 
effective control over the SDUs, which were driven more by grassroots mobilisation 
against Inkatha violence during the negotiations. 29 Inkatha, on the other hand, 
continued to employ the SPU in violent attacks on ANC/UDF well into and beyond the 
elections of 1994. However as IFP fears of political exclusion were accommodated 
through the inclusive Government of National Unity established in 1994 by the ANC 
and the concept of a `rainbow nation' (multiracial society), the violent conflict between 
the two parties de-escalated rapidly to its end. While the total number of fatalities from 
this violence jumped from 1403 in 1989 to 3699 in 1990 and reached a climax of 3794 
in 1993, it declined rapidly from 1994, after the elections, to less than 500 in 1997 430 
The chart below gives a graphic presentation of the rise and decline of ANC-IFP 
violence before and after the transition. 
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Anti-Crime Civic Movements 
Crime and the insecurities associated with it were not an issue at all in the transition 
process and negotiations. The overriding concerns were issues of political violence 
associated with state security forces and party militias; majority rule; and the conduct of 
multi-party general elections. This meant that the growing problem of crime was 
ignored in favour of the obviously more important issues of politics in the pre-election 
period. Given the changed political climate after 1994, the new civics that absorbed the 
People's Courts focused on rising normal crime and civil disputes to provide some form 
of order in the townships. 32 This was because, although the political climate had 
changed and there was far less political repression, the state still lacked the capacity to 
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provide effective policing and democratic order, which had never been prevalent in non- 
white communities. 
However in the early period of the transition, the resurgence of locally based extra-state 
ordering stimulated political debates aimed at formalising them and integrating them 
into the formal justice system. Yet, apart from the community policing initiatives of the 
early 1990s, which focused on human rights issues, there were no attempts to address 
crime throughout the transition period. As the crime rate soared, popular vigilante 
justice under the auspices of the civic movements became rampant across the country 
and consolidated through the transition period 433 Thus the tradition of militarism in the 
civil society, which took roots in the 1980s in relation to crime control were not 
addressed in the process of negotiations, but were rather thrown into bolder relief after 
the transition due to the failure of the state to create the conditions of safety and security 
against high crime rates. It is from this tradition of popular justice that the civil militias 
of the post-1994 era emerged. 
The Demilitarisation of Politics: An Assessment 
The discredited role of the security forces, particularly the SADF, the intelligence 
services and SAP in the political history of the country, forced the issues of 
transformation and effective civil control of the security forces onto the top of the policy 
agenda of the new democratic government. With the integration of the security forces 
completed by the end of the transition period, the new government became particularly 
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concerned with securing the democratic order by insulating the political process from 
undue interference from the military and security establishments through a 
demilitarisation strategy. 434 During the negotiations, a broad set of principles relating to 
defence and security, democratic political control in particular, had been agreed by the 
various parties, and some of these principles were written into the Interim Constitution 
of 1993.435 However, the new government urgently sought to operationalise these 
principles through a strategy of demilitarisation that involved institutional designs and 
restructuring within the security sector. The focus of this strategy included mainly the 
establishment of effective civil control and ending the history of human rights 
violations. The demilitarisation process that accompanied the post-apartheid transition 
to democracy and its assessment are examined in this section. The assessment is based 
on changes in state security policy, new institutional design and changes in actual state 
practice in the security domain, since the inauguration of democracy. 
The demilitarisation focused mainly on SANDF, although changes have also taken 
place in other areas of the security sector. The first element of the strategy was the 
establishment of the civilian Defence Secretariat in 1994. The Secretariat was placed on 
the same level with SANDF headquarters, and both to be accountable to a civilian 
cabinet minister. This removed the military from control of the policymaking process, 
and restricted the SANDF headquarters to policy implementation and advice, while 
reserving policymaking for the Secretariat 436 Apart from this division of labour, the 
accountability of the SANDF to a civilian cabinet minister appointed by an elected 
president helped to regulate the activities of the armed forces. Similar institutional 
reforms were carried out in the police and intelligence services, though far more slowly. 
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A new Secretariat for Safety and Security came into being in 1995 to advise the 
Minister for Safety and Security, ensure police accountability, and monitor policy 
implementation by the SAPS 437 
On the policy arena, the strategy has sought to construct a new framework. The most 
important policy directions are provided by the 1996 Constitution, the White Paper on 
Defence, the Defence Review, the White Paper on Safety and Security and the White 
Paper on Intelligence. These documents clearly specify the supremacy of the civil 
authority over the security forces and their oversight by the Parliament. 38 They also 
clarify the different roles of the military and the police, as well as specify the conditions 
under which the security services are employed. 
The efforts demilitarise the political process has proceeded extensively since the end of 
apartheid, as far as the original objectives are concerned. The installation of the new 
democratic government in 1994 came with an abrupt and complete removal of the 
defence headquarters from national policy formulation and the assertion of civil 
authority over defence and security. Executive control of the security forces was 
demonstrated in 1998 when the Chief of SANDF, General George Meiring, was 
dismissed by President Mandela following a political fall-out over the General's misuse 
of intelligence information 439 Attempts to assert executive control of the SANDF faced 
initial difficulties. The real problem of executive control lied with the relationship 
between the civilian Defence Secretariat and SANDF headquarters, where the transfer 
of functions from military headquarters to the Secretariat was slow 440 This was 
compounded by the fact that the Secretariat was staffed largely by military officers. t 
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In addition the division of labour between the Secretary of Defence and the Chief of 
SANDF has not been as clear in practice as it is in theory. The lack of civilian expertise 
as a legacy of the past, and institutional resistance from former SADF officers, have 
been identified as the main problems. 2 
Legislative oversight of the defence force has been fairly strong, as the JSCD and the 
Portfolio Committee on Defence in the National Assembly have been effective in their 
oversight responsibilities. They were instrumental to the development of the White 
Paper on Defence and have been effective in legislation and holding SANDF officers to 
account for implementation of policy. 443 However, internal deployment of SANDF 
troops did not terminate with the end apartheid. The relative shortage of police 
personnel prompted the deployment of large numbers of SANDF troops on a daily basis 
in long term policing tasks from the beginning of the democratic era. Such deployments 
continued, although with decreasing number until 1999 when it was ended. 444 Yet this 
cannot be regarded as re-enactment of apartheid militarisation. These were operations 
in support of the police in conflict situations where the state is not a protagonist as was 
the case apartheid deployment. Again, operations were regulated by democratic and 
constitutional safeguards, and were largely accepted by society. 
Paramilitary policing, as a major concern of demilitarisation, has drastically declined 
since 1994. Although incidence of police brutality is still high in South Africa, it is far 
less compared to the apartheid era and it is related to crime-fighting rather than political 
repression. Between April 1997 and March 1998, the Independent Complaints 
Directorate (ICD) received complaints of 518 deaths from police action, 157 criminal 
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assaults by the police and 67 acts of misconduct. For 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 the 
respective figures were 558,311 and 69; and 472,500 and 1435 Between 2003 and 
2004, complaints processed by the ICD against members of the SAPS, included 383 
deaths in police custody, 384 deaths from police action and 1,473 cases of serious 
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criminal offences allegedly committed by members of the SAPS The problem of 
police brutality has remained, in spite of the implementation of elaborate programmes 
of human rights training and new codes of conduct for the service. 
Nevertheless, there has been a dramatic decline in the number of people killed in public 
demonstrations and gatherings. The problem of police brutality has rather been 
associated with growing public pressure for tougher policing as crime levels soared with 
the end of apartheid. This pressure resulted in the Government's adoption in 1999 of 
Operation Crackdown, which placed emphasis on effective crime combating using 
lethal force in place of soft policing 447 Even then, there has been no reported case of 
politically motivated killings by the government or its agents, and security officials 
accused of violations have been put on trial8 
The end of politically motivated police operations against the populace by the state, the 
drastic reduction in and more regulated military deployment for internal operations, and 
the prosecution of security officials accused of human rights violation prove that the 
civil authorities have achieved a high degree of democratic control of the security 
forces. This also proves that the state has underataken a drastic demilitarisation of the 
political process. However, the militarisation of the wider society produced by the 
extreme violence of the state in the height of apartheid social control remained very 
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high. Paradoxically, the militarisation of politics and the weakening of repressive social 
control were accompanied by the radicalisation of a militant society and the emergence 
of more structured and enduring forms of civil armed formations and civil militarism. 
The phenomenon of civil militarism in post-apartheid South Africa and the conditions 
under which it emerged are discussed in the sections below. 
Civil Militarism After 1994 
Armed groups associated with the political violence of the transition period gradually 
disappeared after 1994, yet the failure of the new democratic state to provide public 
safety and security under conditions of rising crime levels created the climate for the 
emergence of a new form of militarism in the civilian society in the first few years of 
democracy. Out of the tradition of civil militancy against criminals in the last years of 
apartheid, violent vigilante groups hardened through 1995 and quickly developed into 
full militias within the civilian society. The most prominent of these groups which later 
transformed into civil militias, albeit in various degrees, were the People Against Drugs 
and Gangsterism (PAGAD), which operated in the Western Cape; Mapogo a 
Mathamaga in Limpopo province; and the Mfelandawonye Wamapondomise Burial 
Society in the Eastern Cape. Under the conditions of growing physical threat of violent 
crime and a criminal justice system that was too weak to address the problem, local 
communities gave initial popular support to these anti-crime movements for 
protection 449 However, shortly after their emergence, these groups developed out of 
control into militias and perpetrated organised violence within the communities they set 
out to protect in the first place. 
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The most important factor uniting these armed groups is that they emerged as militias 
immediately after the new Mandela Government began to implement the strategy of 
demilitarising the state and politics. The timing of the rise of these latter day militias 
and the demilitarisation programmes of the new government suggests a link between the 
two phenomena and the next section attempts to explore this link in detail. Although 
Mapogo has so far been the largest of these groups, in terms of coverage and 
membership, PAGAD remained the most violent and efficient of all post-1994 civil 
militias in South Africa. For this reason PAGAD is selected as the focus of analysis in 
examining the relationship between the demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism. 
The Case of People Against Drugs and Gangsterism 
Apartheid's brutal repression succeeded in imposing militarised social control and in 
putting down the nationwide uprisings of the mid-1980s. However such control was 
tenuous as the underlying structural contradictions of apartheid rule persisted and 
deepened towards the end of the 1980s. The replacement of military troops with 
establishment vigilantes and black conservative forces was intended to bolster the 
precarious social control of direct state violence with other militarised civilian 
formations was an extension of state violence by other means. 
This re-adjustment of state violence slowly set in motion the reproduction of violence in 
the wider society, and culminated in the emergence of civil militarism at this point in 
the history of apartheid. In addition, the response to the call by the ANC and its 
supporters to render the country ungovernable radicalised and slowly transformed the 
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civic structures into informal armed groups. However, more structured and organised 
militias and informal armed groups did not begin to emerge until the end of apartheid 
and at the time that demilitarisation was being implemented. The remaining part of this 
section is an attempt to explore the association between the civil militarism and the 
demilitarisation process, by exploring the case of PAGAD. The origins, transformation 
and operations of this organisation are particularly focused upon to explore this 
tentative relationship. 
PAGAD was formed in 1995 as a popular pressure group in response to the soaring 
crime level of the immediate post-apartheid period. This group emerged in the context 
of a criminal justice system that had long been abandoned in preference for paramilitary 
policing and which had become too weak to respond adequately to the rising wave of 
organised and violent crime. It emerged and operated in the Cape Flats, a group of 
Moslem dominated, middle-class, coloured communities around Cape Town. With 
initial base in Athlone, PAGAD coverage area quickly spread to Bo-Kaap, Heideveld, 
Retreat, Mitchell's Plain, Lansdowne, Salt River, Kensington, Pelican Park and 
Manenberg 45° These townships were hotbeds of the anti-apartheid struggle, where the 
de-legitimisation of the state produced neighbourhood watches that were as well-armed 
as community protection structures 45' It is out of these neighbourhood structures that 
PAGAD emerged initially as a popular movement. However, within a short period of 
time, the organisation transformed into an ultra-violent vigilante group, which adopted 
urban terrorist tactics in its operations, and targeted people suspected of drugs and gang 
offences as well as the institutions of the state's criminal justice system in many 
instances of frightening violence 452 
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Led by the middle class and supported by the middle and upper class, PAGAD enjoyed 
initial popular support and managed to mobilise entire communities around the struggle 
against drugs and gangsterism, which had become endemic in the Cape Flats since the 
early apartheid years 453 Initial methods included peaceful protests and marches on the 
houses of drug lords and gang leaders. These marches were also taken to the Minster of 
Justice as a way of mounting pressure on the state to take tougher measures against 
crime, which had become the most important security threat from the mid-1990s. In 
addition, PAGAD initially collaborated with the police who provided escort for the 
early marches 454 By the end of 1995, PAGAD had started using extreme violence by 
openly burning the cars of drug dealers, and bombing their houses. 
The turning point in cooperation with the police came when PAGAD launched its 
campaign of terror, ostensibly against criminals. This started with the case of the 
notorious gang leader, Rashad Staggie, who was shot and openly burnt to death by 
PAGAD mobs under full police deployment in August 1996. By early 1996 PAGAD 
had evolved a sophisticated paramilitary wing called the G-Force, which anchored its 
operation on an intelligence component ass Between 1996 and 1997, G-Force mounted 
a series of violent operations involving the tailing, ambushing and pipe-bombing of 
gangs and drug dealers. At the same time it mounted several attacks on courts and 
raided police stations, seizing firearms and ammunition for further operations ash At 
this stage it became obvious that the organisation had shifted focus from its original 
agenda and had taken on a security and military mission. This new mission and the 
targeting of state institutions like police stations and the courts as well as public places 
204 
revealed a totally different agenda to the initial popular response to crime. It revealed a 
rapid transformation of the organisation into a civil militia that had become a central 
part of the problem, which it set out to deal with originally. An examination of the 
stages of PAGAD development is essential to understanding the factors responsible for 
this change in mission and radicalisation. 
At the beginning of PAGAD, it had no formal organisational structure. However, a year 
after its formation, the organisation experienced a leadership crisis and change, 
followed by a quick process of structuring and radicalisation by the new leadership. 
Before this time an extreme Islamic organisation called Qibla had infiltrated and 
become a strong lobby within PAGAD. Influenced by the Iranian Revolution, Qibla 
lobbied for Islamic solution to the crime problem 457 Through this lobby, Quibla 
succeeded in infiltrating PAGAD and displacing its pioneer leadership following the 
leadership crisis of 1996 458 From this stage, Qibla established the G-Force whose 
members were trained in the use of firearms and military-type operations. As a highly 
sophisticated formation, the G-Force was divided into cells with areas of 
specialisation 459 Three senior officials of the SAPS, in separate interviews, agreed that 
PAGAD was hijacked by strong forces that were not a part of its original agenda. 460 it 
was after this take-over of PAGAD control from the original leadership that the 
organisation transformed from a popular anti-crime pressure group to a civil militia, as 
the G-Force became its central driving force. Thus the transformation of the 
organisation into a militia using urban terrorist tactics mirrored the emergence of the 
radical element from the internal leadership crisis. 
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The weakness of the criminal justice system and its inability to deal with rising crime 
waves effectively fuelled the popular demand on the state for greater security. However 
the adoption of extreme violence by PAGAD cannot be explained by this weakness 
alone. As indicated by one of the interviewees in the course of fieldwork, service 
delivery in the criminal justice system was totally absent in the black townships during 
apartheid rule, and yet these townships did not produce paramilitary organisations after 
the end of apartheid 461 In support of this argument, a serving senior official of the 
SAPS pointed out that even with the post-apartheid infrastructural upgrading of the 
townships, coloured communities are still being served better than the black 
communities, in terms of policing and justice. 
62 Direct observation of the various 
townships in the course of fieldwork also confirmed this difference between the 
coloured and black townships. 
The recourse to violence against the state contradicts the initial vigilante objective of 
community protection. The goal of crime fighting would be served more if community 
initiatives collaborate with the police and the courts to bolster the formal criminal 
justice system. On the contrary, PAGAD attacked courts and raided police stations 
carting away weapons that were never to be accounted for. The intimidation of court 
judges and the harassment of the police certainly serve to weaken the operational 
effectiveness of the criminal justice system in the communities. These activities 
indicate that the new PAGAD that emerged from the internal leadership crisis had a 
different agenda from the mere mobilisation of the communities against drug dealers 
and gang members. 
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Furthermore, if drug dealers and gangs were a security menace in the communities 
where PAGAD emerged, the organisation's militia activities exacerbated that menace. 
The use of petrol and pipe bombs on the cars and houses of gangs and drug dealers, 
surveillance, shooting and burning of suspects, the harassment of court judges and 
invasion of police stations, and involvement of some of its members in crime and 
revenge violence, all worked to generate an atmosphere of fear and feeling of insecurity 
in the communities of PAGAD operation. 3 PAGAD military operations provoked 
violent retaliations from the gangs who came together to fight a common enemy, and 
this precipitated a cycle of conflict between the two camps in the Cape Flats during the 
late 1990s. 
PAGAD was not a response of the poor to an ineffective criminal justice system in the 
face of rising crime. Its composition, particularly at the leadership level, defied the 
theory that popular vigilantism is the typical response of the poor to a weak criminal 
justice system, because they could not have the means to engage the services of private 
security companies, which rich people do. The coloured communities where PAGAD 
operated were certainly not poor in relative terms. Unlike the black shanty townships 
located on the socio-economic margins of the apartheid state, the coloured communities 
were middle-class people who had houses, businesses and infrastructure and where the 
neighbourhood watches were well-armed with licensed firearms. 64 In addition 
PAGAD received moral and financial support from middle and upper class residents, 
who, together with the organisation's leadership, could easily have afforded the services 
of private security companies. The fact that they did not suggests that they had another 
mission than individual and community protection. This was unlike poor people's 
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initiatives such as the Peninsula Anti-Crime Agency (PEACA) and many other 
spontaneous mob actions against crime as well as taxi drivers who fought down violent 
crimes. PEACA, for instance, operates in the poor black township of Khayelitsha near 
Cape Town. It is made up of former combatants of the liberation struggle who could 
not afford an office building but operates from two shipping containers 465 Although it 
was established in 1998, PEACA has not metamorphosed into a militia. Rather it has 
continued to operate in cooperation with the police as an effective community self-help 
initiative by poor people. 
Finally, it has been observed that there was a disconnection between the publicity 
PAGAD had and the scope of actual support that they were able to muster nationally. 
According to one interviewee, the campaign against crime, particularly drugs, was very 
popular because it was seen as a national problem at the time. However, the support for 
PAGAD never spread beyond the Cape Town area. This interviewee pointed out that 
most PAGAD members were ex-drug lords, whose criminal activities discredited the 
whole enterprise of crime fighting 466 This has been corroborated by another former 
police officer who observed that some in the communities saw PAGAD as a response to 
the business challenge posed by the semi-legal and illegal businesses run by the 
gangs 467 These perceptions not only undermined the credibility of PAGAD at the time, 
but also fundamentally weakened the thinking that PAGAD as a militia was a response 
to the weakness of the criminal justice system in the face of rising crime levels. 
208 
To understand PAGAD militarism, there is a need to examine the trajectory of 
PAGAD's metamorphosis in the context of the security transformation which followed 
the democratic transition in South Africa. Qibla, which infiltrated and took over control 
of PAGAD in 1996, is a Shi'ite Moslem sect in the Cape Flats, led by radical Shi'ite 
scholars of international recognition. It had struggled without success to gain influence 
a hold in the Cape Flats where the majority are Sunni Moslems. 68 The emerging 
popular structure of collective action, which PAGAD represented, provided an 
opportunity for Qibla to popularise its ideology. While Qibla could not mobilise as 
much as 3,000 to 4,000 people in a gathering, PAGAD was able to mobilise 20,000 to 
30,000 people in single meetings. Moreover, PAGAD was able to get such crowds to 
speak with one voice 469 Qibla members first joined PAGAD and then began to change 
the agenda by propagating Islamic solutions to crime. The culmination of this 
infiltration and take-over was the supplanting of PAGAD leadership by Qibla elements 
and the consequent radicalisation of the organisation. 
This infiltration and hijacking of PAGAD was not just an isolated case, but conforms to 
a general pattern in the history of self-protection vigilantism in the Cape Flats. 
Historical observations show that the perception of insecurity always led to various 
forms of self-protection, which in turn were hijacked by various interests; be they 
ideological, political or other interests. In the mid-1950s a group of neighbourhood 
watches emerged to offer protection against gangs and drugs, but this group ended up as 
a violent organisation known as the Globe Gangs. However the Globe Gangs were 
absorbed by the police as reservists. Similarly, another group called the Peacemakers 
emerged in the mid-1970s to fight gangs and drugs. Again this group later became a 
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violent vigilante and was consequently absorbed into the police as reservists 
ago 
Mapogo a Mathamaga experienced a similar trajectory. Rising crime was a genuinely 
felt public concern in Limpopo, while the criminal justice system was inefficient and 
discredited at the time Mapogo emerged in 1996. However, shortly after its emergence, 
Mapogo's founder and leader, John Magolego, was captured by the United Democratic 
Movement (UDM) and almost won a seat in the Provincial Parliament. 71 UDM is an 
opposition political party and its links with Magolego were perceived as an attempt to 
benefit from the mass mobilisation of Mapogo to upstage the ANC control of the 
province. Mapogo also experienced internal leadership conflict, although the original 
leadership survived the crisis. The organisation split twice, leading to an exodus of 
many of its executive members who disagreed with Magolego over his lack of financial 
accountability, violent activities through the use of hit squads, the predominance of 
white right-wing members, and the organisation's involvement in politics. 72 All these 
factors generated considerable controversy about Mapogo's intention and led to a 
suspicion of a hidden political agenda. The transformation of PAGAD followed the 
same pattern, except that the security services did not manage to control the movement 
until it had been turned into a militia. 
At the time that PAGAD was transforming into a militant organisation, the security 
services in South Africa were undergoing a complex and painful process of 
transformation. The complexity and difficulty of this process helped to facilitate the 
hijacking and radicalisation of PAGAD. The security transformation, which 
accompanied the democratic transition, was part of the demilitarisation process 
discussed earlier. This process involved the termination of militarised social control 
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and the security footprint in the civil society. It also involved the integration of the 
various security forces of the state with those of the liberation movements and the 
defunct homelands. The end of the Security Branch's footprint created a security 
vacuum, which coincided with the time PAGAD started to mobilise. 73 The Security 
Branch was one of the most notorious units of SAP, especially in the implementation of 
the apartheid emergency regulations. The end of its repressive activities therefore 
meant the relaxation of repressive controls and the permission of popular collective 
actions, which PAGAD represented at its early stage. The new democratic freedom also 
witnessed an escalation in crime rates, which the transforming security services could 
not grapple with. 
The process of integration of the security forces faced daunting challenges. The sheer 
number of the forces to be integrated, the variety of actors involved in the process, and 
the fact that many of them were formerly opposed to one another during the anti- 
apartheid struggle posed a complexity to security policymakers from the end of 
apartheid to the second half of the 1990S. 474 At the same time a large part of the former 
police personnel left the service, as they did not want to work under the ANC 
Government. Apart from integration, a most crucial concern then was to depoliticise the 
police to and change its focus to crime 475 All these challenges and complexities made 
it difficult for the new government to quickly put in place a benign democratic, but 
effective form of social ordering and control to fill the gap created by the dismantling of 
the apartheid security control. The fact that PAGAD violence escalated quickly at this 
time suggests that its new leadership took an opportunistic advantage of the hiatus of 
the security transformation of the mid-1990s to pursue its mission. 
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Furthermore, while the demilitarisation process focused on regulating the security 
forces, the capacity of the state to provide security was not rebuilt. The demilitarisation 
strategy informed police reforms that focused on human rights and civil control, but 
neglected issues of operational effectiveness of the police service, including the areas of 
crime detection, prosecution of criminals, and punishment. 
76 Under the new political 
dispensation, the police were faced with huge public expectations and policy 
frameworks to deliver public safety, but did not receive the appropriate training to 
implement effective democratic policing. 77 Issues of operational effectiveness only 
began to receive official attention in late 1997 when PAGAD violence was already at its 
peak. The police set up special PAGAD unit in August 1997, while the first Detective 
Academy in the country was established in October of the same year. The year 2000 
marked the turning point of PAGAD militarism, as the police finally rose up to the task 
law enforcement. It was in 2000 after the police had jailed scores of PAGAD militants, 
prosecuted hundreds of them, raided the G-Force cell and seized their weapons that 
PAGAD campaign of bombings ended 478 This shows that building the capacity of the 
police to perform their statutory functions was a crucial in closing the opportunities for 
civil militarism created by the relaxation of social control in the course of 
demilitarisation. 
Conclusions 
State Weakness Opportunism, Demilitarisation and Civil Militarism 
PAGAD operated in predominantly coloured communities and most of its operators 
were coloured. Although black communities suffered most from apartheid repression, 
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the coloured population also suffered social exclusion, marginality and neglect, and 
were never fully integrated as first-class citizens in the white South Africa state since 
they were never considered white enough 479 This informed their support for the ANC 
in the struggle against apartheid. Safety and security in the communities were neglected 
as the focus of policing then was on political repression rather than crime. Worse still, 
police and court officials colluded with and assisted notorious gangs in their criminal 
activities, creating low confidence and negative evaluation of the public criminal justice 
system in the Cape Flats. 80 As a result the challenge of crime control was left to the 
communities and the street committees, and neighbourhood watches performed this 
role. There had thus been a desperate need in the Cape Flats for service delivery in 
public safety and security given the notoriety of gang and related violence. 
Civil militarism in post-apartheid South Africa began to occur at the time that the 
demilitarisation of the political process got underway. The end of military occupation, 
the withdrawal of the security forces from the communities and the termination of 
establishment vigilantism produced new waves of political liberties from the strict 
control of the state. However, this new climate also precipitated new pressures on the 
state from the society. The problem of crime and the structural conditions of the 
decades of social exclusion and marginalisation that underlie the problem became issues 
of urgent importance and formed a new focus for public pressure on the state. As noted 
by one interviewee, this new political climate conduced to the unleashing of social and 
political pressures which had always existed, but which had been suppressed for 
decades from the society. One of these pressures is the public demand for more 
effective delivery of security from crime. 81 In effect, the demilitarisation process took 
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the focus away from apartheid repressive forces to crime and criminals as the new most 
important threats to physical security. 
The new political climate of relaxed social control fuelled popular expectations of 
enhanced public security. The historical lack of competence in crime control was a 
major weakness that hindered the state from meeting these expectations. Furthermore, 
the complexities and difficulties encountered in the transformation of the security 
services exposed the weakness of the state to respond adequately to these expectations. 
The centralisation of police resources and the dwindling of police capacity due to the 
shift from merit towards equity exposed the inability of the state to meet the popular 
expectations. 82 In the townships and the rural areas, the absence of crime policing as a 
legacy of apartheid rule exacerbated this weakness. The problems associated with the 
integration of the various security forces, including the mass resignation of former SAP 
members mentioned earlier also adds to this weakness. In the face of rising crime 
waves, the popular pressures arising from the new democratic liberties and the failure of 
the state to respond adequately to these pressures fed the complexities faced by 
policymakers, particularly as it related to the security of citizens. 
Under such conditions, the civic structures in the townships, including street committees 
and neighbourhood watches continued to mobilise against crime while new ones 
emerged, including PAGAD, PEACA and other less known structures. However, just 
as these structures were infiltrated and taken over by political activists during the 
township uprisings of the mid-1980s, these structures constituted viable platforms that 
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could be exploited for political opportunism. PAGAD represented the most attractive of 
these platforms for the fact that it was able to mobilise tens of thousands of people for 
marches within a short period of time after its formation. Besides most of its leaders (at 
the time of formation) were ANC supporters, which meant that they were likely to enjoy 
the sympathy of the state. 83 Furthermore, the predominance of Moslems in PAGAD's 
membership and support base made it easier for ideological penetration. However the 
hijacking of PAGAD changed this relationship and took the organisation beyond a mere 
civic structure of social ordering to an agent of urban terrorism against the state. 
The radicalisation and militarisation of PAGAD by Qibla took place in the context of 
demilitarisation of the state and politics. The demilitarisation process emphasised the 
reduction of the influence and role of the security forces in politics. This necessarily 
weakened social control and permitted the explosion of political pressures hitherto 
contained by apartheid's brutal security forces. The initial mass mobilisation against 
crime was a democratic expression of these pressures, as long as the public peace was 
not breached. However, as authoritarian social control was weakened, democratic 
social control was not quickly put in place, nor were the real problems of a weak 
criminal justice system in the face of rising crime addressed urgently. The inability or 
failure of the new state to penetrate society and establish its empirical predominance in 
the townships through democratic bargains and effective law and order policing allowed 
for the emergence of the popular anti-crime movements, and also left them at the mercy 
of political and ideological opportunists. This failure created an opportunity, which was 
seized upon by Qibla elements when they took over PAGAD and used it for their 
political or ideological ends. 
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Chapter Six 
Demilitarisation and Civil Militarism: 
Nigeria and South Africa Compared 
Introduction 
So far this study has examined the demilitarisation strategies introduced in the context 
of post-authoritarian transition and how these strategies have been associated with the 
exacerbation of public insecurity in Nigeria and South Africa. The main indicator of 
this increase in public insecurity is the privatisation of violence by civil militias outside 
the control of the state, a phenomenon that has become one of the most critical 
predicaments in the quest for human security and development in contemporary Africa. 
Nigeria and South Africa illustrate the fractious wave of political transition from 
authoritarian rule to sustainable democracy, which has become a common experience of 
the vast majority of African states since the dawn of the 1990s. 84 Until this wave, 
decades of authoritarianism (the hallmark of post-independence politics in Africa) 
generated structural contradictions in the society and were generated by these 
contradictions in a mutually reinforcing relationship. Despotic rulers needed to 
manipulate the political process in order to impose their rule and repress popular 
political dissent. The exclusion and repression of political dissent themselves produced 
crises and political instabilities which threatened social order and which were thus met 
with repressive state strategies. Thus political crises and instabilities have been the 
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offspring of the interaction between authoritarian rule and structural contradictions in 
the domestic politics of post-independence Africa. 
Under the conditions of various forms of authoritarian rule, these crises and instabilities 
forced the militarisation of politics as the needed tool for maintaining and enhancing 
social control and order. Thus in spite of these crises and the many conflicts that 
resulted from them, the period of authoritarian rule revealed some degree of social 
control in many states. Until 1991 when the authority of the state collapsed in Somalia 
and 1993, when Eritrea successfully broke away from Ethiopia, African despots 
managed to exercise control over their national territories and populations, even if such 
social controls were characterised by repression and violence. Violent intimidation of 
the opposition and military solutions to internal conflicts put the authoritarian state at an 
advantage (however precarious) over its domestic power contenders in the wider 
society, particularly as far as the challenge to social order was political in nature 485 
Although the state could not eliminate all its internal political enemies, it managed to 
provide some form of social control in response to incessant social disorder. 
However, the wave of democratic transition, which began with the 1990s, has 
progressed with an increasing weakening of this authoritarian social control. The 
democratic change necessarily required the demilitarisation of the political space and 
the abdication of repressive social control measures. This has had profound 
implications for the balance of power between the state and society in post-authoritarian 
Africa. The most crucial implication has been the strengthening of the relative power of 
societal forces in the political process. The corollary of this is a weakening of the 
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ability of the new democratic state to exercise legitimate social control in relation to 
societal forces and to establish its predomination across the national territory. Post- 
authoritarian politics have continued to experience social disorder in which armed 
groups emerging from society operate with greater ease as crucial actors in the 
utilisation of organised violence in everyday politics. 
As the last two chapters of this study show, authoritarianism in Nigeria and South 
Africa involved a high degree of militarisation of politics in order to maintain social 
control against the menace of political crises and instability. The two countries also 
witnessed a drastic weakening of this authoritarian social control as an integral and 
deliberate element of the transition to democratic politics. This is accomplished through 
the demilitarisation of politics, resulting in the reduction or elimination of state violence 
vis-ä-vis the civilian population. 
The two case studies also reveal that, within the context of this democratic transition, 
the demilitarisation process created the freedom and enabling space for popular 
movements and civic structures to engage in collective action which seek to address the 
structural contradictions created by decades of authoritarianism. Also evident from the 
examination of the two cases is the emergence within these popular movements of 
radical elements with political and ideological motivations, interests and pursuits. With 
time these elements with extreme views and methods have tended to take over the 
leadership of the popular movements and transform them into militant organisations 
engaging in violent and illegitimate activities. 
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The abandonment of the popular cause and the assumption of armed violence by these 
groups were bound to fuel the proliferation of organised civilian violence and the 
deterioration of public insecurity in both countries. They also pose further challenges to 
governance in the new democratic atmosphere, in terms of designing and implementing 
the appropriate democratic response from the state. Furthermore, given the general 
condition of state weakness, these movements managed to benefit from local legitimacy 
by providing protection services that the state failed to provide. By attempting to usurp 
the state in the delivery of physical security, the activities of these movements have the 
capacity to undermine or fragment the legitimacy base of the state, thus aggravating the 
fragility of democracy in Africa 
In the last two chapters, the paradox of demilitarisation and civil militarism are 
examined within the separate cases of Nigeria and South Africa under different 
contextual conditions. Findings from the case studies confirmed the central hypothesis 
of the study that the demilitarisation of the state contributes to the development of civil 
militias. This chapter brings the two cases together for cross-analysis in order to test the 
validity of this the hypothesis under the different conditions. The analysis is based on 
comparing across the two cases the key variables of history and context, strategies of 
demilitarisation, civil militia violence, criminality, and transition violence. 
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History and Context 
The wider democratic transition within which the demilitarisation of politics has taken 
place in Nigeria and South Africa is characterised by two common conditions of 
violence and structural weakness. State weakness is admittedly a broad phenomenon 
that embraces a whole gamut of political, economic, military and social dimensions. 
However, for the purpose of this study this weakness is assessed in terms of the ability 
of the state to provide adequate security for citizens. As the previous two chapters 
demonstrated, violence and state weakness had already been present in Nigeria and 
South Africa from the beginning of statehood and have persisted through the era of 
authoritarianism. These two conditions are important because they define the context of 
public insecurity and civil disorder and are examined below. 
Violence and Conflict 
The authoritarian state faced two main threats to internal security and order. The most 
obvious is the challenge from opposition groups and the pro-democracy segments of the 
national population, which mounted strong pressure on the state to redress the inherent 
structural distortions of authoritarian rule. These political pressures were most times 
violent as were the cases of the Biafra Civil War (1967-1970) and the various theatres 
of the anti-apartheid struggle in Nigeria and South Africa, respectively. Although 
ordinary citizens suffered as victims, the primary target of this pressure was the state 
and the resulting violence was centred on social conflicts among various groups in close 
relation to the control of state power. 
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The militarisation of politics and the use of state violence for repression had generated 
incipient civic formations for political engagement with the state, at the climax of the 
authoritarian dispensation. This is so because the repression of political dissent over 
contested national issues and the constant violence of armed and security forces forced 
the gradual evolution of organised civic structures for collective political action. 
In the South West and the Niger Delta of Nigeria, where state repression was most 
fierce and where the democratic pressure had mostly emanated from, a legacy of 
collective actions gradually emerged. There were constant incidences of mass protests, 
rallies, strikes and violent confrontations with security agencies deployed to break up 
such actions. In South Africa, the daily confrontations between the troops and 
communities in the townships also gradually produced a legacy of collective action in 
the communities. From the early 1980s, street and area committees as well as large 
civic organisations were beginning to emerge in such townships as Soweto and Port 
Elizabeth. By the middle of that decade, they had nearly spread across the entire 
country in an effort to render the townships ungovernable for the apartheid state. 
The civic structures also assumed the role of policing against violent crimes. Given the 
political focus of policing, communities were left to their own devices for protection 
against this type of physical violence. In the absence of the state with regards to crime, 
these civic organisations became the unofficial but de facto organs of social ordering asb 
Relying on support from the local community, they were responsible for arrest, 
detention, trial and punishment of criminals. 
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The civic organisations thus performed the dual functions of crime control and political 
resistance. With time a tradition of community mobilisation for collective action 
against shared threats, including structural and physical violence both from the state and 
criminals, particularly in marginal communities, was entrenched in the areas where state 
repression and social control were most intense. By extension, the militarisation of 
politics not only maintained a coercive social control, but also laid the basis for 
community organisation for collective action. By ignoring the protection of citizens 
from violent crime, the militarisation of politics generated a security vacuum, which 
was being filled by the community-based organisations, including both civil and non- 
civil ones. The emergence of the civic organisations for social ordering therefore served 
to expose the absence of the state's bureaucratic power, and the precariousness of 
militarised social control. 
The second, but less obvious challenge to domestic security came from crime. This 
challenge was less obvious because national security in the authoritarian era was 
defined narrowly in terms of regime security and so the state downplayed any threat that 
did not target the state or the regime directly. However, beneath the surface of political 
violence, crime has always been a serious threat to human security, which is a vital 
element of public security. Violent crimes had always threatened the physical security 
of citizens even if it was ignored by the authoritarian state. 
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The implication of this fragmentation of security is that the authoritarian state failed to 
protect the majority of the population from violent crime. In South Africa, the state 
provided protection for the white segment of the population and left the coloured and 
black population to their own devices against crime. 87 Policing was political in 
direction as its emphasis was placed on breaking the resistance to apartheid rule. 
88 In 
Nigeria policing was paramilitary and was directed against the opposition to military 
rule rather than crime. Given the low ranking of crime as a public security issue, the 
authoritarian state demonstrated a failure to develop the capacity to deal with it 
effectively, and this leads to the problem of weakness embedded in the structure of the 
state. 
Institutional Weakness and Service Delivery 
In the face of political challenges to national security, the authoritarian state 
demonstrated considerable weakness in terms of infrastructural power. Although the 
authoritarian state managed to exercise its despotic power through the employment of 
state violence, it could not create a domestic political and social consensus of sufficient 
strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in 
the domestic life of the nation. As shown in Chapters 4 and 5, the authoritarian state in 
Nigeria and South Africa was unable to move beyond the raw exercise of coercion to 
compliance through more peaceful means 489 Thus the institutional capacity of the state 
depended precariously on the use of coercion to impose social control on the 
population. 
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The failure of crime policing itself reflected a wider failure of the criminal justice 
system. While the security landscape was dominated by political violence, crime and 
related violence were neglected by the authoritarian state. A crucial indicator of this is 
the absolute lack of records of crime in both countries before the transition to 
democracy. 490 Apart from the lack of crime records, state justice against crime was 
inaccessible to the vast majority of the population due to the near absence of the state. 
In the case of South Africa, the institutions of the criminal justice system, mainly the 
police and the courts, were remote in terms of physical distance from the vast majority 
of the population. The justice system itself was also too expensive for the socially 
excluded majority, and the process of justice administration was too winding and time 
consuming. 91 In Nigeria, the police and institutions of criminal justice were very 
corrupt and deeply politicised, so that they could not deliver justice efficiently. In both 
cases, the relative absence of the police was in spite of the militarisation of society, 
which saw heavy deployment of joint police and army troops in the streets. The main 
focus of the police deployed in such operations was to deal with political activities such 
as protests, demonstrations, rallies, etc, and this political militarisation took the focus of 
policing away from crime. 
The most important threats to the physical security of people therefore have been both 
political and social. The political threat came from an overbearing and violent state and 
violent conflict, while the social threat came from violent crime. In Nigeria, the most 
serious type of violent crime has been and remains armed robbery, in which bands of 
armed men openly attacked and killed their victims to rob them of money and valuable 
items, especially in the cities. 92 In South Africa, it has been gang violence and robbery. 
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In the Western Cape particularly, inter-gang warfare and violent clashes between gangs 
and communities were a constant phenomenon since the 1950s. 
493 However, as long as 
the emphasis of policing was political, the state never managed to address the social 
dimension (crime) of threat to physical security. Thus the state was both an active and 
passive source of insecurity for the vast majority of its citizens in both countries. 
The neglect of crime by the authoritarian state and the inability of the criminal justice 
system to deliver justice services across the national territory was a core element of 
structural weakness, which limited the scope for public security. Furthermore, the 
repressive strategies of the state made it a natural enemy of the masses. Given this 
antagonistic relationship, it was natural that the state did not consider the provision of 
public security as a national priority. Finally, if the welfare and security of citizens is 
the major rationale for the existence of the state, then the failure of the state to provide 
public security showed that the authoritarian state in both countries was grossly 
dysfunctional and weak. This weakness characterised the context in which the political 
space was militarised as well as the context within which the democratic transition of 
the 1990s and the resultant process of demilitarisation took place. 
The militarisation of politics supplied the coercive power for social control against 
political pressures that were generated by the structural contradictions of 
authoritarianism. However, the authoritarian state lacked the essential infrastructural 
power required to supply the long-term, sustainable and more peaceful means of social 
control. At the time of the democratic transition in both countries, a number of 
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politically active civic associations and pressure groups had established themselves in 
the political and social environment, with many of them having used violent methods in 
confrontations with the state and other rival actors, including uncivil organisations and 
criminal gangs. 
The Crisis of Public Insecurity 
Although conflict and violence constituted the national security problem of the 
authoritarian era, the transition to democracy has been accompanied by a crisis of public 
insecurity. This was highlighted as a more general problem across post-authoritarian 
Africa in Chapter 1, and more specifically as endemic in Nigeria and South Africa in 
Chapters 4 and 5. The exacerbation of crime and the emergence of violent militias in 
the new democracies marked this crisis. Their emergence at the time that these states 
were implementing strategies of demilitarisation also has important implications for 
examining the hypothesis of this study. 
The Crisis of Criminality 
Although crime had been a social reality in both Nigeria and South Africa, there has 
been a sharp increase in the level of public insecurity from crime and related violence. 
The issue of crime level during and after the transition in both countries has been 
controversial. While official police statistics sources insist on a decline in crime level, 
independent sources agree that there has been a rising crime wave since transition. 
Independent surveys of criminal victimisation also indicate high level of crime in public 
perception. 
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Although official statistics of crime in Nigeria is difficult to obtain, the police there 
strongly hold that the overall level of crime, including robbery, has declined since the 
end of military rule in 1999 494 However, the findings of criminal victimisation survey 
conducted in Lagos show that crime, particularly armed robbery, has been on the rise 
since the end of military rule 495 Interviews conducted in the course of fieldwork also 
show that the public perception of crime is high. It is difficult to measure the real 
changes in crime level since the end of military rule. The main reason for this is the 
lack of official records of crime before the transition to democracy, a fact that 
underscores the neglect of crime as a national security issue by the military elites. In 
spite of this controversy, there is a general perception in Nigeria that violent crime is 
increasing. Whether this is so in reality is not so much important because it is the 
perception of crime (the fear of insecurity from crime) that shapes people's behaviour in 
response. 
This controversy has been less important in the case of South Africa. There is a general 
agreement the level of crime rose sharply through the transition years. 96 However there 
is lack of agreement on whether the level has stabilised since the years after transition, 
or whether it has continued to rise. In spite of this, there is a pervasive perception that 
crime has been rising consistently in South Africa. 497 The public perception of crime in 
both countries has also, especially immediately after the transition, coincided with the 
weakness of the criminal justice system in both countries to control crime. The 
coincidence of these two factors has been the justification for the emergence of popular 
anti-crime organisations. 
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Civil Militarism 
Both countries experienced civil militarism as a second element of the crisis of public 
insecurity in the course of the transition. In both countries the organisations which 
transformed into militias did not all mobilise around criminal issues. In South Africa, 
the main militia group, PAGAD, certainly started as an anti-crime movement. However 
in Nigeria, while some of the militias began with an anti-crime agenda, particularly the 
OPC and the Bakassi Boys, others started with a clear political agenda, such as those in 
the Niger Delta. It is therefore problematic to use crime as a common factor in the 
emergence of civil militias. 
Furthermore, while crime levels have continued to be perceived as high in both Nigeria 
and South Africa, the dynamics of civil militarism has varied in both countries. In 
South Africa, the end of violent PAGAD activities from 2000 has meant the end of civil 
militarism in the country even with the perception of a rising crime wave. On the 
contrary, Nigeria has continued to witness an increase in the number and intensity of 
militias and their violent activities. It is also of significant importance to appreciate the 
timing of these militias as developing at the time that the processes of democratisation 
and demilitarisation were being initiated. This is because the capacity of the state to 
deliver security has always been an important public concern in the process of various 
kinds of political transition; and what happens to the security agencies in that process 
has always had crucial consequences for transitional public security 498 The next 
section examines the interaction of the relevance of these outcomes and the processes of 
democratisation and the demilitarisation of politics in both countries. 
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Democratisation, Demilitarisation and Civil Militarism 
As observed in Chapters 4 and 5, the democratic transition and demilitarisation 
strategies differ in scope, depth and the context within which they occurred across the 
two cases. The immediate post-authoritarian period of democratic transition generated 
the political pressure for demilitarisation and the extent to which the demilitarisation 
process was implemented and therefore its scope was determined by the momentum of 
political pressure from the wider society. This momentum as well as the extent and 
scope of demilitarisation were found to be different in the two cases. In spite of this 
difference, the democratisation and demilitarisation were followed by civil militarism. 
This section will explore the linkages between these two concepts. 
Violence and Democratisation 
In Nigeria, the transition was guided by the outgoing military elite, who ensured the 
protection of entrenched interests in the management of the transition. Furthermore, 
and related to the above, the transition was driven partly by the military elite and partly 
by the pro-democracy groups in the society. In addition, the pressure for political 
change was relatively peaceful and sometimes compromising, with many of the pro- 
democracy groups conceding vital ground to the military elites. The result of all this 
was that societal momentum for democratic transition was relatively weak and 
relatively non-violent. 
Although there were a few episodes of violence during mass protests that were quelled 
by security forces, such as the protest against the structural economic reforms of 1996 
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and the protest against the annulment of presidential elections in 1993, such acts of 
violence have been episodic rather than sustained. The short period of the transition, 
including the voting period, was peaceful, unlike the case of South Africa. 
Furthermore, the history of communal conflict was not revisited at this period. Rather 
inter-ethnic and communal violence were endemic features of the era of military rule 
and have continued through the transition to democracy as a constant feature of politics. 
In South Africa, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, the period of the transition was the most 
violent period in the history of the country. It was characterised by violent conflict 
between ANC supporters and government forces on one hand and ANC and IFP forces 
on the other. As explained in the preceding chapter, the transition in South Africa is 
intertwined with political violence, both as an instrument and as a core issue in the 
negotiations. However, these were acts of political violence and were concerned with 
the struggle for the control of state power. On the contrary the popular anti-crime 
movements were not political, at least at the initial stage. The mission and agenda of 
the movements were clearly articulated in terms of crime fighting, and their activities 
targeted alleged crime suspects at the time they began to operate. 
Demilitarisation and Civil Militarism 
One striking difference in the demilitarisation process between the two cases is its 
extent and scope. The public pressure for demilitarisation in Nigeria was relatively 
weak and thus drove a process that was not extensive and far-reaching. Although the 
new civilian leadership of the country has managed to achieve a relatively high degree 
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of executive control of the armed and security forces, parliamentary oversight of the 
forces remain weak and the political misuse of the forces is still occurring. In terms of 
the scope, only the armed forces were affected, while the police and intelligence 
services have been virtually left intact. In the case of South Africa, this momentum was 
relatively high. Although the democratic change was driven by a high degree of 
political negotiations and compromises between the ANC and the NP-led government, 
the ANC had a bargaining advantage, which enabled it to impose its terms on the 
transition 499 The painful history of protracted and costly political violence, the 
international and African sympathy for the ANC, the moral authority of its leadership 
(Nelson Mandela), and the near total mobilisation of the national population for change, 
all combined to fuel a forceful pressure for change. 
The sheer diversity and number of local actors involved in the democratic pressure 
reflect this near total mobilisation of the South African nation. Apart from the ANC 
and its underground, large coalitions of democratic forces, including women groups, 
youth movements, labour unions, academic institutions and local civil society 
organisations all took part in forcing the process and direction of the transition to secure 
fundamental changes in governance with the aim of redressing the structural 
contradictions of apartheid rule. A most crucial element of these contradictions was the 
militarisation of politics and the notoriety such militarisation had acquired through 
decades of egregious violations by the state security forces. Thus the momentum for 
demilitarisation was relatively high, and the process was broad and far-reachingS0° 
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In spite of the above-mentioned differences in the two case studies, the demilitarisation 
process in both countries progressed faster than the structural crises of authoritarian rule 
were resolved. The power imbalances between ethnic and racial groups, relative 
economic deprivations, and intractable violent crime were parts of the structural 
distortions caused by authoritarianism, and which also formed the new foci of political 
pressure from the society. With the transition to democratic governance, the 
momentum for change, rather than abate, shifted to these deep-seated crises and 
engaged the political activism of the civic organisations that emerged at the peak of 
authoritarian rule. 
Incidentally, the demilitarisation of politics also served to embolden the civic 
community in the new shift. Demilitarisation of politics brought the stringent control of 
the state over the political and socio-economic life of the nation and its intimidating 
presence to an end. The end to the physical harassment and occupation of whole 
communities by military and security forces reflected the liberalisation of the political 
space, which gave way to a new wave of democratic freedom. 50' This new climate of 
democratic freedom in turn emboldened the political activism of the civic community in 
its pressure on the state to implement further drastic structural changes. This 
development has had two inter-related significant consequences for national security. 
First, demilitarisation shifted the focus of political pressure from the physical violence 
of the state to structural issues. Although state violence has reduced faster in South 
Africa than it has in Nigeria, the reduction in both cases has produced the same effect in 
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the shift of political pressure on the state from the society. The structural 
contradictions, which began to receive the new political attention, differ across the two 
countries and depended on the history and nature of the two societies. However, one 
common structural issue that generated new political pressures in both countries is 
crime. As state violence reduced, the capacity of the new democratic state to deal 
effectively with violent crime as the most crucial post-authoritarian challenge for public 
security came under public scrutiny. The democratic freedom not only put the state 
under increasing pressure to do more to protect citizens from the violence of crime, but 
also exposed the state's lack of capacity to meet this expectation. 
The weakness of the criminal justice system in both countries did not just occur with the 
transition to democracy, but had always been an element of authoritarian rule. As 
discussed earlier, the authoritarian state in both countries had neglected the importance 
of crime as a national security threat and had left communities to their devices to protect 
themselves. The demilitarisation process thus helped to expose this neglect and the 
consequent inability of the state to deal with the problem by permitting the shift in the 
political pressure to crime. The exposure of the inability of the state to respond 
adequately to this demand provided the reference point for civic organisations to 
mobilise for popular movements around crime issues. In areas where crime remained 
endemic, popular movements began to emerge and mount symbolic and direct pressure 
on the state to address crime. 
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In Nigeria groups like the Bakassi Boys in the eastern cities of Aba and Onitsha, and the 
OPC in Lagos emerged initially as popular anti-crime initiatives. Their early activities 
of crime fighting and popular justice were a symbolic pointer to a crucial security 
vacuum. In South Africa, PAGAD emerged as the most popular anti-crime initiative of 
the people in the Cape Flats area. PAGAD's initial campaigns involved mobilisation 
through the mosques, rallies and marches to the houses of state officials S02 It was a 
more direct call on the state to respond firmly to pressing security needs. However, 
about the same time, crime detection and popular justice was increasingly becoming an 
important strategy for PAGAD. The transition from civic pressure on the state to 
popular justice against crime suspects was not only subtle but also became a threat to 
the rule of law and social order. 
The second and related consequence of demilitarisation for national security is the 
weakening of social control. If social control in the authoritarian era was precarious 
because it depended only on state repression and the intimidating presence of the 
security forces in the communities, the end of that repression and intimidation took 
away what was left of social control. As observed above, the expression of political 
demands within the new democratic freedom gradually proceeded towards issue- 
oriented popular movements, whose activities became increasingly lawless and played 
out in a fashion that threatened public order. The failure of the state to democratically 
control or effectively regulate this incipient social disorder revealed a further weakening 
of social control. Whether it is because the state was unable or unwilling to contain the 
emerging breakdown of law and order, that it did not take immediate and effective 
action to halt the trend meant that social control was low at the point in time. This 
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weakening of social control is in itself an outcome of the demilitarisation process. This 
is so for a number of reasons. First, the wave of anti-crime violence began with the 
implementation of the demilitarisation strategies, particularly the withdrawal of the 
armed and security forces from their posts in the communities. Admittedly violent 
conflict had been endemic in both societies even while they were militarised, but those 
violence were different in nature from the post-demilitarisation violence. 
Furthermore, traditional community self-protection had always been a feature of the 
authoritarian period, particularly in forms of neighbourhood watches and local 
vigilantes. Yet such initiatives were not violent; they were not mass-based; and they 
operated within the bounds of law and cooperated with the formal law enforcement 
agencies. Rather than a substitute to public security, these groups operated as a 
supplement for the state and filled the gap where the state was deficient in the capacity 
to protect communities. Thus the mass anti-crime movements of the democratic era 
were a distinct phenomena rather than historical continuities. 
It has also been posited that the popular movements emerged in response to the failure 
of the criminal justice system to deal with the problem of crime effectively in the new 
democracy. This view has been strongly suggested in the literature as discussed in 
Chapter 2, and corroborated by some observers in the course of fieldwork. 303 Yct it is 
clear that the weakening of the criminal justice system did not just happen with or after 
the democratic transition. In Nigeria and South Africa, the criminal justice system had 
always been too weak to deal with crime long before the transition to democracy. As 
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discussed earlier in this chapter, the police, the courts and correctional services in both 
countries had either been almost absent from the vast majority of the population or had 
systematically neglected their function in relation to crime fighting in the era of 
authoritarian rule. This was a reflection of the narrow security focus of the state on 
political challenges to regime security, while crime as a threat to public security was 
downplayed. Thus the weakness of the criminal justice system in relation to crime had 
always been a feature of the state in both cases. 
However, this enduring weakness that had always been, was exposed by the democratic 
transition and the demilitarisation process. The new democratic climate only made it 
possible to hold the state to account in terms of service delivery, including that of the 
criminal justice system. 504 The existence of vigilantes and neighbourhood watches 
alongside the formal courts and police before the democratic transition was an 
indication of the inadequacy of the criminal justice system. As the demilitarisation of 
politics took public attention from state violence to criminal violence as the new most 
crucial security problem, the new political climate of democratic freedom generated 
popular demand for the state to solve the problem. Because the state never had 
sufficient capacity to solve the problem, it could not meet this popular expectation and 
was increasingly de-legitimised even under the condition of democracy. This de- 
legitimisation in turn generated the mobilisation of communities into popular anti-crime 
movements as a way of disengaging from the state to provide community self- 
protection. 
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Another explanation for the popular anti-crime movements is that they are the typical 
response of the poor to the security vacuum created by the weakness of the criminal 
justice system. According to this view, in societies where the state fails to provide 
adequate physical security, the rich would buy protection from private security 
companies while the poor would engage in vigilante activities since they could not 
afford the private security services. It is true that in both Nigeria and South Africa the 
private security industry has increasingly become a dominant actor within the security 
sector as an indicator of the failure of public security. It is also true that only those who 
are well to do and corporate organisations employ the services of private security 
companies. 505 Furthermore, ordinary or non-violent vigilante activities are engaged in 
by the poor, usually in rural communities or in the poor areas of cities. A very good 
example of such activities is the Peninsula Anti-Crime Association (PEACA), as 
discussed in Chapter 5. PEACA is an example of normal and less organised 
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vigilantism, which operates on the margins of many African societies. 
However, the popular anti-crime movements are certainly not the initiatives of the poor. 
Rather, they are initiated, organised and led by middle-class people, who also could 
afford the services of private security companies. The cases of the OPC in Nigeria and 
PAGAD in South Africa, as examined in Chapters 4 and 5, reveal that popular anti- 
crime movements are distinct from the traditional response of the poor to the public 
security vacuum. OPC was organised and initially led by Frederick Fasehun, a 
successful medical doctor, with the support of many middle-class people in the South- 
West of Nigeria. Similarly, PAGAD was formed and initially led by middle-class 
people who owned businesses and houses. In both cases, these leaders were people who 
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commanded respect in their communities and were able to utilise that respect to 
mobilise popular support. 
In addition, other similar movements in both countries were observed also to have been 
organised by people who are well to do. The Bakassi Boys in Nigeria and Mapogo a 
Mathamaga in South Africa serve as two examples. The Bakassi Boys, which operated 
in the eastern part of Nigeria, was put together by leading businessmen who later 
secured the support of the Governors of Abia State and Anambra State. 07 In the case of 
Mapogo a Mathamaga, which began its operation in the Limpopo Province, the founder, 
Mr John Magolego was already a successful businessman and was able to mobilise 
popular support through his standing in the community. He was also able to transform 
this movement into a legitimate private security company after the state proscribed its 
vigilante activities 508 In all these instances, the amount of money required to mobilise 
and equip as well as to meet the logistic requirements of these movements is far beyond 
the reach of the poor. Popular collective actions usually require large amount of 
financial resources as well as people with huge social capital for mobilisation of popular 
support. 
In summary, given the context of democratic transition, the demilitarisation of the 
political process created the enabling space for the emergence of the popular 
movements around structural issues, a phenomenon which was accomplished in two 
ways. First, by taking away the authoritarian social control systems, the demilitarisation 
process shifted public attention from state violence to criminal violence as the new most 
important source of physical insecurity. Thus, demilitarisation helped to highlight the 
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security implication of crime. Crime became an important issue not because it never 
existed before, nor because its levels rose necessarily, but because it became the most 
important threat to physical security left and thus became a rallying point for public 
action. 
Second, the demilitarisation process also exposed the weakness of state capacity to 
provide physical security for its citizens. The weakening of authoritarian social control 
helped to bolster the new political freedoms under democratic conditions and 
emboldened the mobilisation of the popular movements. Although civic organisations 
did mobilise for collective political action at the peak of authoritarian rule, they were 
constantly repressed with the menacing presence of the security forces in the 
communities. The withdrawal of these forces was required to grant the full freedoms of 
democracy and to end any such official constraints on the expression of such democratic 
freedoms. The demilitarisation process involved the withdrawal of the armed forces 
from the communities, and the communities subsequently began to mobilise for popular 
action as an expression of democratic freedoms. 
Elite Capture of Popular Movements 
The ability of communities to mobilise themselves for popular action in relation to 
shared needs and legitimate pressing concerns is in itself a dividend of democracy, and 
a part of the fundamental freedoms that the struggle for democracy aspired to achieve. 
However, in the two cases considered in this study, the context of state weakness and 
the demilitarisation process both played important roles in creating opportunities for the 
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popular anti-crime movements to be radicalised and hijacked for different purposes 
through violent means by elites. In this section the phenomenon of elite capture of 
popular movements is examined in relation to the demilitarisation process and the 
emergence of civil militias in both Nigeria and South Africa. 
It has been argued earlier that the demilitarisation process exposed the institutional 
weakness of the state in both Nigeria and South Africa. This is because in propelling 
the shift from a tough and repressive state to a more tolerant and less violent state, the 
demilitarisation of politics also permitted the public shift of attention to crime as a 
crucial security problem. This in turn made crime a new rallying point for popular 
mobilisation of pressure on the state for effective response. However, the pressure 
helped to expose the existing weakness of the state to respond effectively to crime. Yet 
the demilitarisation process further exacerbated this condition of state weakness, which 
created the opportunity for the radicalisation and transformation of the popular 
movements into civil militias. 
Apart from failing to respond to the challenge from crime, the post-authoritarian state 
also displayed a lack of capacity to regulate the activities of the popular movements and 
to ensure their compliance with public order in a democracy. As the anti-crime 
movements became more locally popular in terms of their demand on the state, and as 
the state continues to display the inability to act against crime, the movements 
increasingly became radical and began to carry out popular justice on alleged criminals 
out of frustration with the state. 509 It is at this point in the development of the popular 
movements where they become openly violent that the increased weakness of the 
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institutional capacity of the state becomes very evident. While the demilitarisation 
process weakened the coercive power of the state, the bureaucratic power of ensuring 
peaceful compliance to the rule of the state was not put in place to accompany the 
process. The net result is an overall weakening of the state's institutional capacity to 
wield effective social control. 
In Nigeria, the radicalisation of OPC and the Bakassi Boys as well as their engagement 
in violent justice caught the state unprepared. The initial violent acts carried out by 
these groups in the pursuit of justice against crime took place publicly and, sometimes, 
with police deployment in the scene . 
510 Apart from the failure or inability of the 
security forces to prevent such acts of violence, the state failed to show any immediate 
policy response to the new challenge to public order. This trend is replicated in the case 
of South Africa. At the time that PAGAD began to apply violence to their activities, the 
new police service did not take any immediate steps to control them. PAGAD marched 
to the homes of alleged gangs and drug dealers, issued threats of summary punishment, 
culminating in the shooting and burning of gang leader, Rashaad Staggie in 1995, under 
full police deployment and glare 511 Although the state later reacted to this growing 
public disorder faster in South Africa than in Nigeria, its initial inaction or do-nothing 
policy was common to both countries. 
This policy stance of immediate inaction needs to be examined in relation to the 
complexity of reforms that had to be carried out within the security sector in line with 
the new political climate. This is because the immediate, short-term reaction of the state 
would be the restoration of public order, which is a serious security issue. In South 
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Africa, this complexity was daunting. The integration of the various security forces, 
including former ANC fighters, the old South Africa Police and the police services of 
the former homelands, into a single national police service proved to be very complex. 
Mutual animosity resulting from the injustices of the past and the need to be sensitive to 
those animosities added to the complexity of the integration process. 
Moreover the differences in command and control structures and in institutional culture, 
and the fact that many of the experienced former officers of the old apartheid police 
opted out of service as a protest against serving with former enemies, increased the 
number of challenges to be grappled with in the reform process. 12 The rising public 
demand for effective state response to crime thus coincided with the time in which a 
difficult and complex process of security reforms was underway. In Nigeria, as 
considered in Chapter 4, the process was much more shallow and slower, and thus the 
institutional and policy reforms required to meet the growing public expectation in 
relation to crime was inadequate. 
However, of these reforms, it is the demilitarisation process that informed the inaction 
of the state in relation to the radicalisation of the popular movements. The post- 
authoritarian emphasis on human rights and democratic stability were new standards, 
which drove the demilitarisation of the political process, particularly the way in which 
security forces respond to social disorder. The demilitarisation process de-emphasised 
the use of state violence to control political challenge, but at the same time the state 
lacked the capacity to replace the repressive social control with a peaceful and 
s13 democratic one This difference created an immediate social control vacuum and 
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consequently left the state handicapped in terms of the appropriate policy response in 
line with the change in the political environment. 
Thus at the time the popular movements were becoming radical the state did not act 
because it could not do so appropriately, and this exposed a weakening of the state in 
relation to social forces. Although the deployment of armed force to aid the police in 
managing internal crisis continued, they were situations where the state only intervened 
as a third-party between different social groups, and not as a protagonist in conflict. 
The popular anti-crime movements were expressions of the new democratic freedom 
and expectation, which were only increasingly going out of control by becoming violent 
in their methods. An armed response, therefore, would put the state in direct 
confrontation with the democratic movements, making the state a party to internal 
Crisis. 
State inaction in the face of radical popular movement accentuated the weakness of the 
new democratic state and thus created the political opportunity for elite capture of the 
popular movements. State inaction in the face of violent mob justice against crime was 
proof of a total loss of social control or the institutional capacity to ensure compliance 
with the rule of law through non-violent means. This condition undermined the 
authority of the state and transformed the democratic freedom to democratic licence, in 
which certain social activities embarked upon as democratic expression went 
unregulated and uncontrolled by the state. It was this licence that powerful local elites 
exploited by capturing the popular movements and using them to pursue ulterior 
interests other than crime fighting. 
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Conclusions 
Popular anti-crime movements are captured by local elites through infiltration and take- 
over of their leadership. In both cases of OPC and PAGAD, as discussed in Chapters 4 
and 5, the popular movements experienced leadership crisis at the point where they 
became radical. This crisis involved a struggle for control between the original 
founders who were more moderate and a group of new but more radical members. In 
both cases, the latter group emerged out of the crisis as the new leaders and took over 
control of the movements. The emergence of this group is accompanied with a 
transformation of the character and objectives of the movements. Whereas they were 
essentially concerned with curbing the menace of violent crimes at the beginning, they 
began to assume the character of militia formations after the leadership crisis and 
change. 
The struggle over control and the consequent change of leadership indicate the process 
by which the movements were hijacked by powerful local elites; and the gradual shift in 
character from being a radical anti-crime movement to a violent armed organisation 
engaging in acts of urban terrorism represent the phase in which the popular movements 
were being transformed into militia organisations. Thus, the civil militias considered in 
the two cases are products of opportunism, a process by which state weakness is 
exploited by powerful elites to brazenly capture popular movements and to use them as 
violent instruments for parochial goals. While this opportunism takes a political form in 
the case of OPC in Nigeria, that is the goals are political in nature; the case of PAGAD 
is more of an ideological opportunism. Opportunism, therefore, whether political or 
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ideological, provides a crucial insight into the transformation of popular movements 
into civil militias in the cases examined in this study. 
The foregoing shows that in the course of implementing demilitarisation of politics, 
state elites are unprepared for managing and even anticipating such popular uprisings. 
Indeed, in both cases, democratisation was supported by security reforms that sought to 
dismantle the political prerogatives of the armed forces, yet there appeared to be no 
clear thinking on how parallel efforts could address the requisite demilitarisation of the 
wider society (as well as politics), which in many respects undermined the gains of the 
reforms. 
However, opportunism does not occur in a political vacuum. It occurs in the context of 
state weakness, indicated by the collapse of social control as shown in Figure 4 below. 
In the two cases examined, this crisis of social control is generated and exacerbated by 
the process of demilitarisation of the political process in the course of democratic 
transition. The weakness or inability of the criminal justice system to respond 
effectively to the problem of crime had been a feature of the state since the era of 
authoritarian rule. However, it is the demilitarisation process that highlighted this 
weakness as a result of the exposure of crime as the new security menace. Under the 
conditions of democratic freedom, the new focus on this weakness provided the basis 
for the emergence of popular anti-crime movements. 
245 
Figure 4 
Explaining the Relationship between Civil Militarism and Demilitarisation of 
Politics 
Structural 
Democratisation eakness 
Demilitarisation o. Popular Opportunism , Demands 
Radical 
Groups 
Civil 
Conflict Militarism 
ý., Weakened . -ý 
Social Control '---- 
Source: Author 
These dynamics expose the inherent dangers of conventional strategies of 
demilitarisation in post-authoritarian environments, where the structures for public 
security are weak and where structural legacies of authoritarian rule have not been 
resolved. The gradual decline of civil militarism in South Africa as the institutional 
capacity of the police and the criminal justice system was being improved is instructive. 
Even though the structural problem of inequality has not been resolved, the 
improvement of the infrastructural power of the state since the end of apartheid has 
helped close the space for opportunistic mobilisation of uncivil groups. 
The two case studies show that where the institutional capacity of the state is weak and 
where there are many unresolved contradictions, such as high crime rates, political 
exclusion or economic deprivation, civil militias could develop quickly to create 
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conditions of public disorder and insecurity. The case studies have also demonstrated 
that two reasonably different approaches to democratisation, which relied solely on 
demilitarisation of politics, can be undermined in very similar ways due to failure to 
address the institutional structures which could accommodate the grassroots malaise 
leading to the violent uprisings of informal groups. The last chapter will provide a 
summary of the chapters of this dissertation and provide recommendations for further 
research and policy development. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The global political transformations of the post-Cold War era and, specifically, the 
triumph of political liberalism have produced a complexity of outcomes in different 
parts of the world. Defined as the `dismantling of authoritarian institutions by means of 
reforms entailing the progressive relaxation of state controls over political expression 
and organisation, and the granting of civil and political liberties ... ', political 
liberalisation at the global level created the crucial political impetus for democratic 
transition and profound security transformations worldwide. 514 In Africa, one crucial 
consequence of these changes has been the renewed quest for the twin goals of 
democracy and security. 
The struggle for democracy in Africa has already been well underway before the end of 
the Cold War. Masse-based domestic resistance to authoritarian rule as well as the 
opposition of excluded political elites were already piling strong pressures on military 
or military-backed dictators for more inclusive politics after the first decade of 
independence. The macro-economic dislocations, which hit the continent from the early 
1970s and persisted through the 1980s, as well as the consequential dire social 
difficulties brought upon people also served to energise these domestic democratic 
pressures. 515 Thus the post-colonial twin conditions of political exclusion and persistent 
underdevelopment generated an indigenous democratic movement. 
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Yet the strong international support enjoyed by African dictators throughout the Cold 
War years tilted the balance of power in their favour against domestic opposition groups 
and democracy movements, thus blocking the chances for early democratisation in the 
region. Furthermore, the near simultaneous dissolution of authoritarian regimes in 
Africa and in other regions from the early 1990s lends credence to the crucial role of 
global forces in the democratic transitions of the post-Cold War era. 
Disillusioned with development assistance to African dictatorships, and motivated by 
the view that democracy would improve the economic performance of African states 
and peace in the region, Western powers and multilateral financial institutions suddenly 
replaced their support for authoritarian regimes with a new international (essentially 
Western) pressure for political liberalisation and democracy from 1990 as the new 
global political orthodoxy. 516 This strategic shift became the decisive factor for the 
experience of the so-called third wave of the process of democratisation in Africa. Thus 
the liberal world order is witnessing an era in which the quest for and desirability of 
democracy in Africa has become a shared goal for both local and international actors. 
The same can be said with regards to the quest for security in the region since the dawn 
of the 1990s, even though the real experience of security has not proceeded at the same 
pace with this new quest. The end of the Cold war coincided with a deterioration of 
security in the continent, with the emergence of many new internal armed conflicts and 
the exacerbation of old ones as the superpower abdication of Cold War commitments to 
African dictators permitted the full manifestation of suppressed crisis into armed 
violence. In spite of this gloomy picture, however, there has been an unprecedented 
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collaboration between African and international actors in a renewed quest for peace in 
the region beginning with African initiatives in 1990 and, later, international support 
from the end of that decade. 
At the national level, African governments have become part of a global post-Cold War 
trend in which ethnic conflicts are contained through state strategies of accommodation. 
These strategies involve power sharing, devolution of state power and granting of 
minority rights, as against the failed policy of repression of ethnic claims on the state 517 
The redefinition of the mission of regional economic cooperation mechanisms (RECs) 
to deal with armed conflicts in the region, such as the ECOWAS response to the 
Liberian civil war in 1990, was another decisive factor. This new response was 
significant in demonstrating that the post-Cold War decline in the strategic importance 
of Africa would be met by regional solutions to regional security challenges. The 
dissolution of the moribund Organisation of African Unity (OAU) a decade later and its 
transformation into the African Union (AU), equipped with far more decisive security 
mandate and stronger instruments, further underscore the new momentum within Africa 
to make the region more secure. 
International involvement in the search for security in Africa, hesitant through much of 
the 1990s, slowly gathered momentum by the end of the decade as the linkages between 
security and development started to receive international policy recognition S18 The 
UN, EU and bilateral as well as multilateral donors have since then embarked on large 
and expensive operations to resolve some of the most intractable and violent armed 
conflicts in the region. On-going support for conflict prevention, peacekeeping and 
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peace-building initiatives in many conflict and post-conflict countries represent, even if 
the degree of such commitment still fall below actual expectations, growing 
international commitment to the quest for security in Africa. 
This new global commitment to security in Africa has been identified by recent studies 
as the most important factor for observed drastic reduction in the incidence and intensity 
of intra-state armed conflict since the dawn of the new millennium S19 Yet, although 
there are now less numbers of civil war in Africa, low-level violence and political 
disorder still characterise and bedevil on-going projects of democratisation in many of 
the post-authoritarian states. Of this new violence, the phenomenon of civil militarism 
has stood out as a most crucial paradox of democratisation and the search for security in 
Africa. 
Civil militarism and low-level conflict are not sensational enough to attract international 
response, and they are often ignored by state elites as negligible threats. However, they 
constitute a challenge to the authority of the state and make the security dividends of 
democracy elusive. The availability of alternative and unregulated violence employed 
in pursuit of a variety of goals constricts the very ends of democratisation - civil 
liberties and freedoms, national security, and public order. Endemic low-level violence 
limits the scope for the development of democratic governance in other ways. The use 
of violence to resolve social conflicts encourages the bypassing and informalisation of 
the rule of law and the application of democratic processes and institutions to seek 
solutions to social conflict. 
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This study focused on civil militarism as an endemic form of such new insecurity 
associated with demilitarisation. The study was based on the working hypothesis that 
the demilitarisation of politics in post-authoritarian African states generates the 
emergence of civil militarism. It is the exploration of this hypothesis that this study has 
been concerned with. The exploration has proceeded inductively through the last 6 
chapters of this dissertation, which are summarised below. 
In Chapter 1 of this study, this problem was examined in detail within the particular 
context of post-authoritarian transition. It was observed that the current democratic 
transition in Africa has coincided with the transition from state violence to civil 
militarism as a major threat to the physical security of citizens, though in some cases 
authoritarian legacies have remained but with reduced level of repression. It was also 
observed that the point where militia violence begins to emerge in post-authoritarian 
states is that crucial stage of the transition process where new state elites adopt 
strategies to demilitarise the political process as guarantee against democratic reversal. 
It was therefore proposed that the conventional approach to demilitarisation in post- 
authoritarian African states generates civil militarism. 
This proposition formed the central hypothesis of the empirical study. Two case studies 
of Nigeria and South Africa were selected to explore this relationship between 
demilitarisation and civil militarism, and the nature of such relationship. The cases were 
also used to explore the dynamics of such relationship, particularly in terms of 
differences in the impact of contextual conditions. Although both cases involved the 
strategies of political demilitarisation adopted in post-authoritarian contexts, they 
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represent unique cases in terms of the nature of the state, the history of authoritarian 
rule, the momentum of the democratic transition, and the extent and depth of the 
demilitarisation process. These indicators were used to measure the similarities and 
differences between the demilitarisation process in Nigeria and South Africa, and how 
these variations and similarities impact on civil militarism in both cases. 
Chapter 2 set out the methodological framework of the study and the justifications for 
the approach adopted. Chapter 3 dealt with the review of existing literature that touch 
upon the issues of demilitarisation and public insecurity, organised violence and its 
governance by the state, and the privatisation of violence. The review examined two 
main bodies of relevant literature: civil-military relations and internal armed conflict. 
The literature suggested some important linkages between demilitarisation and civil 
militarism to support the main hypothesis of the study. The privatisation of violence as 
an indicator of civil militarism is suggested as a manifestation of the structural 
conditions of exclusion and inequality in physical violence. This transition from 
structural to physical violence occurs where the state suffers from the fragmentation of 
authority. The literature also suggests that this fragmentation of state authority and 
institutions create a security vacuum which is being occupied by civil militias. In sub- 
Sahara Africa, this fragmentation is identified in the literature as a product of nco-liberal 
pressures, and the process of democratisation was identified as a central clement of 
these pressures. Finally, it was also suggested that civil militarism in African countries 
is a legacy of authoritarian rule, by which state violence was reproduced in the wider 
society, and which is now manifesting in the post-authoritarian political order. 
Although demilitarisation of politics is an essential component of democratic transition 
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in Africa, the way in which it is linked with civil militarism in conditions of fragile 
states, fraught with structural crisis and legacies of authoritarian rule required further 
clarification. This tentative linkage was then explored in the two case studies. 
The two cases selected for this study represented countries in which the main variables 
in the hypothesis of the study were present, as is obvious from the discussions in 
Chapters 4 and 5. Nigeria and South Africa both made transition to democratic 
governance at a time when many structural issues of exclusion and inequality had not 
been resolved. The democratic transition in both cases involved the implementation of 
demilitarisation as a deliberate strategy of consolidating the new democracy. Also in 
both cases the process of demilitarisation was characterised by the phenomenon of civil 
militarism. In the case of Nigeria it was discovered that the context of unresolved 
divisions within society and growing crime rates generated popular demands on the 
state. It was also found that the Nigerian state has since failed to meet these demands 
and has been unable to provide effective social control against disorder. This has 
created more opportunities for politicians and criminals to hijack popular movements, 
which are being turned into militias. As the conditions of weakness on the side of the 
state pervades, the militias have continued to grown in number and intensity. 
The case of South Africa shows similar trends. Demilitarisation occurred when the 
state was weak institutionally, while rising crime levels generated popular demands on 
the state. The inability of the state to meet the demands and to regulate the popular 
movements effectively also created the space for opportunistic capture of the 
movements. In this case, opportunists were mainly Islamic ideologues, although there 
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were some business and political elements. A most important finding from this case is 
that, as the institutional capacity of the state was strengthened from the end of the 1990s 
through effective policing, social control drastically improved and the civil militias 
gradually disappeared. 
Chapter 6 constituted the synthesis of findings from the cases of Nigeria and South 
Africa. The cross-case analysis aggregated the specific findings from the cases into 
broad but consistent categories. First it shows that demilitarisation of the state and 
politics alone in a post-authoritarian context can generate civil militarism, where the 
state is structurally weak and fails to resolve collective grievances within society. The 
chapter shows that in weak states, the approach to demilitarisation weakens repressive 
social control but does not replace it with effective democratic social control, and this 
creates the space for opportunistic development of militias. The findings from the case 
studies therefore confirm the main hypothesis of this study that the demilitarisation of 
the state and politics after political transition from authoritarianism can generate civil 
militarism. Although the cases differ in terms of the extent of democratisation and 
demilitarisation, the failure to address institutional structure to accommodate grassroots 
uncivil mobilisation can produce violent militias in the wider society. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The initial objectives of this study have been met in the course of the research. The 
study set out to explore the relationship between demilitarisation of politics and civil 
militarism in post authoritarian African states, as its main objective. It also sought to 
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explore for intervening and extraneous variables that play a role the linkage between the 
two phenomena. As the study has showed, the two case studies and the activities of 
OPC and PAGAD is one of many examples of where a more militant or vigilant 
element of a non-state group can generate public insecurity during a period 
characterised by efforts to promote a more democratic approach to security governance 
and civil-military relations. More specifically, as states embark on democratic security 
reforms including the de-politicisation of the military, more enabling space opens for 
non-state actors to exert a voice in a state's security affairs. Due to the inadequacy of 
conventional demilitarisation strategies - indicated by the failure of the state to deal 
with the culture and mindset of violence in society, the failure to improve the capacity 
of state structures responsible for public security, and the failure to enter into productive 
bargain with social movements with legitimate demands - the ability of the state to 
wield effective social control seriously weakened. This creates opportunities, which 
allow popular groups to be captured by the more radical and violent elements of the 
community. Under such conditions, public insecurity is aggravated and concentrated 
violence against state forces continues. Both the OPC and PAGAD case illuminate this 
phenomenon in their activities against criminals, innocent victims and the state, creating 
fear and insecurity in the communities. 
This phenomenon of civil militarism is certainly not limited to South Africa and 
Nigeria, but has been observed in a number of other African countries, including the 
majority of countries in West Africa. 520 In Nigeria various types of civil militias have 
emerged since the end of military rule in 1999 as dominant sources of widespread 
insecurity, including the Bakassi Boys, the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force, the 
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O'odua People's Congress and the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta, 
among others. 
Furthermore, the study also sought to inquire into ways for developing an alternative 
approach to demilitarisation, which is comprehensive enough to inform a coherent 
strategy that addresses the linkage between demilitarisation and civil militarism. 
Uniting the observations taken from the political demilitarisation process in Nigeria and 
South Africa shows that that future strategies and policy developments in this area must 
embrace ways of demilitarising the wider society and not just the state and the political 
system. Future approaches tackling demilitarisation must address this growing problem 
and extend their analyses and practical efforts beyond traditional state structures and 
reach out to a greater society, which has been acclimatised for years to a state of societal 
militarisation. Indeed, change management efforts underpinning demilitarisation 
strategies must embrace the agendas of non-state groups which have the capacity to 
exert influence under the reformed and democratised structures, and which also have the 
potential to provide shields for groups keen to use these channels for the pursuit of more 
violent ends. It is also high time that the debate on civil-military relations addresses this 
phenomenon. 
The way demilitarisation is being managed currently is grossly insufficient and countcr- 
productive in terms of strengthening democracy, promoting human security, good 
governance, and conflict prevention. Demilitarisation therefore needs to be improved 
upon to involve a comprehensive approach that deals with militarism in both the state 
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and society. The lack of any existing practical guidance and adequate literacy on 
demilitarisation makes the quest for such a comprehensive approach very difficult. 
Given the serious negative implications of existing approaches for democratisation, 
peacebuilding and conflict prevention, there is an urgent need to promote robust 
knowledge on demilitarisation. This requires serious debates on how to approach 
demilitarisation and further academic research to deepen understanding of how such a 
comprehensive strategy needs to be approached. Equally important is the need for 
practical guidance for state policymakers in new democracies. The importance of tools 
and guidelines cannot be over-emphasised as this study has showed that their absence 
leave state elites with no sense of direction and so forces them to introduce changes that 
are dangerous for human security. In line with this recommendation, the linkages 
between demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism needs to be absorbed by SSR 
policy, defence reform tools, defence reviews, PRSPs, and other similar international 
policy instruments. 
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Appendix 1 
Guiding Interview Questions Used During Fieldwork 
1. Under what circumstances did the civil militias emerge? 
2. What were their main motivations? 
3. How did the militias metamorphose over time? 
4. How did your militia organisation impact upon safety and security in the 
community? 
5. What are your personal observations and interpretations of civil militia violence 
in relation to public security as has been provided by the state? 
6. How do you see the phenomenon of militia violence in relation to the 
democratisation process and reforms with the security sector? 
7. What was the response of the state to the emergence and growth of civil 
militias? 
8. To what extent are those policy responses effective and why? 
9. What policies were responsible for reduction in militia violence and how did 
those policies work? 
10. In what ways can state responses to militia violence be improved upon or 
implemented differently? 
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